Incident Library
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Cases3 cases

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  1. Symptoms

    On 31 March 2026 Buttondown was down twice, for about seven and about thirteen minutes. New requests could not get a database connection and failed, although the database itself was healthy: queries were fast, CPU and memory were fine and replication lag was nominal.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    User reports and the team's own manual observation, not automated monitoring. The health check endpoint kept returning 200 for most requests, so no alert fired.

    Remediation
    • Killed active queries to free database connections in the first outage
    • Restarted the database to force-kill the running queries in the second outage
    Action items
    • Reserve a small number of database connections for administrative access
    • Monitor and alert on the database connection count as a percentage of the configured maximum
    • Make the health check endpoint run a lightweight query so connection exhaustion shows in the health checker and the load balancer
    • Add database connection limits to the quarterly capacity review
    • Document and script a fallback that force-recycles workers to release connections without needing a database connection
    Lessons

    Buttondown notes that the tool used to recover from the first outage needed the same resource that was exhausted, which locked the team out during the second outage, and that a health check which cannot detect connection exhaustion, the most common failure mode, gives little protection. A configuration value set long ago drifted out of line with traffic because nobody reviewed it.

  2. Symptoms

    From 21:04 UTC on 7 August 2025, database transaction locks on the Storj US1 satellite started to increase, and upload and download requests began to fail. The on-call team was paged at 21:14 UTC.

    Trigger

    An unusually high volume of concurrent uploads to the same objects reached the US1 satellite.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    –
    Detection

    The on-call team was paged at 21:14 UTC, ten minutes after database transaction locks began to rise.

    Remediation
    • Reset the state of connections periodically to keep contention errors from growing in a cascade
    Action items
    • Remove the sources of contention between database transactions with code changes
    • Add monitoring and alerts for increased levels of database locks
    • Look for further process and system improvements, including tools that reduce or remove the need for manual maintenance
  3. Symptoms

    From 07:22 UTC on 22 February 2024, the bitbucket.org website and the Bitbucket Cloud APIs became slow, and Bitbucket Pipelines runs were badly delayed. Git requests over HTTPS and SSH kept working.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • Added resources to Bitbucket Pipelines to clear the backlog of jobs, which was fully cleared by 17:30 UTC
    Action items
    • Reconfigure the vacuuming threshold for database tables with high write activity
    • Adjust alert thresholds to catch this behaviour earlier
    • Tune autoscaling and load shedding for the Pipelines services and increase build runner capacity
Check your cluster for this

These 3 cases involve Database and PostgreSQL vacuum. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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