Incident Library
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  1. Symptoms

    On 10 July 2019 the Stripe API failed a substantial majority of requests twice, from 16:35 to 17:02 UTC and from 21:14 to 22:47 UTC. In the first period automated monitoring detected within a minute that a database cluster had failed to elect a new primary.

    Trigger

    The primary node of a database cluster failed at 16:35 UTC while one shard had several stalled nodes. The second period was set off by rolling the election protocol back to the previous minor version at 20:42 UTC.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Automated monitoring detected the failed election within a minute, and the team was alerted at 16:36 UTC. The second period was announced at 21:14 UTC by automated alerts that some shards in the cluster were unavailable.

    Remediation
    • Restarted all nodes of the database cluster, which forced a successful primary election
    • Updated the production configuration and restarted the database cluster's nodes
    • Ramped traffic back up, putting services for user-initiated API requests first
    Action items
    • Alert when nodes stop reporting their replication lag
    • Alert when a shard enters a state that could trigger the election fault
    • Work with the database maintainers on a fix for the underlying fault
    • Add circuit breaking on failed operations to particular database clusters
    • Use fault isolation to contain the impact of a single failed shard
    • Limit the resources used by clients that keep retrying failed requests
    • Add procedures and tooling that make rapid configuration changes during incident response safer
Check your cluster for this

This case involves Database and Database failover manager. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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