Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases3 cases

1 to 3 of 3

  1. Symptoms

    One Monday morning the author opened the Prometheus dashboard to check a Kubernetes cluster for alerts and could not reach it. The Prometheus pod was in CrashLoopBackOff: kubectl get pods showed it 1/2 ready with 950 restarts over 3d20h on worker3.

    Trigger

    After start, the Prometheus time series count rose to 2,162,256 within five minutes and its memory use filled the 8GB host.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The author found it on a Monday morning when the Prometheus dashboard, opened to check the cluster for alerts, could not be reached.

    Remediation
    • removed most of the unnecessary settings from the Prometheus ConfigMap, after which the container stopped crashing
    Action items
    • Set appropriate resource requests and limits on the Prometheus pod
    • Reduce unneeded metrics by adjusting scrape targets or scrape interval
    • Estimate Prometheus memory needs, provide dedicated hosts with a node label such as deploy-topology: Prometheus, and pin the Prometheus pod to them with a nodeSelector
    Lessons

    Exit code 137 together with an OOM event in the kubelet log means the kernel killed the container, not kubelet. Under node memory pressure the kernel kills the process with the highest score, and kubelet derives each container's oom_score_adj from the pod's QoS class: a container without a memory request in a pod where another container has one ends up Burstable with a score near 1000, so it is killed first. In a large cluster, Prometheus memory needs to be estimated from the expected series count and requested explicitly.

  2. Symptoms

    For about six months, applications on Omio's Google Kubernetes Engine clusters stalled at random: they got stuck, stopped answering health check requests or lost network connections, and nothing the team looked at explained why.

    Trigger

    Multi-threaded workloads running with CPU limits on nodes whose kernel did not yet have the fix for a known CFS quota bug that causes unnecessary throttling.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Months of random stalls and failed health checks led the team to read the cgroup cpu.stat throttling counters inside the pods, which showed far more throttling than the limits should allow.

    Remediation
    • removed CPU limits until the kernel with the CFS bug fix was deployed across all clusters
    Action items
    • Deploy the kernel with the CFS quota bug fix across all clusters
    • Monitor utilisation, saturation and error metrics, API latency and error rates to confirm the change behaves as expected
    Lessons

    A CPU limit is a time quota per 100 ms period, not a share of cores, so a multi-threaded container can be stopped for most of each period long before it uses the cores it was given, and a kernel bug can make that worse. Throttling is invisible in standard Kubernetes metrics and has to be read from the cgroup counters. Removing limits trades away protection against a container that takes a whole node, which is only acceptable when runtimes are tuned.

  3. Symptoms

    The daily NRE Labs statistics showed lesson activity collapsing, and kubectl could not reach the cluster: `The connection to the server 1.2.3.4:6443 was refused - did you specify the right host or port?`

    Trigger

    Unknown. The liveness probe that kubeadm writes into the etcd static pod manifest (an `etcdctl get foo` against 127.0.0.1:2379, failureThreshold 8, timeoutSeconds 15) started failing. The author first suspected GCP maintenance the night before, but could not reproduce the probe failure by hand and does not know why it began.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The author saw lesson activity drop in the daily NRE Labs statistics during his morning routine.

    Remediation
    • removed the liveness probe section from the kubeadm-generated etcd static pod manifest and applied it between etcd restarts
    Action items
    • Add monitoring, especially for the single-node master
    • Run a basic "down for maintenance" page in Google Cloud Functions that points to Twitter for updates, to redirect to during outages
    Lessons

    Because all of the infrastructure is managed as code, the cluster could be rebuilt quickly, but destroying it before finding the cause also destroyed the evidence. Monitoring matters, especially with a single-node master. Read the restart counts in kubectl output, not just the Running status. Remember the fundamentals instead of expecting the issue to be more complicated than it is, and do not let the urgency of an outage push you into hasty decisions. Put up a maintenance page instead of leaving the site failing halfway.

Check your cluster for this

These 3 cases involve kubelet and Linux kernel. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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