Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases8 cases

1 to 5 of 8

  1. Symptoms

    The on-call engineer for a high-traffic service was alerted that requests were failing in large batches every 30 seconds.

    Trigger

    DEBUG level logging was on in production when traffic surged, raising log volume to about 100 times normal while the service logged synchronously.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The on-call engineer was alerted that requests were failing in large batches every 30 seconds.

    Action items
    • Replace synchronous logging with TraceAwareAsyncAppender, which captures trace_id and span_id on the calling thread and drops logs instead of blocking when the queue is full (neverBlock=true)
    • Keep the amount of log output at a sustainable level, since an asynchronous queue still fills under sustained overload
    Lessons

    Removing AsyncAppender to keep trace IDs also removed the protection that kept request threads away from stdout back-pressure. A company-wide standard applies the same side effect to dozens of services, so check what a standard rests on and what working behaviour it takes away. ThreadLocal context does not cross into an asynchronous worker, but capturing it on the calling thread before handing the event off keeps both the IDs and the asynchronous output. Under extreme load, dropping log lines is preferable to stopping request handling.

  2. Symptoms

    Every rolling update of the team's microservices on Amazon EKS, behind an Application Load Balancer, was followed by intermittent 502 and 503 errors for users. A Slack message at 3 a.m. read "배포는 성공했는데, 서비스는 죽었다" (the deployment succeeded, but the service died). Every pod was Ready and Datadog was green while users saw errors.

    Trigger

    A rolling update of a Deployment served through an ALB that registers pod IPs as targets, with no pod readiness gates.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A Slack message at 3 a.m. reported that the deployment had succeeded but the service was down; Datadog dashboards were green at the time.

    Remediation
    • labelled the namespace with elbv2.k8s.aws/pod-readiness-gate-inject=enabled so the AWS Load Balancer Controller injects pod readiness gates and Kubernetes waits for the ALB target to be healthy before deleting old pods
    Lessons

    A pod being Ready in Kubernetes does not mean the load balancer will send it traffic. Without a readiness gate, a rolling update can delete the old pods while the ALB still considers the new targets unhealthy, and dashboards that track pod status stay green during the errors. Making pods wait longer on shutdown reduced the errors but did not fix the start-up gap and made every deployment much slower; the readiness gate ties the pod's Ready state to the ALB's view of the target.

  3. Symptoms

    On a Friday afternoon a tenant of SCHIP, Adevinta's multi-tenant Kubernetes runtime, reported a spike of HTTP 5xx errors in some of its services. The drops in quality of service came back periodically through the following days, each one short, and were reported mostly around midnight.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A tenant reported a spike of HTTP 5xx errors in some of its services; the DNS Latency SLI had already been degraded for some time without being acted on.

    Remediation
    • raised the dnsmasq concurrent query limit from 150 to 1500
    • added a CoreDNS header block that sets the ra and aa flags and clears rd, so dnsmasq caches cluster.local answers
    • configured dnsmasq on each node to answer NXDOMAIN for unresolvable search-domain names instead of forwarding them to CoreDNS
    • changed the fluent-bit log router hostname to a fully qualified name
    • asked the affected tenants to use fully qualified names for internal calls
    Lessons

    The DNS Latency SLI had shown the problem long before anyone looked at it. An SLO only protects you when its SLIs are trusted and a drop is investigated. The investigation took a month partly because several on-call groups worked on it separately, without one place for observations and hypotheses, and sometimes chased hypotheses already discarded. Disprove one hypothesis before starting the next, and collect data the metrics system lacks: DNStop showed the garbage lookups that no dashboard did. With ndots:5, short service names multiply DNS traffic; a node-local cache only helps if it can cache the cluster DNS answers at all.

  4. Symptoms

    At 08:29 UTC on 22 June 2021 alerts fired because all services in the Kubernetes cluster were returning 503. No inbound traffic was reaching the cluster. A customer reported the problem at 08:32.

    Trigger

    The pipeline replaced the AWS VPC CNI as part of a refactoring that moved EKS add-ons from kubectl to native Terraform management.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Alerts fired at 08:29 UTC, eight minutes after the VPC CNI was replaced; a customer reported the issue at 08:32.

