Incident Library
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Cases3 cases

1 to 3 of 3

  1. Symptoms

    Right after the primary datacenter was switched from EQIAD to CODFW at 14:00 UTC on 20 September 2023, on-wiki search on all Wikimedia wikis became delayed or unavailable for a subset of users. At 14:08 the alert "CirrusSearch codfw 95th percentile latency - more_like" fired and reached IRC and the Search Platform email list as "PROBLEM alert - graphite1005/CirrusSearch codfw 95th percentile latency - more_like is CRITICAL".

    Trigger

    At 14:00 UTC the primary datacenter was switched from EQIAD to CODFW. more_like queries that were expected to go to eqiad, the non-primary datacenter, went to codfw instead, apparently because RESTBase sent them as POST rather than GET.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Automated monitoring caught the problem, but not quickly enough to prevent user-facing impact: the Grafana alert "CirrusSearch codfw 95th percentile latency - more_like" went to IRC and the Search Platform email list at 14:08. No one was paged; SREs were already watching closely because of the datacenter switchover. At 14:14 Hashar pinged #wikimedia-search and engineers began troubleshooting.

    Remediation
    • Banned the overloaded node elastic2044 from the Elasticsearch cluster
    Action items
    • Work out which Elasticsearch steps are needed before a datacenter switchover
    • Update the Elasticsearch section of the datacenter switchover documentation
    • Review the suggested switchover improvements in T285347 and decide whether to implement them
    • Make the RESTBase /related/{article} endpoint send GET instead of POST so the CirrusSearch query cache stays warm in both datacenters
    • Review the shard balance of busy wikis, especially enwiki_content
    Lessons

    Monitoring caught the problem, but not quickly enough to prevent user-facing impact. The heightened attention during the switchover meant the impact was recognised immediately, and banning a single node was quick and easy. The mitigation was not guided by an existing runbook, and the shards on the overloaded host were not checked before it was banned.

  2. Symptoms

    Hours after a routine switch between two clusters of Retriever, Honeycomb's storage and query engine, late on 24 July 2023, the internal SLO for Shepherd, the ingest service, began to burn slowly. The performance was only marginally slow and inconsistent, with no good explanation, so engineers treated it as minor and left it for the morning.

    Trigger

    Late on 24 July Honeycomb switched between two Retriever clusters to avoid a subtle bug, and the new cluster stopped writing the last-written timestamps the schema cache depends on. On the morning of 25 July a feature flag flip meant to move those writes back stopped the remaining writes entirely.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Hours after the cluster switch, the internal SLO for the ingest service Shepherd started burning slowly. Engineers left it for the morning, when a chart showed that Retriever's database calls updating the last-written records had stopped.

    Remediation
    • Flipped only the writes back to the other Retriever cluster with a feature flag, which did not fix the problem
    • Set up circuit breakers that denied all Shepherd traffic with a 5xx error to protect the database
    • Failed the hard-locked database over to a replica
    • Restarted all Retriever hosts so they could provide data for the cache
    • Set the last-written timestamp of every schema with traffic in the last day to now, so the schema store reloaded the cache
    • Removed the circuit breaker and restarted the query hosts that failed internal checks
    Action items
    • Finish the Retriever cluster migration and remove all code that could disable writes behind the cache
    • Explore ways to strengthen the cache further
    • Lower the contention put on the database during update storms from new schemas
    • Stabilise the performance costs of some operations in the system
    • Study instrumentation and experimentation that detect and handle such edge cases better
    Lessons

    Locally good decisions combined into the outage: the query engine wrote the timestamps because it already saw all the data, the shared cache helped scale ingest and untangle the main database, the cluster switch was done to avoid a bug, frequent deploys hid the feature flag bug, pausing deploys during the investigation kept hosts from restarting, and past near-misses made the team expect a slow failover. Feature flags, frequent deploys, pausing deploys during incidents and learning from near-misses all contributed, although they are among the practices Honeycomb trusts most. For a rare lockup of this kind a database failover is the fastest recovery. Several recent Honeycomb incidents started from trying to avoid a subtle bug.

  3. Symptoms

    On Monday, September 10th, 2012, during a schema migration, the health checks on GitHub's MySQL master failed and Percona Replication Manager moved the 'active' role to another node of the new three-node cluster. That node's InnoDB buffer pool was cold and it performed poorly, its health checks failed in turn, and the role failed back to the original server. GitHub.com went down.

    Trigger

    A schema migration on Monday, September 10th put more load on the master database than earlier migrations had, and Percona Replication Manager's health checks on the master failed.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    On the morning of September 11th, a developer told the operations team that the 'standby' node was returning incorrect query results.

    Remediation
    • Enabled Pacemaker's maintenance-mode so no health checks or automatic failovers ran, and let the buffer pool warm
    • Powered off the out-of-date node 'c' to end the partition
    • Stopped Pacemaker and Heartbeat on nodes 'a' and 'b' and started them on node 'a' only
    • Started MySQL on node 'a' in the active role
    • Removed the events leaked to wrong dashboards and audited the wrongly routed repositories
    • Contacted the owners of the exposed private repositories
    Action items
    • Change the Pacemaker configuration so the active database role fails over only when an operations engineer starts it
    • Find a way to warm the InnoDB buffer pool of slave databases so failovers do not hurt performance
    • Audit the Pacemaker and Heartbeat stack, focusing on the code path behind the segfault
    • Run hardware tests on the server where the segfault happened
    Lessons

    GitHub concluded that automated failover is not the right strategy for its primary production database: for every failover in this incident, any member of the operations team would have said it should not happen. Failovers that must happen, in an emergency or during maintenance, should not hurt performance.

Check your cluster for this

These 3 cases involve In-memory cache and Database. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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