Cases15 cases

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1. IL-0188 Rolling updates on EKS returned 502 errors for about 30 seconds because Kubernetes deleted old pods as soon as new pods passed readiness, before the ALB had marked the new pod targets healthy

   Yonghyun Kim2025

   Symptoms

   Every rolling update of the team's microservices on Amazon EKS, behind an Application Load Balancer, was followed by intermittent 502 and 503 errors for users. A Slack message at 3 a.m. read "배포는 성공했는데, 서비스는 죽었다" (the deployment succeeded, but the service died). Every pod was Ready and Datadog was green while users saw errors.

   High error rateService outage

   Trigger

   A rolling update of a Deployment served through an ALB that registers pod IPs as targets, with no pod readiness gates.

   Root cause

   Faulty deployment

   Component

   Cloud load balancerIngress controllerPod termination

   Contributing factor

   Unverified assumptionUnreviewed defaultsMonitoring blind spot

   Detection

   A Slack message at 3 a.m. reported that the deployment had succeeded but the service was down; Datadog dashboards were green at the time.

   Remediation

   • labelled the namespace with elbv2.k8s.aws/pod-readiness-gate-inject=enabled so the AWS Load Balancer Controller injects pod readiness gates and Kubernetes waits for the ALB target to be healthy before deleting old pods

   Lessons

   A pod being Ready in Kubernetes does not mean the load balancer will send it traffic. Without a readiness gate, a rolling update can delete the old pods while the ALB still considers the new targets unhealthy, and dashboards that track pod status stay green during the errors. Making pods wait longer on shutdown reduced the errors but did not fix the start-up gap and made every deployment much slower; the readiness gate ties the pod's Ready state to the ALB's view of the target.

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2. IL-0150 A latent race condition in DynamoDB's DNS automation left an empty DNS record for dynamodb.us-east-1.amazonaws.com, and the DynamoDB and EC2 launch failures that followed caused EKS, ECS and Fargate container launch failures and cluster scaling delays in us-east-1

   Amazon Web Services2025

   Symptoms

   At 11:48 PM PDT on 19 October 2025, every system that reached DynamoDB in us-east-1 through the public regional endpoint started getting DNS failures and could not connect. This included customer traffic and internal AWS services that depend on DynamoDB. DynamoDB global table replicas in other regions still answered but fell behind in replication to and from us-east-1.

   DNS resolution failuresHigh error rateScale-up failureIntermittent connection failuresHigh latency

   Trigger

   One DNS Enactor, slowed by unusually high retry delays, applied a much older DNS plan to the regional DynamoDB endpoint just as another Enactor that had applied the newest plan ran its clean-up, which deleted that older plan and with it every IP address of the endpoint.

   Root cause

   Software defect

   Component

   Authoritative DNS servers and recordsApplication databaseCloud load balancer

   Contributing factor

   Automation amplificationRetry stormNo runbook

   Detection

   DNS failures to DynamoDB began immediately at 11:48 PM PDT and the engineering teams of affected AWS services were engaged at once; by 12:38 AM they had identified DynamoDB's DNS state as the source. The later NLB health check problem was detected by monitoring at 6:52 AM.

   Remediation

   • applied temporary mitigations by 1:15 AM that let some internal services reach DynamoDB and repaired key internal tooling
   • restored all DynamoDB DNS information by 2:25 AM through manual operator intervention
   • throttled incoming work and selectively restarted DWFM hosts from 4:14 AM so droplet leases could be re-established
   • reduced the load on Network Manager to bring network configuration propagation times back to normal by 10:36 AM
   • disabled automatic health check failover for NLB at 9:36 AM, and re-enabled it at 2:09 PM after EC2 recovered
   • relaxed the EC2 request throttles from 11:23 AM until all EC2 APIs and launches were normal at 1:50 PM

   Action items

   • Disable the DynamoDB DNS Planner and DNS Enactor automation worldwide
   • Fix the race condition and add protections against applying incorrect DNS plans before re-enabling the DNS automation
   • Add a velocity control to NLB that limits how much capacity a single load balancer can remove when health check failures cause availability zone failover
   • Build an additional EC2 test suite that exercises the DWFM recovery workflow at scale
   • Improve throttling in EC2 data propagation systems so incoming work is rate limited by the size of the waiting queue

   Lessons

   A single DNS record that automation can empty is enough to take a widely used regional endpoint off the network, and every service built on it fails in turn. A check made once at the start of a long operation can be stale by the time the operation writes its result. Recovery of the dependency is not recovery of the dependents: systems that lost state during the outage, such as EC2's droplet leases and network propagation backlog, can collapse under their own catch-up work, and container services that rely on new instance launches keep failing to launch and scale until that work is done.

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3. IL-0079 A GKE node auto-upgrade to an ubuntu_containerd image with a kernel regression left kube-proxy unable to apply its ip6tables rules, so load balancer health checks failed and several clusters lost all ingress traffic

   Altinity2025

   Symptoms

   On a Saturday, an OpsGenie alert fired for a ClickHouse cluster in Altinity.Cloud that had gone silent: no queries, no metrics, and no logs from customers trying to connect. The pods were running and the nodes looked healthy, but no traffic reached the database. Other clusters soon showed the same thing, and external access was blocked across several GKE clusters.

