Incident Library
Applied filters SymptomHigh latencyOrganisationPagerDutyClear allEvery case under the filters, with no sentence; newest first.
Suggested filters Search, and the values found in your words appear here.

Graph

  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases2 cases

1 to 2 of 2

  1. Symptoms

    On 3 June 2014, PagerDuty's notification pipeline performed poorly and some notifications were delayed after the Cassandra cluster behind it became heavily degraded. About 3% of events sent to the integration API could not be received.

    Trigger

    On 3 June 2014 the Cassandra background repair process started its normal run on one node of the cluster while other high load was on the cluster; on 4 June the team restarted the postponed repair by hand.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • Reduced the load on the Cassandra cluster
    • Stopped the Cassandra repair process
    • Cut communication between some Cassandra nodes to stabilise the cluster
    • On 4 June, deleted all in-flight data in the notification pipeline in a "factory reset"
    • Brought downstream systems back into a consistent state with the emptied pipeline by hand
    Action items
    • Scale the existing Cassandra nodes vertically to bigger, faster servers
    • Set up multiple Cassandra clusters and spread the workloads across them
    • Set system load thresholds at which the Cassandra clusters are scaled out horizontally ahead of need
    • Upgrade the current and new clusters to a more recent Cassandra version
    • Add more load shedding techniques to control Cassandra under high load
    • Bring more Cassandra expertise in-house
    Lessons

    PagerDuty concluded that its Cassandra cluster was underscaled and shared by too many services with different load and usage patterns, and that the scaling work should have come before the planned Cassandra version upgrade.

  2. Symptoms

    On Saturday 13 April 2013 at 8:11am Pacific Time, PagerDuty's on-call engineer was paged about one node of the notification dispatch system, and an attempt at 8:13 to bring the node back failed. Customers saw delayed notifications and 500 errors on PagerDuty's API endpoints.

    Trigger

    At 7:57am Pacific Time, according to AWS, a peering point in Northern California began to degrade, causing connectivity problems for the two AWS regions that PagerDuty used as two of its three datacenters.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The PagerDuty on-call engineer was paged at 8:11am about an issue with one node of the notification dispatch system, and at 8:18 monitoring detected multiple-provider failures for notifications.

    Remediation
    • Restarted most of the failed coordinator processes by hand
    • The notification dispatch system reached quorum again and processed all queued notifications
    Action items
    • Add more logging and aggregate logs into a single searchable source
    • Add a process watcher that restarts failed coordinator processes automatically
    • Build a dashboard that shows inter-host connectivity
    • Train engineering staff on Cassandra and ZooKeeper
    • Investigate moving off one of the AWS regions to a new hosting provider and datacenter that avoids a single point of failure
    Lessons

    Datacenters chosen to be independent and physically separate can still share a network peering point, and a design built to survive the loss of one datacenter did not survive losing two at once.

Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Coordination and key-value store and Database. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause2