Cases6 cases
1 to 5 of 6
IL-0350Hosts in an IONOS TXL cluster lost connectivity when an InfiniBand fabric resweep failed on a full multicast tableIONOS Cloud2026- Symptoms
On 3 March 2026, during a scheduled maintenance to replace a faulty switch in a cluster in IONOS Cloud's TXL data center, monitoring alerts fired and the hosts in that cluster lost network connectivity. Customers saw intermittent network degradation or outages, and the Data Center Designer (DCD) web frontend and the AI Model Hub became unreachable.
- Trigger
During a scheduled maintenance to replace a faulty switch, Topology 2 of 2 in the affected cluster was disabled as planned, and a link flap on a switch in Topology 1 then flooded the InfiniBand control plane with alerts and started a fabric resweep.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
IONOS began investigating monitoring alerts in TXL; the first status update was posted at 11:36 UTC.
- Remediation
- Switched from the affected control plane to its standby
- Rebooted the locked-up gateways
- Recovered Topology 1 from the scheduled maintenance
- Paused provisioning in the cluster that had a backlog of queued jobs
- Re-enabled provisioning once network connectivity improved and watched job execution
- Re-established connectivity for the systems that support the DCD
- Action items
- Adjusted the control-plane configuration to use less aggressive failover timers and reduced heavy sweep activity, lowering the load on the forwarding table
- Reduced the number of multicast group memberships to relieve the forwarding table
- Set up continuous monitoring of forwarding table use and control-plane memory with alerts before capacity limits are reached
- Move the control plane to dedicated high-performance servers, separate from data-plane traffic
- Audit IPv6 configurations and IPoIB driver settings
- Modernise the interconnect fabric, including switches, gateways and drivers
- Hardened IAM maintenance protocols so that critical identity services keep working when the primary Cloud APIs are temporarily unavailable
- Move IAM to a dedicated platform without a dependency on the standard managed Kubernetes clusters
- Introduce a dedicated provisioning provider for DBaaS and Managed Kubernetes
- Add automated circuit breakers to the provisioning engine against overload and queue buildup from self-healing services
- Improve visibility and control over job execution and prioritisation in the provisioning queue
- Change the provisioning queue architecture to decouple services and reduce spillover
- Lessons
IONOS identified the linking of services through the shared provisioning queue as a key reason the degradation lasted as long as it did. Alongside making each service more robust, it is decoupling the provisioning queue and addressing dependencies between services to reduce the blast radius of future incidents.
- Symptoms
At 11:48 PM PDT on 19 October 2025, every system that reached DynamoDB in us-east-1 through the public regional endpoint started getting DNS failures and could not connect. This included customer traffic and internal AWS services that depend on DynamoDB. DynamoDB global table replicas in other regions still answered but fell behind in replication to and from us-east-1.
- Trigger
One DNS Enactor, slowed by unusually high retry delays, applied a much older DNS plan to the regional DynamoDB endpoint just as another Enactor that had applied the newest plan ran its clean-up, which deleted that older plan and with it every IP address of the endpoint.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
DNS failures to DynamoDB began immediately at 11:48 PM PDT and the engineering teams of affected AWS services were engaged at once; by 12:38 AM they had identified DynamoDB's DNS state as the source. The later NLB health check problem was detected by monitoring at 6:52 AM.
- Remediation
- applied temporary mitigations by 1:15 AM that let some internal services reach DynamoDB and repaired key internal tooling
- restored all DynamoDB DNS information by 2:25 AM through manual operator intervention
- throttled incoming work and selectively restarted DWFM hosts from 4:14 AM so droplet leases could be re-established
- reduced the load on Network Manager to bring network configuration propagation times back to normal by 10:36 AM
- disabled automatic health check failover for NLB at 9:36 AM, and re-enabled it at 2:09 PM after EC2 recovered
- relaxed the EC2 request throttles from 11:23 AM until all EC2 APIs and launches were normal at 1:50 PM
- Action items
- Disable the DynamoDB DNS Planner and DNS Enactor automation worldwide
- Fix the race condition and add protections against applying incorrect DNS plans before re-enabling the DNS automation
- Add a velocity control to NLB that limits how much capacity a single load balancer can remove when health check failures cause availability zone failover
- Build an additional EC2 test suite that exercises the DWFM recovery workflow at scale
- Improve throttling in EC2 data propagation systems so incoming work is rate limited by the size of the waiting queue
- Lessons
A single DNS record that automation can empty is enough to take a widely used regional endpoint off the network, and every service built on it fails in turn. A check made once at the start of a long operation can be stale by the time the operation writes its result. Recovery of the dependency is not recovery of the dependents: systems that lost state during the outage, such as EC2's droplet leases and network propagation backlog, can collapse under their own catch-up work, and container services that rely on new instance launches keep failing to launch and scale until that work is done.
IL-0347About 25% of Scaleway FR-PAR-1 hypervisors lost VPC connectivity when both VPC BGP route reflectors got stuckScaleway2024- Symptoms
On 18 October 2024, from 7:50 to 8:01 UTC, about 25% of the hypervisors in Scaleway's FR-PAR-1 availability zone lost VPC connectivity with the rest of the region, and products that use VPC failed with them. Public internet connectivity and Elastic Metal VPC connectivity were not affected.
