Incident Library
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Cases13 cases

1 to 5 of 13

  1. Symptoms

    On 19 August 2026 the first equipment-level signs in Nebius's us-central1 region appeared around 09:40 UTC: the InfiniBand fabric degraded and GPU over-temperature alerts began to accumulate. Customer reports followed shortly after 10:00. At 10:15 on-call engineers were paged on critical component temperature alerts, and the incident was declared at 10:21.

    Trigger

    A storm-related event at the data center building took the building management system offline and shut down the chilled-water cooling loop.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    No facility-level alert fired, because the storm also disabled the building management system that monitors the facility. Engineers acted on component over-temperature alerts that paged on-call at 10:15 UTC, after InfiniBand degradation, GPU over-temperature alerts and customer reports; the temperature rise from about 09:15 was visible on dashboards but had no alert.

    Remediation
    • had the facility operator switch cooling to manual bypass mode and opened rack rear doors to vent heat
    • re-energised tripped racks, control-plane racks first
    • restored the regional infrastructure control plane by manual intervention
    • restarted block-storage host components to clear stale disk attachment state
    • raised the VM recovery rate limits by hand for the region-scale recovery
    • started the affected Managed Kubernetes control-plane instances by hand
    • applied a controlled stop and start to control-plane instances whose data disk had been left unattached
    • identified and started 104 customer VMs that the incident had stopped
    Action items
    • Complete a joint resilience review with the facility operator covering redundancy of facility-management and monitoring systems, cooling that keeps running when those fail, electrical protection of cooling equipment and on-site response
    • Add facility-level environmental alerting on cooling plant state and room temperature trend that pages on-call independently of the building management system
    • Set up a documented emergency escalation path with the facility operator, with an on-call contact tree and guaranteed response times
    • Define an emergency heat-load reduction procedure with criteria, ownership and mechanics for shutting down or degrading workloads during a cooling loss
    • Establish a dependency-ordered region cold-start procedure with clear ownership for each service layer
    • Run regular region-scale recovery drills that cover VMs, storage attachments and Managed Kubernetes clusters
    • Fix the disk-attachment bug that extended the Managed Kubernetes outage and deploy the fix to all production regions
    • Improve the recovery policies Compute users can configure, and move all Managed Kubernetes control-plane nodes to the improved policy
    • Automate reconciliation of stale storage attachment state after abrupt host failures
    • Remove in-region dependencies from monitoring startup and recovery, and extend cross-region monitoring
    • Make regional health checks used for global traffic management reflect real service availability
    Lessons

    Facility monitoring that runs on the same system it watches goes silent in exactly the failure it should report, and with no alert on the room temperature trend there was no practical window to shed heat load in a controlled way. A cold start of a whole region exercised recovery paths built for isolated failures: single-attempt VM recovery, conservative rate limits and stale disk attachments all needed manual work. The longest part of the outage was restoring customer resources, Managed Kubernetes control planes above all, so Nebius is extending its recovery drills to that layer.

  2. Symptoms

    Seven hours into a distributed training run on Databricks AI, the job failed with an NCCL timeout.

    Trigger

    A single InfiniBand port used for RDMA NCCL collectives went down once and recovered.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The training job crashed with the NCCL timeout. The continuous health checks, which watched InfiniBand port flapping by count, had not flagged the single flap.

    Remediation
    • Tuned the NCCL_IB_TIMEOUT defaults to be more resilient to short port-down windows
    • Used the port-down signal to crash the job and restart it from a checkpoint instead of waiting for the watchdog
    • Fed the investigation into gpu-monitor, whose RDMA fabric port-down check is thresholded on cumulative downtime rather than flap count
    Action items
    • Tune the NCCL_IB_TIMEOUT defaults to be more resilient
    • Crash and restart the job from a checkpoint on the port-down signal instead of leaving GPUs idle until the watchdog fires
    • Threshold RDMA fabric port-down detection on cumulative downtime, not flap count, in gpu-monitor
    Lessons

    For training impact the signal that matters is cumulative port downtime, not the number of flaps: one long enough flap can crash a multi-day run. NCCL_IB_TIMEOUT, with an effective default of about seven seconds, decides the outcome long before the PyTorch watchdog timeout does. Health checks need to cover the whole node lifecycle: active checks before workloads start, passive checks for silent degradation under load, and periodic multi-node NCCL fabric checks in between.

  3. Symptoms

    At 21:06 UTC on 14 February 2026 every GPU node in Lambda's AUS01 data center rebooted at the same moment, without warning or plan, affecting multiple customers. The nodes came back online quickly, but the storage they used had disconnected, and customer workloads failed.

