Cases2 cases
1 to 2 of 2
IL-0255Basecamp's two redundant links between data centers dropped together and a Redis replica resync loop stalled chat37signals2020- Symptoms
At 11:59AM CDT on Friday 28 August 2020, Basecamp's Ops team received a flood of alerts from PagerDuty, Nagios and Prometheus. Monitoring showed that the newer of the two metro links between the data centers in Ashburn, VA and Chicago, IL had been lost for about 20-30 seconds, and BC3 kept responding slowly after the link came back.
- Trigger
Both redundant metro links between Basecamp's Ashburn and Chicago data centers dropped for short periods; monitoring showed the newer link down for about 20-30 seconds.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
A flood of alerts from PagerDuty, Nagios and Prometheus, with monitoring showing the lost metro link. A lingering alert for one Redis DB instance later pointed to the replication problem.
- Remediation
- Turned chat off at the load balancer layer so the rest of BC3 could stabilise
- Restarted Redis on the replica that was stuck in the resynchronization loop
- Action items
- Make the documented Redis configuration changes for the known replication issue
- Make concrete plans to remove the shared physical path under the two metro links
- Prove the failover systems in production at peak load
- Make explicit room for post-incident follow-up work and push other work out
- Lessons
Planned redundancy and live testing had given Basecamp a false sense of security, especially at peak load: moving between redundant network links or shifting load across data centers should work without issue, and Basecamp would rather find out in a controlled test with the full team ready. The follow-up from an outage needs urgency and explicitly cleared time, not just a place on a list.
IL-0358Packet Public Cloud locations had high latency and unreachable paths from routing loops and blackholed trafficPacket2019- Symptoms
At about 08:49 UTC on 2 June 2019, Packet's internal network monitoring alerted on serious reachability and performance problems in several of Packet's global datacenter locations. The first investigation found routing loops and traffic being blackholed to specific internal and Internet destinations.
- Trigger
A trans-continental US backbone link in the network of Packet's upstream provider Zayo had a hardware failure and blackholed IP traffic routed over it.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- –
- Detection
Packet's internal network monitoring alerted at 08:49 UTC on reachability issues in several global datacenter locations, and engineers confirmed them at 08:52.
- Remediation
- Migrated traffic to an alternative network and removed Zayo from the provider mix
- Applied route filters to return service to normal
- Optimised specific routing policies to improve latency across the backbone with the new traffic mix
- Action items
- Expand internal connectivity monitoring and alerting of on-call operations teams
- Expand network automation and routing so traffic can be balanced across all available backbone paths and an operator can trigger automated re-routes across all Packet datacenters in a major provider incident
- Make Packet's provisioning systems less dependent on third party network providers and inter-datacenter connectivity
These 2 cases involve Backbone network (WAN) and BGP routing. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.
By root cause1
Dependency failure2 cases
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Organisation