Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases33 cases

21 to 25 of 33

  1. Symptoms

    At 18:40 UTC db1075, the primary database of section s3, stopped answering, and all s3 wikis went read-only because no writes could reach it. Reads kept working from the replicas. At 18:42:45 Icinga reported "PROBLEM - Host db1075 is DOWN: PING CRITICAL - Packet loss = 100%".

    Trigger

    The RAID battery backup unit (BBU) of db1075, the s3 primary database host, failed and the whole host crashed.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Icinga reported db1075 HOST DOWN on IRC at 18:42:45, but that alert does not page; replica Slave IO alerts followed, users reported problems on #wikimedia-operations, and the first SMS page went out at 18:56. Volunteers and staff noticed the failure before the alerts did.

    Remediation
    • Power-cycled db1075 from the iDRAC after finding the BBU problem
    • Let MySQL finish InnoDB recovery on db1075
    • Removed read_only=ON from db1075 by hand
    • Ran puppet by hand a second time so pt-heartbeat started
    Action items
    • Implement or refactor a script that moves replicas when the primary is unavailable
    • Fix the MediaWiki heartbeat model so pt-heartbeat does not use a super-user, avoids a single point of failure and follows the real primary without depending on puppet
    • Decide what to do with the batch of hosts that already had BBU issues
    • Buy a new BBU for db1075
    • Remove db1075 from the primary role
    • Address MediaWiki spam while the database is read-only or the primary is unavailable
    • Make primary database hosts page on HOST DOWN
    • Track hardware errors better in Netbox
    Lessons

    A BBU failure should not crash a whole host, yet it had happened before on HP hosts. HOST DOWN on a primary database should page instead of only alerting on IRC. Starting pt-heartbeat through puppet races with MySQL startup, and the unnoticed failure kept lag reported and made the outage 8 minutes longer.

  2. Symptoms

    At 22:54 UTC on 21 October 2018 GitHub's internal monitoring started alerting on many faults at once. By 23:02 UTC the first responders saw that the replication topologies of many MySQL clusters were in an unexpected state: the Orchestrator API showed topologies made only of servers in the US West Coast data center. When connectivity came back, the application tier had immediately started sending writes to the new West Coast primaries.

    Trigger

    At 22:52 UTC on 21 October, routine maintenance to replace failing 100G optical equipment cut connectivity between GitHub's US East Coast network hub and its primary US East Coast data center for 43 seconds.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    GitHub's internal monitoring raised alerts on numerous faults at 22:54 UTC, two minutes after the partition. By 23:02 UTC the first responders had found, by querying the Orchestrator API, that many database clusters had a topology with only US West Coast servers.

    Remediation
    • Locked the internal deployment tooling to stop further changes
    • Paused webhook delivery and GitHub Pages builds to stop jobs writing metadata
    • Restored the affected MySQL clusters from backups into the US East Coast data center and let them replicate from the West Coast
    • Found ways to restore directly from the West Coast to get around the throughput limits of downloading from off-site storage
    • Moved all database primaries back to the US East Coast data center
    • Spread read traffic over additional MySQL read replicas in the US East Coast public cloud so replication could catch up
    • Failed over to the original topology once the replicas were in sync
    • Processed the backlog of webhook events and Pages builds, pausing to raise an internal TTL after about 200,000 webhook payloads were dropped
    Action items
    • Reconcile the writes from the captured MySQL binary logs that were not replicated, automatically where possible and with user outreach otherwise
    • Make sure status updates can be published even when GitHub Pages builds are paused
    • Give more accurate public estimates of the time to repair
    • Configure Orchestrator so it cannot promote database primaries across regional boundaries
    • Move to a status reporting mechanism that shows the status of each component of the platform
    • Serve GitHub traffic from multiple data centers in an active/active/active design with N+1 redundancy at the facility level
    • Test assumptions about the system more proactively
    • Validate failure scenarios systematically, with investment in fault injection and chaos engineering tooling
    Lessons

    Orchestrator did what it was configured to do, but the application tier could not work with primaries on the other side of the country: leader election within one region is generally safe, while the sudden cross-country latency was a major contributing factor. The behaviour emerged from a partition larger than any GitHub had seen. Replication caught up along a power decay curve, not a straight line, so the linear estimates of recovery time were wrong. GitHub concluded that tighter operational controls and faster response are not enough on their own and that failure scenarios have to be validated before they happen.

