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1. IL-0211 A Mandrill PostgreSQL shard shut down at transaction ID wraparound and email sending was impaired for about 40 hours

   Mailchimp2019

   Symptoms

   From 05:35 UTC on 4 February 2019 Mandrill, Mailchimp's transactional email service, sent only 80% of queued emails, because one of its PostgreSQL shards, shard4, stopped accepting writes. When Mandrill engineers opened an investigation at 11:58 UTC, they saw a sharply elevated load on shard4.

   Writes rejectedThroughput degradationLoad imbalanceNode disk full

   Trigger

   At 05:35 UTC on 4 February the transaction ID counter of shard4, the busiest Mandrill PostgreSQL shard, reached its upper limit and PostgreSQL shut the database down to protect against wraparound.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   DatabasePostgreSQL vacuum

   Contributing factor

   Ignored early signalNo alert on limitSignal buried in noiseRetry stormMonitoring blind spot

   Detection

   The first exception was logged overnight but was buried by unrelated exceptions in the centralized error reporting. Mandrill engineers opened an investigation at 11:58 UTC and, while looking for the source of the rising load on shard4, found the wraparound at 12:56 UTC.

   Remediation

   • Put shard4 into standalone mode and started VACUUM at 14:16 UTC on 4 February
   • Stopped and restarted the vacuum with settings that made it run faster
   • Started a dump and restore of the database without the Search and Url tables while the vacuum ran
   • Replaced storage volumes on the Mandrill app servers whose disks were filling with queued jobs and logs
   • Moved the job-queue tables from shard4 to other live shards
   • Truncated the Search and Url tables on the locked database at 19:12 UTC on 5 February, after which the vacuum finished in about an hour
   • Started sending from the backlog at 21:36 UTC
   • Added alerting for XID wraparound by 22:40 UTC

   Lessons

   Mailchimp named the factors that slowed its response: knowledge of and access to Mandrill systems and monitoring rested with a few people, Mandrill logging needed a locally writable disk, logs of malformed API requests were hard to separate from real application errors, job health was hard to see, and the disk space problem made partial deployments for triage risky. What helped was trained incident commanders with clear roles (incident commanders in 3-hour rotations, scribes, technical liaisons and points of contact between teams), periodic summaries with a list of recent and open decisions, and taking time in a video meeting to reassess, which led to the truncation. Running in the cloud let the team expand storage quickly, and the team was lucky that the largest table holding up the vacuum held data it could delete.

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2. IL-0215 Twilio's billing Redis master lost all balances and went read-only, and auto-recharge charged customer cards repeatedly

   Twilio2013

   Symptoms

   At 2:39 AM PDT (9:39 UTC) on 18 July 2013, services that relied on the redis-master of Twilio's billing system began to fail because the load on its host had become extreme. At 2:42 AM PDT monitoring alerted the on-call engineers to a failure in the Redis cluster.

   Database overloadData lossWrites rejected

   Trigger

   At 1:35 AM PDT on 18 July a loss of network connectivity disconnected all billing redis-slaves from the redis-master at once, and all of them requested a full synchronization at the same time. On-call engineers then restarted the overloaded redis-master.

   Root cause

   Configuration change

   Component

   In-memory cacheDatabase replication

   Contributing factor

   Retry stormHarmful manual actionUnsafe failure behaviour

   Detection

   At 2:42 AM PDT monitoring alerted the on-call engineers to a failure in the Redis cluster. At 3:28 AM PDT the billing system monitoring reported the anomalous charges, and at 12:36 PM PDT monitoring detected the recurrence.

   Remediation

   • Restarted the redis-master to relieve the high load, which loaded a wrong configuration
   • Took the billing system offline to stop further credit card charges
   • Restored service to all suspended accounts
   • Restored the lost account balances from the independent double-bookkeeping record in the relational datastore
   • Took billing offline again after the recurrence and reactivated the newly suspended accounts
   • Refunded all erroneous credit card charges
   • Gave all affected accounts a credit of 10% of their last 30 days of spend
   • Replaced the original Redis cluster and corrected the redis-master configuration
   • Activated the billing system progressively for groups of customer accounts

   Action items

   • Disable Redis restarts on the redis-master and recover the master by pivoting a slave instead
   • Add fail-safes so the billing system neither suspends accounts nor charges cards when balances are missing or cannot be written
   • Validate the billing system against the double-bookkeeping databases in real time

   Lessons

   Losing the in-flight balances and the ability to write balances at the same time exposed a flaw in the auto-recharge system: it failed in a dangerous way, charging cards and suspending accounts instead of stopping.

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