Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases6 cases

3 to 6 of 6

  1. Symptoms

    Between 12 AM and 8 AM CEST on 11 May 2025, every ZenML Pro workspace server was unreachable, so customers could not use workspace UIs or pipelines. The ZenML Pro dashboard was not affected.

    Trigger

    At 23:38 on 10 May, secrets encryption with AWS KMS was enabled through Terraform as part of the EKS module upgrade.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Engineers found the cluster degraded when they resumed the upgrade at 06:00.

    Remediation
    • deleted and recreated the EKS node group with the correct IAM permissions and configuration
    • restored service access across all affected ZenML Pro environments
    Action items
    • Upgrade all Terraform modules (EKS, VPC) to current supported versions
    • Complete the EKS cluster upgrades as planned
    • Review the strategy for periodic Kubernetes and infrastructure upgrades to prevent a recurrence
    Lessons

    A successful upgrade on a much smaller staging cluster understated the risk of the same change in production. Skipping Kubernetes and module versions let upgrade complexity build up until one upgrade carried many changes at once.

  2. Symptoms

    On 2023-05-18 a Slack alert arrived at 20:01 and Istio stopped working properly in the production GKE cluster. The istiod error logs said that the v1beta1.Ingress and v1beta1.ValidatingWebhookConfiguration resources could not be found.

    Trigger

    GKE automatically upgraded the production cluster's control plane from 1.22.17-gke.7500 to 1.23.17-gke.1700 at 19:52 on 2023-05-18.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A Slack alert at 20:01 on 2023-05-18, nine minutes after the control plane upgrade. The istiod error logs showed that the v1beta1 Ingress and ValidatingWebhookConfiguration resources could not be found.

    Remediation
    • upgraded Istio from 1.7.4 to 1.13.3
    Lessons

    The first diagnosis, end of support for Istio, was wrong; the real cause was found by matching the alert time against the cluster's UPGRADE_MASTER operations in Logs Explorer. The author recommends checking the version compatibility matrices of Kubernetes, Istio and other packages, keeping a production version for at least six months and upgrading three months before end of support, keeping the test environment on the latest version, backing up before upgrades, managing deployments and versions with a tool such as Argo CD, and testing upgrades in a test environment before production.

  3. Symptoms

    At 11:38 UTC on 3 August 2022 an end-user team told the platform team that applying a Service resource to one of the Kubernetes clusters failed.

    Trigger

    A certificate chain in a third-party application expired, through no action of DFDS, and the outdated Kyverno installation got stuck in a crash loop.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    An end-user team alerted the platform team at 11:38 UTC that applying a Service resource failed; the platform team started looking into it at 11:50 UTC.

    Remediation
    • reproduced the issue in a sandbox cluster and deployed the fix there first
    • updated Kyverno to a newer Helm chart version in the affected production cluster
    Action items
    • Implement monitoring on Kyverno
    • Create internal documentation on the Kyverno setup
    • Investigate the exact certificate issue in the third-party application
    • Consider changing the failurePolicy on ClusterPolicy resources going forward
    Lessons

    Operational issues should be added to the 'Ops Day to Day' board from the start.

  4. Symptoms

    At 18:56 PDT on 23 June 2022 (01:56 UTC on 24 June) several models went offline at once: some fine-tuned curie and davinci models, the Codex beta models code-davinci-001 and code-cushman-001, the legacy GPT models curie, babbage and ada, and all Embeddings models.

    Trigger

    A destructive operation on one of the three production clusters, caused by human error that the existing safeguards did not catch, took the whole cluster offline.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • re-allocated the models from the lost cluster to the remaining two clusters
    • rebuilt the VPN link with Azure support after losing the connection to AKS during cluster setup
    • built workarounds with Azure support after losing the connection to Azure Private Link
    • tore down the cluster and rebuilt it from scratch after the upgraded Kubernetes version broke the ingress
    • moved traffic back into the rebuilt cluster between 05:30 and 06:30 PDT
    Action items
    • Add checks and locks so that this and similar production-critical infrastructure cannot be modified by accident
    • Add better visibility into the operations being performed and make parts of the system more lexicographically distinct
    • Keep working with Azure on the AKS network connectivity issues so they do not disrupt new cluster operations
    • Update playbooks with the new cluster failure modes and change the setup steps for new clusters and infrastructure
    • Upgrade Kubernetes systematically and set aside time so the clusters do not fall behind again
    • Shard fine-tuned models across multiple clusters and work towards more automatic cross-cluster replication
    • Distribute and replicate Azure Blob Storage so fine-tuned models load faster and more reliably
    • Finish rolling out node-to-node caching to relieve Azure Blob Storage bottlenecks
    • Change how model weights are stored so they are more efficient and faster to load
    Lessons

    Losing one of three clusters exhausted the GPU headroom, and GPUs could not be added on short notice, so full recovery depended on bringing the same cluster back. Rebuilding it exposed a deferred Kubernetes upgrade: the newer version broke the ingress, and because AKS cannot downgrade there was no way back except a full rebuild. Recovering many large models at once is limited by the bandwidth of the storage they load from, and the caches that normally hide this do not help when everything moves to a different cluster.

Check your cluster for this

These 6 cases involve Admission webhook and GKE control plane. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause4

Breaking change in an upgrade3 cases

  1. IL-0097 A cluster autoscaler version bump was incompatible with the one cluster still on Kubernetes 1.33, so no scale-up events fired and new nodes were not created
    2i2c2026
  2. IL-0101 After Google forced a GKE control plane upgrade to 1.33.2 at a deprecation deadline, no new node could initialise, so autoscaling and spot node replacement stopped for 15 hours
  3. IL-0180 A GKE control plane auto-upgrade from 1.22 to 1.23 removed the v1beta1 Ingress and ValidatingWebhookConfiguration APIs that Istio 1.7.4 still used, and Istio stopped working in production

Software defect1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0078 Enabling EKS secrets encryption with KMS through Terraform removed worker node IAM permissions and took down all ZenML Pro workspaces
    ZenML2025

Certificate or credential expiry1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0107 Kyverno stuck in a crash loop behind a webhook with failurePolicy fail blocked every change to Kubernetes Service objects for 88 minutes
    DFDS2022

Operator error1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0115 One of OpenAI's three production AKS clusters went offline through a human error, and rebuilding it took 10½ hours because an AKS Kubernetes upgrade broke the ingress and AKS cannot be downgraded
    OpenAI2022