Incident Library

IL-0350 IONOS Cloud · 2026-03-03networkingkubernetes

Hosts in an IONOS TXL cluster lost connectivity when an InfiniBand fabric resweep failed on a full multicast table

The affected cluster in TXL runs two InfiniBand topologies. For a scheduled maintenance to replace a faulty switch, Topology 2 was disabled. The Multicast Forwarding Table (MFT) on all switches in Topology 1 was already strained by IPoIB multicast groups, so Topology 1 was running in a vulnerable state. A link flap on one switch flooded the InfiniBand control plane with alerts and triggered a fabric resweep, the automated mechanism that resets the network map. With the MFT at capacity the reprogramming failed, the surge of failed route updates overwhelmed the management layer and caused a critical gateway overload, BGP sessions dropped and hosts in the cluster lost connectivity. IONOS ended the network incident by switching from the affected control plane to its standby, rebooting the locked-up gateways and recovering Topology 1 from the scheduled maintenance.

While hosts were unreachable, every provisioning job for them was queued, and self-healing in the affected services kept adding jobs. After the network recovered, this volume caused resource locking that slowed the provisioning queue, so volume operations and self-healing waited and several services stayed degraded: IAM, and with it the DCD frontend, Managed Kubernetes and DBaaS. IONOS paused provisioning in the cluster, re-enabled it once connectivity improved, and let the backlog drain; provisioning and DBaaS were back to full operation at 21:49 UTC. IONOS named the coupling of services through the provisioning queue as a key reason the degradation lasted so long. The report says a related incident, covered by an RCA released on 11.03.2026, had the same technical root cause.

For the network, IONOS made the control-plane failover timers less aggressive and reduced heavy sweep activity, reduced multicast group memberships, and added monitoring with early alerts on forwarding table use and control-plane memory. Longer term it is moving the control plane to dedicated servers, auditing IPv6 and IPoIB driver settings and modernising the interconnect fabric, and it is changing IAM, Managed Kubernetes provisioning and the provisioning engine so that one cluster's backlog spills over less.

Severity
–
Scope
Network connectivity for hosts in one TXL cluster, with spillover to the DCD web frontend through IAM, the AI Model Hub, DBaaS, Managed Kubernetes and provisioning of infrastructure changes
Users affected
–
Region
TXL data center (Location DE/TXL)
Time to detect
–
Time to resolve
–

Symptoms

On 3 March 2026, during a scheduled maintenance to replace a faulty switch in a cluster in IONOS Cloud's TXL data center, monitoring alerts fired and the hosts in that cluster lost network connectivity. Customers saw intermittent network degradation or outages, and the Data Center Designer (DCD) web frontend and the AI Model Hub became unreachable.

In the network, a link flap on a switch in Topology 1, the topology still running while Topology 2 was disabled for the maintenance, flooded the InfiniBand control plane with alerts and started a fabric resweep. The Multicast Forwarding Table (MFT) on the Topology 1 switches was already near capacity from IPoIB multicast groups, so the reprogramming for the resweep failed. The flood of failed route updates overwhelmed the management layer, gateways locked up, BGP sessions dropped and the hosts in the cluster lost connectivity.

Each service showed the outage differently. Servers hosting DBaaS and Managed Kubernetes workloads lost BGP connectivity directly, and DBaaS was added to the affected services because of a rising error count. The AI Model Hub kept working but could not be reached, because its Managed Kubernetes cluster lost network connectivity. The DCD frontend was unavailable because the IAM service behind it could not be reached: an IP assignment maintenance job started during the incident stayed pending for a long time.

The disruption lasted much longer than the network fault. Provisioning jobs for resources in the cluster could not succeed and were queued, and services that entered self-healing added more jobs, so the queue grew exponentially. After the network recovered, the backlog caused resource locking that slowed the queue, and volume attach and detach operations and self-healing actions waited, which kept IAM and Managed Kubernetes degraded. At 12:38 UTC the status page reported problems again on the DCD frontend and AI Model Hub after an earlier recovery; provisioning in the cluster was paused at 12:54 UTC, AI Model Hub was operational again at 14:37 UTC, the DCD at 15:25 UTC, and provisioning and DBaaS were restored at 21:49 UTC.

Symptom Network unreachableLink flappingService outage

Root cause

Trigger
During a scheduled maintenance to replace a faulty switch, Topology 2 of 2 in the affected cluster was disabled as planned, and a link flap on a switch in Topology 1 then flooded the InfiniBand control plane with alerts and started a fabric resweep.

Detection

IONOS began investigating monitoring alerts in TXL; the first status update was posted at 11:36 UTC.

Remediation

Action items

Lessons

IONOS identified the linking of services through the shared provisioning queue as a key reason the degradation lasted as long as it did. Alongside making each service more robust, it is decoupling the provisioning queue and addressing dependencies between services to reduce the blast radius of future incidents.

Sources

Related cases

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kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for conditions like the ones in this case, InfiniBand fabric, Network control plane (SDN), BGP routing among them, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex. Its checks cite public reports like this one.

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