Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases8 cases

1 to 5 of 8

  1. Symptoms

    The day began with an alert that several instances of the Redis cluster were running out of disk space. That part was fixed quickly. The outage came an hour later: right after the Redis StatefulSet was deleted and recreated at 8:10 UTC, Kubernetes restarted every Redis pod within about five minutes, and problems started to appear.

    Trigger

    To make Git match the volumes that had been resized by hand, the Redis StatefulSet was deleted with orphan (non-cascading) deletion and recreated with the new storage template; Kubernetes reconciled the new spec by restarting the entire Redis cluster.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    An alert about Redis instances running out of disk space started the work; the outage itself showed up as backend errors about Redis connections right after the StatefulSet was recreated.

    Remediation
    • made the Redis masters forget obsolete node identities, reset the affected replicas and rejoined them, then waited for replication to catch up
    • identified the component that was actually running out of memory, scaled the backend service and raised memory limits for that component
    • temporarily relaxed probes so backend instances took traffic immediately instead of flapping between ready and not ready
    • reverted the temporary workarounds at 10:00 UTC
    Action items
    • Add startup probes so a Redis pod is not marked ready until its dataset is loaded
    • Build an own control plane for Redis that handles restarted pods stuck to an old master address
    • Reduce dependence on the single Redis cluster: move some important data to other stores, such as a separate Redis cluster per server, and use Kafka for some backend components
    Lessons

    The disk resize was not the problem; the cleanup afterwards was. An immutable field pushes operators toward deleting and recreating the controller, and that can set off a full reconcile. Startup and readiness probes are what slow a rolling restart down to a safe pace; without them a distributed store restarts in the most fragile way. Recovery plans must expect a cluster to heal slowly, and dependent services need to degrade gracefully while it does.

  2. Symptoms

    On a Friday afternoon a tenant of SCHIP, Adevinta's multi-tenant Kubernetes runtime, reported a spike of HTTP 5xx errors in some of its services. The drops in quality of service came back periodically through the following days, each one short, and were reported mostly around midnight.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A tenant reported a spike of HTTP 5xx errors in some of its services; the DNS Latency SLI had already been degraded for some time without being acted on.

    Remediation
    • raised the dnsmasq concurrent query limit from 150 to 1500
    • added a CoreDNS header block that sets the ra and aa flags and clears rd, so dnsmasq caches cluster.local answers
    • configured dnsmasq on each node to answer NXDOMAIN for unresolvable search-domain names instead of forwarding them to CoreDNS
    • changed the fluent-bit log router hostname to a fully qualified name
    • asked the affected tenants to use fully qualified names for internal calls
    Lessons

    The DNS Latency SLI had shown the problem long before anyone looked at it. An SLO only protects you when its SLIs are trusted and a drop is investigated. The investigation took a month partly because several on-call groups worked on it separately, without one place for observations and hypotheses, and sometimes chased hypotheses already discarded. Disprove one hypothesis before starting the next, and collect data the metrics system lacks: DNStop showed the garbage lookups that no dashboard did. With ndots:5, short service names multiply DNS traffic; a node-local cache only helps if it can cache the cluster DNS answers at all.

  3. Symptoms

    The graph of WebSocket connections to messaging-hub, the messaging platform used by the Japanese food delivery service Demaecan, showed sudden deep drops even outside peak traffic. The drops kept coming back at irregular intervals. Messages still reached clients, because messaging-hub switches to Firebase Cloud Messaging when a WebSocket is gone.

    Trigger

    Another service that shared the same L7 load balancer deployed its own load balancer configuration in the Verda dashboard, which reloaded HAProxy; 30 minutes later, at the hard-stop-after limit, the old HAProxy process exited and closed every WebSocket connection it still held.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The developer noticed deep, sudden drops in the WebSocket connection graph that were not tied to peak traffic and kept recurring irregularly. The Nginx packet drops were found through network monitoring.

    Remediation
    • separated the Merchant system's token issuance API into its own deployment so reconnect traffic did not delay other Merchant APIs
    • scaled out Nginx with pod anti-affinity and a label selector so each pod ran on a different node, which stopped the nf_conntrack packet drops
    • raised Ingress Nginx proxy-read-timeout and proxy-send-timeout and the load balancer timeout to 3600s, which did not stop the drops
    • moved messaging-hub from the shared L7 load balancer to an L4 load balancer, which ended the WebSocket drops
    Lessons

    A reload of a shared load balancer by a different team can cut long-lived connections, and with hard-stop-after the cut comes 30 minutes later, far from the change that caused it. The author's lesson is not to narrow the scope of the search too early: trusting that the infrastructure was fine kept the investigation inside the team's own systems for days. A reconnect wave from many WebSocket clients can overload the systems that issue connection tokens and fill nf_conntrack on proxy nodes. Scaling Nginx out only helps for conntrack if the pods land on different nodes, and anti-affinity leaves extra replicas Pending once they outnumber the nodes. That messaging-hub problems can still load the connected systems remains an open problem.