    Trigger

    A power event at the AUS01 data center caused a loss of power.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    –
    Remediation
    • restored the compute fabric and InfiniBand connectivity, bringing all spine switches and most leaf switches back online
    • restored part of the UPS redundancy
    • powered up all nodes in AUS01, completed physical checks and started the storage back up
    • restored Starbase and the other storage-dependent services in us-west-3
    • told affected customers to reboot their VMs, or the hypervisor if needed, to clear stale or empty NFS mounts
    Lessons

    A power loss that reboots the network spine and the shared storage together with the GPU nodes takes longer to recover than the nodes themselves. The GPU nodes were back quickly, but the fabric was restored first, storage was started only after physical checks, and some VMs were left with stale NFS mounts that customers were told to fix with a VM reboot or, if that was not enough, a hypervisor reboot.

  4. Symptoms

    While the Spring Cloud Config Server was briefly down for an upgrade, every client application began to answer its liveness probe with a failure saying it could not reach the config server.

    Trigger

    A downtime upgrade of the Spring Cloud Config Server made it stop responding for a short time.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Lessons

    A liveness probe that includes an external dependency turns a short outage of that dependency into a restart loop of every client. Keep external dependencies out of liveness checks and handle temporary problems with readiness probes. Libraries can add health indicators to Spring Boot's actuator health endpoint automatically, so check what the probe path actually reports. The author ran another Kubernetes environment for two years without liveness probes, relying on strict readiness probes and on the application terminating itself on unrecoverable faults.

  5. Symptoms

    On 1 April 2025 users of Linode Kubernetes Engine (LKE) began having trouble connecting to their clusters' control planes, and the LKE Dashboard was affected as well. Services inside the clusters kept working. The first status update was posted at 20:28 UTC; at 21:33 UTC Linode said it was investigating an issue with DNS functionality within LKE.

    Trigger

    An earlier update to a database that the LKE DNS system depends on caused the DNS service to hang.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    –
    Detection

    The first status update, at 20:28 UTC on 1 April, said Linode was investigating and that users might have difficulty connecting to their cluster control plane. At 21:33 UTC Linode said the issue affected DNS functionality within LKE, and at 22:29 UTC that it had identified the underlying cause.

    Remediation
    • restarted the affected LKE DNS services
    Action items
    • Improve how the DNS services recover from transient connectivity failures to their dependencies
    • Improve monitoring to detect similar problems sooner
    • Update the deployment process to better coordinate changes between dependent systems
    Lessons

    A change to a database that the DNS service depends on can make the DNS service hang, which here cut off external access to the clusters and the LKE Dashboard while services inside the clusters kept working. The DNS service should recover by itself from transient failures of its dependencies, and changes to dependent systems need to be coordinated.

Check your cluster for this

These 13 cases involve InfiniBand fabric and Data center power and cooling. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause1

Dependency failure13 cases

  1. IL-0133 A storm shut down cooling at Nebius's us-central1 data center, and a disk hot-plug bug kept Managed Kubernetes control planes down for hours after power returned
    Nebius2026
  2. IL-0023 A training run crashed with an NCCL timeout after one InfiniBand port went down once and recovered
  3. IL-0134 A power event at Lambda's AUS01 data center rebooted 246 GPU nodes, all spine switches and the VAST storage, failing customer workloads and leaving stale NFS mounts on VMs
    Lambda2026
  4. IL-0187 A brief Spring Cloud Config Server downtime failed every client application's liveness probe, because the actuator health check included the config server, and Kubernetes restarted the pods in a kill loop
  5. IL-0162 LKE users could not reach their cluster control planes or the LKE Dashboard because an earlier database update made the internal LKE DNS service hang
    Linode2025
  6. IL-0103 During an EKS node AMI update, Istio sidecars crash-looped because hundreds of pods restarting at once overloaded the external certificate authority behind istiod
  7. IL-0159 Docker Hub rate-limited Linode's IPv6 address space with 429 Too Many Requests, breaking image pulls for LKE and LKE-E clusters
    Linode2025
  8. IL-0025 Failed boots, InfiniBand link flapping, NCCL hangs and throughput sags while bringing up a 4,088-GPU H100 training cluster
    Imbue2024
  9. IL-0021 GKE GPU nodes on Container-Optimized OS could not download NVIDIA drivers (403 Forbidden) and came up without working GPUs
  10. IL-0135 A power source switch during UPS maintenance cut power to a row of GPU servers and shut down Crusoe Cloud VMs in us-northcentral1
  11. IL-0126 The OPT-175B training run restarted more than 40 times in two weeks as cloud GPU nodes failed with ECC errors, replacement nodes came back faulty, and checkpoint downloads hung
  12. IL-0039 New Kubernetes worker nodes could not join any cluster because a package URL hardcoded in kops nodeup broke
  13. IL-0073 Intermittent Kafka connectivity overloaded Docker daemons, set off a node rescheduling cascade and poisoned the Consul gossip mesh
    Target2019