Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases7 cases

1 to 5 of 7

  1. Symptoms

    Every rolling update of the team's microservices on Amazon EKS, behind an Application Load Balancer, was followed by intermittent 502 and 503 errors for users. A Slack message at 3 a.m. read "배포는 성공했는데, 서비스는 죽었다" (the deployment succeeded, but the service died). Every pod was Ready and Datadog was green while users saw errors.

    Trigger

    A rolling update of a Deployment served through an ALB that registers pod IPs as targets, with no pod readiness gates.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A Slack message at 3 a.m. reported that the deployment had succeeded but the service was down; Datadog dashboards were green at the time.

    Remediation
    • labelled the namespace with elbv2.k8s.aws/pod-readiness-gate-inject=enabled so the AWS Load Balancer Controller injects pod readiness gates and Kubernetes waits for the ALB target to be healthy before deleting old pods
    Lessons

    A pod being Ready in Kubernetes does not mean the load balancer will send it traffic. Without a readiness gate, a rolling update can delete the old pods while the ALB still considers the new targets unhealthy, and dashboards that track pod status stay green during the errors. Making pods wait longer on shutdown reduced the errors but did not fix the start-up gap and made every deployment much slower; the readiness gate ties the pod's Ready state to the ALB's view of the target.

  2. Symptoms

    At 11:48 PM PDT on 19 October 2025, every system that reached DynamoDB in us-east-1 through the public regional endpoint started getting DNS failures and could not connect. This included customer traffic and internal AWS services that depend on DynamoDB. DynamoDB global table replicas in other regions still answered but fell behind in replication to and from us-east-1.

    Trigger

    One DNS Enactor, slowed by unusually high retry delays, applied a much older DNS plan to the regional DynamoDB endpoint just as another Enactor that had applied the newest plan ran its clean-up, which deleted that older plan and with it every IP address of the endpoint.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    DNS failures to DynamoDB began immediately at 11:48 PM PDT and the engineering teams of affected AWS services were engaged at once; by 12:38 AM they had identified DynamoDB's DNS state as the source. The later NLB health check problem was detected by monitoring at 6:52 AM.

    Remediation
    • applied temporary mitigations by 1:15 AM that let some internal services reach DynamoDB and repaired key internal tooling
    • restored all DynamoDB DNS information by 2:25 AM through manual operator intervention
    • throttled incoming work and selectively restarted DWFM hosts from 4:14 AM so droplet leases could be re-established
    • reduced the load on Network Manager to bring network configuration propagation times back to normal by 10:36 AM
    • disabled automatic health check failover for NLB at 9:36 AM, and re-enabled it at 2:09 PM after EC2 recovered
    • relaxed the EC2 request throttles from 11:23 AM until all EC2 APIs and launches were normal at 1:50 PM
    Action items
    • Disable the DynamoDB DNS Planner and DNS Enactor automation worldwide
    • Fix the race condition and add protections against applying incorrect DNS plans before re-enabling the DNS automation
    • Add a velocity control to NLB that limits how much capacity a single load balancer can remove when health check failures cause availability zone failover
    • Build an additional EC2 test suite that exercises the DWFM recovery workflow at scale
    • Improve throttling in EC2 data propagation systems so incoming work is rate limited by the size of the waiting queue
    Lessons

    A single DNS record that automation can empty is enough to take a widely used regional endpoint off the network, and every service built on it fails in turn. A check made once at the start of a long operation can be stale by the time the operation writes its result. Recovery of the dependency is not recovery of the dependents: systems that lost state during the outage, such as EC2's droplet leases and network propagation backlog, can collapse under their own catch-up work, and container services that rely on new instance launches keep failing to launch and scale until that work is done.

  3. Symptoms

    From 12:06 US/Pacific on 12 June 2024, services built on Vertex AI Prediction began reporting failed user requests in eight regions: us-central1, asia-southeast1, europe-west3, europe-west4, us-east1, us-west1, northamerica-northeast1 and us-east4.

    Trigger

    Starting on 8 June 2024, a new form of user request to the GenerateContent API caused intermittent segmentation faults in the Vertex Serving Prediction API servers; on 12 June the rate of such requests increased.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Internal production monitoring alerted engineers to the segfaults on 10 June 2024 at 07:35 US/Pacific, before any visible customer impact; on 12 June services built on Vertex Prediction reported failing user requests.

    Remediation
    • confirmed the new failures came from the same segfault found on 10 June
    • accelerated the rollout of the fix that was already in progress, completed at 15:59 US/Pacific
    Action items
    • Ensure early signals of server binary issues are captured in production health analysis and investigated in time
    • Ensure release validation of feature changes and updates in production
    Lessons

    A crash that only some requests trigger can stay invisible while load balancers route around the restarting servers. It becomes an outage when the share of such requests grows until too many servers are restarting at once. Here the cause was known and a fix was rolling out two days before customers were affected, but the progressive rollout had not finished when the triggering traffic increased; Google's follow-up is to investigate early signals of server binary issues in time.

