Incident Library
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  1. Symptoms

    On 7 July 2023 from 11:05 to 15:25 UTC many public Jenkins infrastructure services were completely down, including get.jenkins.io, plugins.jenkins.io, accounts.jenkins.io, javadoc.jenkins.io and incrementals.jenkins.io, while ci.jenkins.io, issues.jenkins.io, repo.jenkins-ci.org and www.jenkins.io were partly or completely disrupted.

    Trigger

    After the upgrade to Kubernetes 1.25 changed the range of the pods' originating IP and LDAP access was blocked, a fix (Azure PR 431) deployed at 10:55 UTC to set a proper set of pod IP ranges removed all node pools of the cluster.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    After the upgrade, at 10:30 UTC, the team noticed that services inside the cluster, such as accounts.jenkins.io, could not reach the LDAP service.

    Remediation
    • Created the cluster again from scratch with a fixed network setup
    • Set a custom pod CIDR in a range separate from the virtual network
    • Moved the services and their DNS records to new public IPs
    • Pushed a pull request that recorded the manual rebuild, including the IP setup, in code
    Action items
    • Protect the public IPs from deletion with a Management Lock
    • Keep the public IPs in a separate resource group and point the Kubernetes-managed load balancers to it with the service.beta.kubernetes.io/azure-load-balancer-resource-group annotation
    • Improve network diagrams and documentation so possible overlaps are visible when preparing operations
    • Avoid changing the configuration of all AKS node pools at once
    Lessons

    The team said that changing one node pool at a time would have shown the problem after the first pool and avoided a full outage, and that the public IPs should change as little as possible because users behind corporate firewalls with allow-lists depend on them. The team also noted that it could rebuild, in under 4 hours, the cluster that hosts almost all public services.

Check your cluster for this

This case involves Cloud load balancer and CNI plugin. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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