Incident Library
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  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
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Cases2 cases

1 to 2 of 2

  1. Symptoms

    From 06:00 UTC on 10 June 2025, Heroku services degraded badly: customers reported intermittent logins, applications failed, and Heroku's monitoring detected widespread errors with dyno networking. Heroku's own tools and the Heroku Status Page were affected as well, which delayed communication with customers and left many of them without accurate status updates. Only at 13:58 UTC did the team find a workaround to post updates to the @herokustatus account on X.

    Trigger

    An automated operating system update ran on Heroku's production infrastructure when it should have been disabled, and it restarted the hosts' networking services.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Customers reported intermittent logins, and Heroku's monitoring detected widespread errors with dyno networking. Heroku's own tools and the Heroku Status Page were affected as well.

    Remediation
    • Restarted internal instances in rotation, which gave some relief
    • Had an upstream vendor invalidate the token used for the automated updates
    • Disabled the automated upgrade service
    • Recycled dynos across the whole fleet
    Action items
    • Put permanent controls in place so no system change happens outside the controlled deployment process
    • Audit all base images for similar risks
    • Make network routing survive graceful restarts of the networking service
    • Build fully independent backup communication channels
    • Overhaul incident response tooling, including tools that run queries across the whole fleet
    • Streamline break-glass procedures for rapid access to critical systems
    • Improve monitoring to detect complex issues earlier
    Lessons

    Heroku's post-mortem names three areas: production lacked immutability controls, so an automated process could change it; communication was too slow, made worse by a status page that went down with the platform; and gaps in tooling and process made recovery take longer than it should have.

  2. Symptoms

    From 22:31 UTC on 27 July 2024, 33 Heroku Postgres clusters in the EU (Dublin) region could not serve requests and ran into memory problems, and some Essential-tier customers could not connect to their databases. Customers trying to reach an affected database received out of memory errors.

    Trigger

    A third-party vendor deployed a change to a monitoring agent that runs on Heroku's Postgres database clusters.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Heroku Support paged the technology team at 07:50 UTC on 28 July based on customer support tickets. The second occurrence also reached the technology team as an escalation from Heroku Support.

    Remediation
    • Allocated more resources and restarted the Postgres clusters, which fixed the first outage temporarily
    • Provisioned the previous version of the third-party monitoring software, which did not leak memory
    • The vendor applied an interim mitigation
    Action items
    • Add enhanced metrics collection for the third-party monitoring software
    • Evaluate the vendor's fixed release of the monitoring software and roll it out if acceptable
Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Database and Host routes and routing rules. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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