- Trigger
At 6:20 UTC a Top of Rack switch in FR-PAR-1 had a software crash. One of the two BGP route reflectors for VPC ran on a hypervisor in that rack and was left in an abnormal state.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
Health-check monitoring on both route reflectors detected the anomaly, and the Scaleway Customer Excellence and SRE teams detected the customer impact and opened an incident.
- Remediation
- Fixed both VPC route reflectors by manual action
- Action items
- Fixed the autohealing mechanism that had failed to fix route reflectors stuck in a stale state; the fix is https://github.com/FRRouting/frr/pull/17163
- Run different software versions on the route reflectors so a single bug cannot stop several instances
- Investigate the software issue that left the route reflectors in a stale state
- Symptoms
Standard alerting paged Honeycomb's on-call engineers about the performance and stability of event ingestion, and the automated load-shedding mechanisms tripped and sent further notifications. The status page described a higher than normal error rate and response time on the ingestion service.
- Trigger
An abnormally large number of queries arrived from many separate connections within a few minutes.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
Standard alerting notified the on-call engineers about ingestion performance and stability, and the automated load-shedding mechanisms added notifications when they tripped. The first status post, about alerts on a higher than normal error rate and response time, went up at 18:28 PST (02:28 UTC), 13 minutes after the 02:15 UTC start.
- Remediation
- Scaled the ingest fleet up manually and aggressively
- Cut off most ingest for a few minutes so the ingest hosts could come back with enough capacity
- Temporarily lowered the rate limits for the most aggressive traffic sources until their traffic subsided
- Action items
- Keep the ingest fleet scaled up to prevent a repeat while longer-term fixes are worked on
- Decide on the projects that will address these failure paths
- Lessons
Load shedding and auto-scaling were in place, yet a burst that arrived faster than the cache could spread its writes still took the ingest hosts down. During recovery, Kubernetes' crash loop back-off worked against the operators: the hosts that had failed stayed offline while the fleet needed every host. Clients that retry whole OTel batches after a partial drop can multiply traffic many times over, so per-source rate limits were what finally stabilised ingest.
IL-0037Image registry rate-limited a whole region after a crash-looping DaemonSet with imagePullPolicy Always pulled through three NAT instancesDatadog2019- Symptoms
Users reported that their jobs were not starting, with some sign that image pulls were involved. Many pods across the cluster were in error states related to image pulls, while applications that were already running were not affected.
- Trigger
A change to the permissions on a storage bucket that one application needed to read. The application could no longer start, and its DaemonSet, running on roughly a thousand nodes of the cluster, went into a crash loop with imagePullPolicy: Always, so every restart pulled the image again although it was already on the node.
- Root cause
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Detection
Users reported that their jobs were not starting; monitoring had not caught it first.
- Remediation
- replaced the affected NAT instances so registry traffic came from new source IPs
- reconfigured the static IPs and firewall rules so applications could reach the Cloud SQL database again
- Action items
- Add an admission webhook that rejects floating image tags, starting with latest
- Apply the image tag webhook to workload objects only, not to pods, after it blocked pods created by in-cluster controllers
- Lessons
The speakers' takeaway is to be very careful with DaemonSets in large clusters: they say they had broken everything DaemonSets depend on, including DNS, Vault and the image repository, and that it is very easy to break things when managing them by the thousand. imagePullPolicy: Always made every crash-loop restart pull the image again. Sending all registry traffic through three NAT instances put the whole region behind three source IPs, which the registry rate-limited, and changing those IPs cut the connections to a critical database reached over the internet through them. An admission webhook on pods rejects the pods that controllers in the cluster create, where no user sees the error.
These 6 cases involve Database and BGP routing. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.
By root cause2
Capacity exhaustion4 cases
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Organisation
IL-0350Hosts in an IONOS TXL cluster lost connectivity when an InfiniBand fabric resweep failed on a full multicast tableIONOS Cloud2026IL-0202A burst of queries and database writes exhausted connection pools and memory on Honeycomb's ingest hosts, and Kubernetes crash-loop back-off kept failed hosts offline so ingest capacity stayed too low to recoverHoneycomb2023IL-0037Image registry rate-limited a whole region after a crash-looping DaemonSet with imagePullPolicy Always pulled through three NAT instancesDatadog2019IL-0064CPU-heavy pods packed onto one Google Cloud node drove it to kernel panics, and the crash moved from node to node until the site was downMoonlight2019
Software defect2 cases
- Component
- Contributing factor
- Organisation
IL-0150A latent race condition in DynamoDB's DNS automation left an empty DNS record for dynamodb.us-east-1.amazonaws.com, and the DynamoDB and EC2 launch failures that followed caused EKS, ECS and Fargate container launch failures and cluster scaling delays in us-east-1IL-0347About 25% of Scaleway FR-PAR-1 hypervisors lost VPC connectivity when both VPC BGP route reflectors got stuckScaleway2024