  4. Symptoms

    The web service breached its latency SLO at 07:30 UTC and its Apdex dropped: some requests to the GitLab.com web front end slowed down for about 15 minutes. This happened while web traffic was being shifted from virtual machines to the web pods on Kubernetes, and the pods did not scale up as the traffic arrived.

    Trigger

    Shifting web traffic from VMs to Kubernetes pods during the GitLab.com web migration.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The web latency SLO breach at 07:30 UTC; an engineer declared the incident in Slack at 07:40.

    Remediation
    • Lowered the target CPU utilisation of the web pods' autoscaler to a more conservative value (merge request gitlab-com/gl-infra/k8s-workloads/gitlab-com!1149)
    Action items
    • Adjust the target utilisation for the web pods (gitlab-com/gl-infra/k8s-workloads/gitlab-com!1149)
    Lessons

    When traffic is moved onto pods that rely on CPU-based autoscaling, a CPU target set too high can keep the pods from scaling as the traffic arrives; GitLab fixed it by setting a more conservative target.

  5. Symptoms

    Services on Buffer's kops-managed cluster on AWS (about 60 nodes and 1500 containers) answered more slowly than they should have. The container throttling metric showed that many containers were being throttled whatever their CPU usage was, including containers that never came close to their CPU limit.

    Trigger

    CPU limits on user-facing services, enforced through CFS quota by a Linux kernel with a bug that throttled containers even when they were well under their limit.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    While reviewing the container throttling metric, the team noticed many containers being throttled even though their CPU usage stayed far below their limits.

    Remediation
    • removed CPU limits from all services directly or indirectly on the users' critical path
    • moved those services to dedicated tainted nodes and gave them matching tolerations
    • set each service's CPU request to its peak usage over a few months plus a margin of more than 20%, and set memory requests the same way
    Action items
    • Move nodes to a kernel that contains the CFS throttling fix (4.19 or later), which for Buffer means a kops version whose host image is Ubuntu 20.04
    • After the kernel upgrade, check whether throttling is fully gone and update the post
    Lessons

    A CPU limit can slow a service down even when the service uses a small part of it, because of how the kernel enforces CFS quota on older kernels; the throttling metric shows it, the CPU usage graph does not. Upgrading the kernel is the safer fix. Removing limits works for latency, but only together with honest CPU and memory requests, isolation of the unbounded services, and monitoring of node usage, since unbounded containers can starve the kubelet.

Check your cluster for this

These 8 cases involve HAProxy and Ingress controller. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause4

Configuration change3 cases

  1. IL-0063 VPN outage after recreating a Redis StatefulSet restarted the whole Redis cluster without readiness checks
  2. IL-0177 WebSocket connections to LINE's messaging-hub on Kubernetes dropped all at once whenever another service's change reloaded a shared HAProxy L7 load balancer, and the reconnect wave overloaded a token API and filled nf_conntrack on Nginx
    LINE+2022
  3. IL-0209 A too-high HPA CPU target kept GitLab.com web pods from scaling up as traffic moved from VMs to Kubernetes, breaching the web latency SLO for 15 minutes
    GitLab2021

DNS or network fault2 cases

  1. IL-0083 Intermittent 5xx errors in a multi-tenant Kubernetes cluster came from internal DNS: the node-local dnsmasq hit its 150 concurrent query limit, did not cache cluster.local answers, and ndots search lookups flooded CoreDNS
  2. IL-0056 Calls from EKS pods to services behind an NLB in another VPC failed intermittently because the AWS VPC CNI did source NAT on the node

Software defect2 cases

Organisation
  1. IL-0029 Slow user-facing services from CPU throttling on containers that used far less CPU than their limit
    Buffer2020
  2. IL-0011 HAProxy ingress piled requests onto the same pods because a Go template visited the backend map in sorted pod IP order

Capacity exhaustion1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0075 Kubernetes API servers pegged on CPU when the cluster grew to about 290 nodes, traced to Datadog agents polling the API