  3. Symptoms

    On 26 September 2018 at 10:51 JST the whole Mackerel monitoring service stopped working properly and its alive monitoring stopped. The application servers could not connect to Redis, which stores Mackerel's monitoring data, and could not return correct responses.

    Trigger

    Redis memory use had been growing, so operators set up replication in order to scale Redis up. Building the replication took a long time and Redis stopped answering for a while, and keepalived treated this as a node failure and started a failover nobody intended.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • Switched back to the correct Redis and briefly saw the application return
    • Restarted the application servers one after another, which did not improve the symptoms
    • Detected the organizations posting inappropriate metrics and blocked their requests
    • Adjusted the timeout interval of the application servers
    • Temporarily added capacity to Diamond, the TSDB
    • Increased the number of Kinesis shards and Redis Cluster shards
    • Scaled out the API application servers
    • Put Mackerel in maintenance mode, checked it internally and let outside requests back gradually
    Action items
    • Raise the number of keepalived health checks for Redis so a brief load increase does not trigger a failover
    • Scale Redis up
    • Add more application servers
    • Change the application to store only the monitoring data it needs in Redis, reducing Redis memory use
    • Build a way to detect inappropriate API requests quickly and show them on a dashboard
    • Build a function to block organizations making inappropriate requests quickly
    • Keep improving the accuracy of detecting inappropriate requests and consider adding features such as an API limit
    • Strengthen monitoring of the application servers' internal processing so problems are handled before they become outages
    Lessons

    Hatena did not find why recovery took so long, but expects that keeping failover from reacting to short load spikes and giving the application more performance headroom would prevent an outage this long. It also aims to keep problems contained to a small part of the service when a failure does happen.

  4. Symptoms

    On 7 August 2017, while checking the application after the maintenance that moved Mackerel from an on-premises data center to AWS, the team found that data updated during a specific time window was missing. Everything written to the PostgreSQL database between 14:30 and 15:30 JST was gone.

    Trigger

    One hour after the application was switched to the newly promoted primary db001, db001 lost network connectivity and the database failed over to the standby db002.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The team found the missing data while checking how the application behaved after the migration work.

    Remediation
    • Tried to restore the lost updates by hand from the table data left on db001 and gave up
    • Tried point-in-time recovery from the base backup and WAL and gave up
    • Built a new replica db003 with db002 as primary to restore redundancy
    • Kept db001 in maintenance state for investigation
    • Watched db002 for some time to confirm the problem did not recur, then completed the migration
    Action items
    • Change the PostgreSQL replica creation script to set recovery_target_timeline = 'latest' in recovery.conf by default
    • Add a check to a server configuration test tool such as Serverspec that recovery.conf contains recovery_target_timeline = 'latest'
    Lessons

    A setting needed only for a rare layout, such as a grandchild replica during a migration, was applied by hand through a script option and was forgotten. Because recovery_target_timeline = 'latest' is harmless on ordinary standbys too, Hatena now sets it by default whenever a replica is created. The staging rehearsal used the same layout and steps but had the setting right, so it could not catch the mistake. Hatena notes that a similar layout may be used again for a future PostgreSQL upgrade or a move to another region.

  5. Symptoms

    At 10:24 AM EDT on April 5th, 2017, DigitalOcean began to receive alerts that its public services were not working, and by 10:27 the team had verified that the production database on the primary had been deleted. The control panel and the API were unavailable for four hours and fifty-six minutes: running Droplets kept working, but no new Droplets or other resources could be created or managed.

    Trigger

    A process performing automated testing had been misconfigured with production credentials, and the production primary database was deleted.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Alerts at 10:24 AM EDT that public services were not functioning; within three minutes the team found that the primary database had been deleted.

    Remediation
    • Began recovery from a time-delayed database replica
    • Took a backup of the time-delayed replica
    • Copied the backup to the primary and recovered it
    • Copied the backups to the replicas until all systems were restored
    Action items
    • Drastically reduce access to the primary system for certain actions
    • Upgrade network connectivity between database servers
    • Update hardware to speed up recovery
    • Assess further safeguards against developer error
    • Improve the processes around data recovery
    • Explore ways to provide better real-time information to customers during future customer-impacting events
Check your cluster for this

These 33 cases involve Database replication and Database. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause11

