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Cases2 cases

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  1. Symptoms

    At 13:00 UTC on Monday, June 27, 2022, Basecamp 3 became extremely slow, then showed error pages, and then stopped working altogether. Basecamp 2 and Basecamp Classic kept working normally.

    Trigger

    At 13:00 UTC, when Basecamp 3 sends scheduled notifications in massive batches, a rush of demanding queries reached the primary database and started a cascade of heavy lock contention.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The team saw the Basecamp 3 primary database become completely congested within 30 seconds of 13:00 UTC and responded immediately.

    Remediation
    • Paused and disabled parts of Basecamp 3, such as delaying progress report emails
    • Failed over from the primary database to a replica, which brought Basecamp 3 back until it tipped over again
    • Put Basecamp 3 into maintenance mode
    • Set hard limits on database query time
    • Brought features back online step by step with the query limits in place
    Action items
    • Keep hard limits on database query time so slow queries fail instead of piling up
    • Tune the limits on concurrency
    • Treat top-of-the-hour database load spikes from scheduled batches as unacceptable
    • Reduce the number of parallel workers for some scheduled jobs
    • Let some scheduled activities run over several minutes instead of all at once
    • Move bursty queries from the primary database to read-only replicas
    • Fix the quiet performance regressions found in a review of the past year of database metrics
    • Find and spread out other bursty activities that concentrate load on the database
    • Tune the database for more predictable behaviour under heavy load and high concurrency
    • Add observability into the database's internal locking and transaction states
    • Build tools to switch off high-load Basecamp 3 features selectively during an incident
    • Run operational fire drills for a wedged database
    • Evaluate upgrading the database software and hardware
    • Set service level objectives for the components behind Basecamp 3
    • Hold quarterly performance and load reviews to catch slow, subtle changes
    Lessons

    A system running just past its limits can flip from stable to unstable without any particular trigger, and steady growth plus small regressions that raised no alarm had brought Basecamp 3's primary database to that point. Under lock contention, terminating queries does not relieve the database, because rolling back their transactions waits on the same locks. The team struggled to respond with confidence because there was no single clear cause and little visibility into the database's internals.

  2. Symptoms

    On Tuesday 1 September 2020 Basecamp could not be loaded at all for 17 minutes, from 9:51am to 10:08am Central Time (14:51–15:08 UTC), and nothing seemed to work. On Wednesday 2 September it happened again for 15 minutes, from 10:50am to 11:05am Central Time (15:50–16:05 UTC).

    Trigger

    On 1 September the network links between the data centers went offline, and during the recovery a hardware load balancer crashed. On 2 September the primary load balancer in Virginia crashed again, and later its secondary crashed too.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • On 1 September, intervened by hand to get the network routers working with the standby load balancer
    • On 2 September, fixed the same router and load balancer desynchronization by hand
    Action items
    • Find the cause of the load balancer crash with the vendor and apply its bugfix
    • Replace the hardware load balancers
    • Reroute the redundant cross-datacenter network paths for proper circuit diversity
    • Evaluate moving from hardware to software load balancers, which can be deployed in minutes
    • Evaluate decentralizing the load balancer architecture to limit the impact of one failure
    • Assess the systems for resilience, fragility and risk, and review the assessment process itself
    Lessons

    Basecamp plans for failures like these and practises responses to catastrophic failures in its live systems, but three obscure issues in five days chained into overlapping failures. What caught the team by surprise were cascading failures that exposed unexpected fragility and hard paths to recovery, which Basecamp says it can prepare for.

Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Backbone network (WAN) and Database. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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