Cases3 cases

1 to 3 of 3

1. IL-0150 A latent race condition in DynamoDB's DNS automation left an empty DNS record for dynamodb.us-east-1.amazonaws.com, and the DynamoDB and EC2 launch failures that followed caused EKS, ECS and Fargate container launch failures and cluster scaling delays in us-east-1

   Amazon Web Services2025

   Symptoms

   At 11:48 PM PDT on 19 October 2025, every system that reached DynamoDB in us-east-1 through the public regional endpoint started getting DNS failures and could not connect. This included customer traffic and internal AWS services that depend on DynamoDB. DynamoDB global table replicas in other regions still answered but fell behind in replication to and from us-east-1.

   DNS resolution failuresHigh error rateScale-up failureIntermittent connection failuresHigh latency

   Trigger

   One DNS Enactor, slowed by unusually high retry delays, applied a much older DNS plan to the regional DynamoDB endpoint just as another Enactor that had applied the newest plan ran its clean-up, which deleted that older plan and with it every IP address of the endpoint.

   Root cause

   Software defect

   Component

   Authoritative DNS servers and recordsApplication databaseCloud load balancer

   Contributing factor

   Automation amplificationRetry stormNo runbook

   Detection

   DNS failures to DynamoDB began immediately at 11:48 PM PDT and the engineering teams of affected AWS services were engaged at once; by 12:38 AM they had identified DynamoDB's DNS state as the source. The later NLB health check problem was detected by monitoring at 6:52 AM.

   Remediation

   • applied temporary mitigations by 1:15 AM that let some internal services reach DynamoDB and repaired key internal tooling
   • restored all DynamoDB DNS information by 2:25 AM through manual operator intervention
   • throttled incoming work and selectively restarted DWFM hosts from 4:14 AM so droplet leases could be re-established
   • reduced the load on Network Manager to bring network configuration propagation times back to normal by 10:36 AM
   • disabled automatic health check failover for NLB at 9:36 AM, and re-enabled it at 2:09 PM after EC2 recovered
   • relaxed the EC2 request throttles from 11:23 AM until all EC2 APIs and launches were normal at 1:50 PM

   Action items

   • Disable the DynamoDB DNS Planner and DNS Enactor automation worldwide
   • Fix the race condition and add protections against applying incorrect DNS plans before re-enabling the DNS automation
   • Add a velocity control to NLB that limits how much capacity a single load balancer can remove when health check failures cause availability zone failover
   • Build an additional EC2 test suite that exercises the DWFM recovery workflow at scale
   • Improve throttling in EC2 data propagation systems so incoming work is rate limited by the size of the waiting queue

   Lessons

   A single DNS record that automation can empty is enough to take a widely used regional endpoint off the network, and every service built on it fails in turn. A check made once at the start of a long operation can be stale by the time the operation writes its result. Recovery of the dependency is not recovery of the dependents: systems that lost state during the outage, such as EC2's droplet leases and network propagation backlog, can collapse under their own catch-up work, and container services that rely on new instance launches keep failing to launch and scale until that work is done.

   View case
2. IL-0147 AKS nodes behind an HTTP proxy failed to provision with CSE exit code 31 on 202508 node images, because a refactoring stopped the proxy from being used when downloading uncached Kubernetes binaries

   Microsoft2025

   Symptoms

   Creating or scaling a node pool on AKS 1.31.8 failed: the VMSS instances never finished provisioning. This started after planned maintenance moved the node image from 202507.* to 202508.*, in a cluster where nodes must send all outbound traffic through an internal HTTP/HTTPS proxy and direct egress is blocked. It happened with both Ubuntu and AzureLinux images.

   Scale-up failureUpgrade stall

   Trigger

   A node image auto-upgrade from 202507.* to 202508.* during planned maintenance, on clusters whose Kubernetes patch version was not pre-cached in the new image.

   Root cause

   Software defect

   Component

   Node operating system imageNode pool

   Contributing factor

   Cache-masked failureAutomation amplification

   Detection

   The customer saw VMSS instance provisioning fail with a vmssCSE error in the VMSS activity logs and reported it as a GitHub issue.

   Remediation

   • The customer pinned the node image to a 202507.* snapshot on clusters running 1.31.8
   • The customer upgraded clusters to AKS 1.31.9 or 1.31.10, whose binaries are cached in the 202508.* images
   • The AKS team hot-patched VHD 20250811 so the proxy configuration is used for uncached binary downloads and made it globally available in public regions on 2025-09-04; it also announced the hotfix for VHD 20250820
   • The AKS team told users to reimage their nodes with az aks nodepool upgrade --node-image-only to pick up the hotfixed image

   Action items

   • Apply the proxy fix in all future VHDs

   Lessons

   A bootstrap path that runs only when an artefact is missing from a cache is easy to break without noticing: here only clusters on Kubernetes versions not pre-cached in the node image ever downloaded binaries, so only they met the proxy regression. Testing node provisioning behind a mandatory egress proxy, on older patch versions as well as the newest, would exercise that path. For clusters with restricted egress, pinning the node image or moving to a Kubernetes version cached in the image were both quick workarounds while the fix was shipped.

   View case
3. IL-0157 After a release, new nodes could not join Linode Kubernetes Engine clusters with IP ACL enabled, so autoscaling failed on about 20 to 25 clusters

   Linode2025

   Symptoms

   From about 01:00 UTC on 2025-03-05, Linode Kubernetes Engine (LKE) clusters with IP ACL enabled failed to autoscale: new nodes could not join the cluster, and some customers had service disruptions. About 20 to 25 clusters in several regions around the world were affected; the status page lists the US-IAD (Washington), US-ORD (Chicago), US-SEA (Seattle) and IN-MAA (Chennai) LKE components.

   Scale-up failureService outage

   Trigger

   Akamai deployed the latest LKE software release.

   Root cause

   Software defect

   Component

   Cluster autoscaler

   Contributing factor

   –

   Detection

   Customers began having problems at about 01:00 UTC, and the first status post, at 06:49 UTC, said the team was investigating an LKE autoscaling problem when IP ACL is turned on.

   Remediation

   • restarted the gateway pods, which gave only short-term relief
   • rolled back the release on all affected clusters

   Action items

   • Continue investigating the root cause and take preventive actions

   Lessons

   The defect hit only clusters with IP ACL enabled, and it showed when the autoscaler tried to add nodes. Restarting the gateway pods did not hold; rolling back the release ended the incident.

   View case

By root cause1