Capacity exhaustion6 cases

  1. IL-0379 InfluxDB Cloud queries in Azure West Europe slowed and timed out as storage pods fell behind and kept restarting
  2. IL-0288 ZooKeeperWait rose to thousands of seconds on three redundant ClickHouse instances, degrading a CDN77 data pipeline
    CDN772026
  3. IL-0305 Replicas of one Intercom Vitess shard hit 100% CPU and fell up to 2.2 hours behind, serving stale inbox data
  4. IL-0443 A Repro Aurora MySQL reader restarted unexpectedly and writer insert latency rose about sevenfold for a day or more
    Repro2019
  5. IL-0334 Instapaper's RDS MySQL bookmarks table hit the 2TB ext3 file size limit, inserts failed and the service went down
  6. IL-0296 Transloadit's us-east Redis cluster lost queued jobs and heartbeats, raising WORKER_JOB_ERROR errors for 81 customers

Breaking change in an upgrade2 cases

Organisation
  1. IL-0569 After an MHA master failover, one of three MySQL replicas failed with a malformed binlog error and could not catch up
    DeNA2026
  2. IL-0308 Most RevenueCat backend systems failed after cutover to a new Aurora PostgreSQL 14 cluster as queries became very slow

Certificate or credential expiry1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0490 Records were missing from LootLocker's new MySQL database after a migration cutover and the service degraded for 3 hours

Software defect5 cases

  1. IL-0281 PostHog's Logs ClickHouse cluster silently deleted almost all its S3 data, losing US logs older than 3 days
  2. IL-0527 OpenStreetMap.org made no replication diffs for 16 hours as PostgreSQL logical decoding failed on a memory alloc error
  3. IL-0376 A maintenance update set off needless full syncs between Upstash Redis replicas in eu-west-1, slowing the databases
  4. IL-0589 Every Kickstarter MySQL replica on Amazon RDS stopped replicating on a duplicate-key error in the backings table
  5. IL-0303 GitHub's MySQL master failed over to a node with a cold buffer pool during a schema migration and GitHub.com went down
    GitHub2012

Cloud provider outage2 cases

Contributing factor
Organisation
  1. IL-0368 PlanetScale's control plane went down and some database branches failed queries during the AWS us-east-1 outage
  2. IL-0488 Kit's RDS MySQL write latency rose 100x and running threads jumped from 9 to 900, backing up Sidekiq job queues
    Kit2022

Operator error4 cases

  1. IL-0242 Both PostgreSQL servers behind matrix.org were lost during a disk expansion, and the homeserver was down for 24 hours
  2. IL-0431 During Mackerel's move to AWS, PostgreSQL failed over to a replica that had stopped replicating, losing an hour of data
    Hatena2017
  3. IL-0218 GitLab.com's primary PostgreSQL data was wiped by mistake and, with no working backup, the site was down about 18 hours
    GitLab2017
  4. IL-0319 Dropping databases on the MySQL replica mysql2 also dropped them on mysql1, as the pair actually ran master-master

Dependency failure2 cases

  1. IL-0526 OpenStreetMap.org went offline, then read-only, for 56 hours after HE.net routing equipment cut both fibre uplinks
  2. IL-0255 Basecamp's two redundant links between data centers dropped together and a Redis replica resync loop stalled chat

Configuration change6 cases

  1. IL-0392 MariaDB replication of section x1 between eqiad and codfw broke on a missing heartbeat row during a cookbook run
  2. IL-0374 DigitalOcean creates and management actions failed globally when its service discovery datastore lost quorum
  3. IL-0331 An RDS MySQL Multi-AZ failover lost 5 seconds of committed data and broke replication on all five read replicas
  4. IL-0430 Mackerel's Redis stopped answering during a replication setup, keepalived failed over by mistake, and Mackerel degraded
    Hatena2018
  5. IL-0325 DigitalOcean's control panel and API were down for 4 hours 56 minutes after the production primary database was deleted
  6. IL-0215 Twilio's billing Redis master lost all balances and went read-only, and auto-recharge charged customer cards repeatedly
    Twilio2013

Data loss or corruption1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0311 BattleMetrics' primary PostgreSQL went read-only at transaction ID wraparound, breaking the website and RCON updates

DNS or network fault3 cases

  1. IL-0240 Cloudflare API requests failed and the dashboard slowed for hours after the authentication database lost its replicas
  2. IL-0210 GitHub's MySQL clusters failed over to the US West Coast and the site served slow, stale, inconsistent data for 24 hours
    GitHub2018
  3. IL-0590 F5 load balancers cached a path MTU of 296 after Rackspace reboots, and Mailgun connections failed intermittently

Hardware failure1 case

  1. IL-0323 A RAID battery backup unit failure crashed db1075, the MariaDB primary of section s3, and every s3 wiki went read-only