    Remediation
    • committed a fix that reverted the infrastructure-modules reference
    • re-triggered the pipeline after it failed on an AWS API timeout
    • let the pipeline reattach the target groups to the ALB
    Action items
    • Revert the ALB de-registration delay to the default of 300 seconds
    • Update the roll-over script to set the ALB de-registration delay to zero temporarily before a roll-over
    • Create an ingress test suite
    Lessons

    The change to the de-registration delay had been weighed mainly for performance. Critical pipeline runs should be watched while they run. Everyone should receive the alerts and react to them, and alert messages that were unclear should be reworded.

  5. Symptoms

    An alert fired because some Metrictank instances could not drain their write queue, which meant they could not write to Cassandra. Google had not yet published an incident, but a team member's Discord server, also hosted on GCP, was down, which pointed at GCP; Google confirmed an SSD persistent disk incident about 90 minutes after it began.

    Trigger

    A Google Cloud incident in which SSD persistent disks performed so poorly that many I/O operations failed for an extended period.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    An alert that Metrictank write instances could not flush their write queue to Cassandra. Error rates alone rose too slowly to notice quickly, because most queries were served from memory.

    Remediation
    • Added compute nodes hoping new nodes could attach the disks, which did not work
    • Deleted and recreated the Cassandra StatefulSet with an updated pod management policy, so all pods but one started
    • Raised Kafka topic retention to avoid data loss during the long downtime
    • Temporarily added nodes so Metrictank restarts were not slowed by CPU starvation
    • Restarted all Metrictank instances, which took more than 20 hours, so they connected to the new Cassandra IPs
    Action items
    • Re-instantiate the gocql connection in Metrictank when it is detected dead, so it reconnects even when all Cassandra IPs change
    • Fix the Metrictank write-queue deadlock by updating an internal data structure with atomics instead of a lock
    Lessons

    An OrderedReady StatefulSet cannot recover past a single pod whose volume will not attach; when every pod is down, the ordering that protects normal start-up blocks the whole cluster. A client that learns peer addresses only from live peers needs a way to go back to the service name when all peers are replaced at once. A long-tolerated bug with a config workaround can surface at the worst time; this one turned out to have a simple fix. Writing incoming data to a Kafka write-ahead log first meant all data could still be ingested after recovery, and Kafka on non-SSD disks escaped the disk incident. With both Metrictank bugs fixed, the team expects a similar event to take less than 3 hours to recover from instead of 23.

Check your cluster for this

These 8 cases involve Application database and Telemetry agent. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause5

Configuration change3 cases

  1. IL-0179 With DEBUG logging and synchronous log output, a high-traffic service filled the 64 KB stdout pipe, so request threads blocked in write() while holding database connections and HikariCP ran dry, failing requests in 30-second bursts
  2. IL-0105 Replacing the AWS VPC CNI during a Terraform refactoring detached the ALB target groups, and every service in the Kubernetes cluster returned 503
    DFDS2021
  3. IL-0066 Broken ConfigMap change lay dormant for weeks, then took down Pusher's edge proxy when a cluster upgrade replaced its pods
    Pusher2019

Faulty deployment1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0188 Rolling updates on EKS returned 502 errors for about 30 seconds because Kubernetes deleted old pods as soon as new pods passed readiness, before the ALB had marked the new pod targets healthy

DNS or network fault1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0083 Intermittent 5xx errors in a multi-tenant Kubernetes cluster came from internal DNS: the node-local dnsmasq hit its 150 concurrent query limit, did not cache cluster.local answers, and ndots search lookups flooded CoreDNS

Cloud provider outage1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0193 A GCP persistent disk degradation took down a Cassandra StatefulSet whose OrderedReady policy blocked recovery, and Metrictank could not reconnect to the recreated pods, causing a 23-hour Graphite query outage

Capacity exhaustion2 cases

  1. IL-0064 CPU-heavy pods packed onto one Google Cloud node drove it to kernel panics, and the crash moved from node to node until the site was down
  2. IL-0075 Kubernetes API servers pegged on CPU when the cluster grew to about 290 nodes, traced to Datadog agents polling the API