   Service outage

   Trigger

   GKE automatically upgraded worker nodes to the ubuntu_containerd image 1.32.3-gke.1785003, which ships kernel 6.8.0-1022-gke.

   Root cause

   Breaking change in an upgrade

   Component

   kube-proxyNode operating system imageLinux kernelCloud load balancer

   Contributing factor

   Unpatched known bugNo staged rollout

   Detection

   An OpsGenie alert fired when one ClickHouse cluster stopped receiving queries, metrics and customer connection logs.

   Remediation

   • added maintenance exceptions to pause all upgrades on the GKE clusters that were not yet affected
   • changed the load balancer health check policy to ignore failed kube-proxy health checks, so traffic flowed to the nodes again
   • began migrating the affected clusters from the ubuntu_containerd to the cos_containerd node image by recreating nodes

   Action items

   • Expand image pre-testing pipelines to catch regressions earlier
   • Enable notifications for upcoming GKE auto-upgrades
   • Make GKE maintenance windows required across the fleet to control when upgrades roll out
   • Track Google's issue and wait for a patched Ubuntu image

   Lessons

   A managed node upgrade can break kube-proxy in a way that leaves pods and nodes looking healthy while the load balancer sends nothing, because the load balancer health check depends on kube-proxy. kube-proxy's own logs showed the cause. Altinity recommends that GKE users on ubuntu_containerd restore traffic by switching to externalTrafficPolicy: Cluster, which disables the kube-proxy health check in the load balancer, move production workloads to cos_containerd, and pause auto-upgrades where possible until a patched image has been confirmed and tested.

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4. IL-0192 A Crossplane composition merge-policy change for a TLS policy update switched Kubernetes Services from LoadBalancer to ClusterIP and deleted the load balancers behind about 25% of Grafana Cloud services

   Grafana Labs2025

   Symptoms

   At 08:41 UTC on 18 February 2025, several Grafana Labs application teams noticed that some of their endpoints were no longer available. The investigation quickly found that the load balancers for those endpoints were gone.

   Service outageResources deleted

   Trigger

   A change to the merge policy of a Crossplane composition, made so that the default TLS policy of the load balancers could be overridden, was applied to development, staging and production at the same time.

   Root cause

   Configuration change

   Component

   Configuration templatingCloud load balancer

   Contributing factor

   Unverified assumptionNo staged rolloutExcessive blast radiusNo safeguard on destructive change

   Detection

   Application teams noticed at 08:41 UTC that some of their endpoints were no longer available.

   Remediation

   • rolled back the Crossplane composition change
   • recreated the affected Kubernetes Services so that Kubernetes recreated their load balancers

   Action items

   • Add a CI check that blocks a deployment to more than one wave, so any exception to the dev, staging, canary, production order is caught
   • Give higher priority to a more sophisticated wave design that was already under discussion
   • Enable deletion protection on the load balancers, one layer below Crossplane
   • Enable deletion protection on other critical cloud provider resources
   • Develop the Crossplane Managed Resources exporter for change validation and visibility, now in beta testing within Platform engineering; simulated against the change that caused this outage, it shows a clear diff
   • Complete and test support for reconfiguring the TLS policy so application teams can deploy it

   Lessons

   A change that looked small and low-risk had a side effect that only a full end-to-end test through Crossplane and the cloud provider's load balancer controller would have shown; seeing the intended override work was not that test. Staged rollout and blast-radius limits that exist only as process can be skipped, so Grafana Labs moved to enforce waves in CI and to add deletion protection on the load balancers themselves, beneath the Crossplane layer.

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5. IL-0131 A new kind of GenerateContent request made Vertex AI prediction API servers segfault, and once enough of them restarted at the same time the serving fleet could not carry the load

   Google Cloud2024

   Symptoms

   From 12:06 US/Pacific on 12 June 2024, services built on Vertex AI Prediction began reporting failed user requests in eight regions: us-central1, asia-southeast1, europe-west3, europe-west4, us-east1, us-west1, northamerica-northeast1 and us-east4.

   High error rateHigh latencyIntermittent timeouts

   Trigger

   Starting on 8 June 2024, a new form of user request to the GenerateContent API caused intermittent segmentation faults in the Vertex Serving Prediction API servers; on 12 June the rate of such requests increased.

   Root cause

   Software defect

   Component

   Model inference serverCloud load balancer

   Contributing factor

   Partial rolloutNo headroom

   Detection

   Internal production monitoring alerted engineers to the segfaults on 10 June 2024 at 07:35 US/Pacific, before any visible customer impact; on 12 June services built on Vertex Prediction reported failing user requests.

   Remediation

   • confirmed the new failures came from the same segfault found on 10 June
   • accelerated the rollout of the fix that was already in progress, completed at 15:59 US/Pacific

   Action items

   • Ensure early signals of server binary issues are captured in production health analysis and investigated in time
   • Ensure release validation of feature changes and updates in production

   Lessons

   A crash that only some requests trigger can stay invisible while load balancers route around the restarting servers. It becomes an outage when the share of such requests grows until too many servers are restarting at once. Here the cause was known and a fix was rolling out two days before customers were affected, but the progressive rollout had not finished when the triggering traffic increased; Google's follow-up is to investigate early signals of server binary issues in time.

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