  4. Symptoms

    LOTTE ON, Lotte E-commerce's online shopping mall of about 40 microservices on Amazon EKS, returned errors for a period of time whenever the Horizontal Pod Autoscaler (HPA) scaled pods in after load dropped. Requests reached containers that had already been deleted and failed with 502 errors.

    Trigger

    HPA scale-in deleting pods, and the deletion of Blue pods after a blue/green switch of the Service label selector.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • delayed container shutdown on pod deletion (a wait in the SIGTERM handler or a preStop sleep, capped by terminationGracePeriodSeconds) so containers stop only after the pod has left the Service endpoints
    • switched some workloads' Ingress-created ALBs from instance mode to IP mode so traffic goes straight to pod IPs without iptables and conntrack
    Action items
    • Move all workloads to ALB IP mode gradually
    Lessons

    Removing a pod from Service endpoints and stopping its containers happen at the same time in Kubernetes, so a pod can stop while traffic is still routed to it unless shutdown is delayed with a preStop hook or in the application. With an instance-mode ALB, traffic passes through node iptables and conntrack, and established connections can keep going to a pod IP after its iptables rules are gone. IP mode avoids that path, within the limit of 1000 targets per target group.

  5. Symptoms

    At 07:53 UTC on 2022-03-31 the rate of 50x errors on GitLab.com went up, and at 07:54 PagerDuty paged the engineer on call (EOC) about the rising error rate. Users saw slow pages and intermittent 50x error pages. The incident lists the Web, API, Git and Pages services as affected.

    Trigger

    A k8s-workloads/gitlab-com pipeline deployed merge request !1643, a GitLab chart bump that changed the port names of Kubernetes Services and Deployments (related to the Prometheus service and pod monitors), starting with the canary environment gprd-cny at 07:49 UTC.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A PagerDuty alert on the rising error rate paged the EOC at 07:54 UTC, one minute after the 50x errors went up. The engineer deploying the change noticed the errors and linked them to it.

    Remediation
    • drained the canary environment and re-enabled it after twenty minutes
    • cancelled the deployment jobs for clusters c and d before they started
    • drained gprd-us-east1-d in HAProxy and re-enabled it five minutes later
    • raised the minimum replica count above 100 (merge request !1650)
    • drained gprd-us-east1-c in HAProxy, deployed the change to it, and re-enabled it
    • reverted the minimum replica increase (merge request !1652)
    Action items
    • Implement graceful draining of a whole regional cluster
    • Create a Chatops command that puts PagerDuty into maintenance mode
    Lessons

    Renaming ports on Kubernetes Services and Deployments behind a GCP load balancer made the load balancer reconfigure, and requests were slow or timed out until the new configuration had fully applied, which took minutes. GitLab notes that alerting worked well. The follow-up work is a way to drain a whole regional cluster gracefully and a Chatops command to put PagerDuty into maintenance mode.

Check your cluster for this

These 7 cases involve Cloud load balancer and Ingress controller. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause4

Faulty deployment1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0188 Rolling updates on EKS returned 502 errors for about 30 seconds because Kubernetes deleted old pods as soon as new pods passed readiness, before the ALB had marked the new pod targets healthy

Software defect3 cases

  1. IL-0150 A latent race condition in DynamoDB's DNS automation left an empty DNS record for dynamodb.us-east-1.amazonaws.com, and the DynamoDB and EC2 launch failures that followed caused EKS, ECS and Fargate container launch failures and cluster scaling delays in us-east-1
  2. IL-0131 A new kind of GenerateContent request made Vertex AI prediction API servers segfault, and once enough of them restarted at the same time the serving fleet could not carry the load
  3. IL-0106 A malformed Traefik IngressRoute triggered a Traefik v2 bug once a node rollover restarted every Traefik pod, and all Kubernetes services returned 404
    DFDS2021

DNS or network fault1 case

Contributing factor
Organisation
  1. IL-0178 On EKS, HPA scale-in returned 502 errors because containers stopped before their pod IPs left the Service endpoints, and after blue/green switches conntrack kept sending established connections to deleted pods behind an instance-mode ALB

Configuration change2 cases

Organisation
  1. IL-0208 A GitLab chart bump that renamed Kubernetes Service and Deployment ports made the GCP load balancer reconfigure, and GitLab.com slowed down and returned intermittent 50x errors
    GitLab2022
  2. IL-0105 Replacing the AWS VPC CNI during a Terraform refactoring detached the ALB target groups, and every service in the Kubernetes cluster returned 503
    DFDS2021