Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases2 cases

1 to 2 of 2

  1. Symptoms

    From 21:38 UTC on 21 March 2025, Cloudflare R2 object storage returned errors for 1 hour and 7 minutes: all object writes failed and about 35% of object reads failed globally. R2 global availability alerts fired at 21:45 UTC, at a 2% error budget burn rate.

    Trigger

    During a routine rotation of the credentials the R2 Gateway Worker uses to authenticate with the storage infrastructure, the new credentials were deployed to the Worker of the default environment instead of the production Worker, and the old credentials were then removed from the storage infrastructure at 20:37 UTC.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    R2 global availability alerts fired at 21:45 UTC, seven minutes after impact began, at a 2% error budget burn rate, and the R2 engineering team turned to operational dashboards and logs.

    Remediation
    • Deployed the new credentials to the production R2 Gateway Worker, which restored R2 availability
    Action items
    • Add logging tags with the suffix of the credential ID the R2 Gateway Worker uses
    • Require confirmation that the new token ID suffix matches storage infrastructure logs before deleting the old token
    • Run key rotation through the hotfix release tooling, which enforces the environment, instead of manual wrangler commands
    • Write the two-person validation of these changes into the standard operating procedures
    • Extend the closed loop health check system to test new keys, report their status through alerting and confirm global propagation before releasing the gateway Worker
    • Add observability views of upstream success rates that bypass caching
    Lessons

    Because the deletion of the old credentials took effect gradually, availability metrics were a poor way to confirm the change. Cloudflare said the team should have checked directly which token the R2 Gateway service was using to authenticate with the storage infrastructure instead of relying on those metrics.

  2. Symptoms

    On 30 October 2023 at 3:51PM, six minutes after a configuration update was deployed to the xPro production Heroku stack, Pingdom alerted the DevOps on-call engineer, who confirmed at 3:52PM that the site was not responding.

    Trigger

    A configuration update applied through Salt at 3:45PM found that the Vault lease of the database credentials was about to expire and could not be renewed, so Vault generated new credentials.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Pingdom alerted the DevOps on-call engineer at 3:51PM, and the alert went through OpsGenie; Pingdom closed it automatically at 4:25PM.

    Remediation
    • Created a new database parameter group and applied it to the running RDS instance
    • Cleared the cached credentials and re-applied the Heroku configuration through Salt
    Action items
    • Move the management of xPro resources, including the RDS instance, into Pulumi, where AWS default parameter groups are not used
    Lessons

    Almost none of the configuration for this stack, the RDS instance in particular, was managed as code, and that was one of the main reasons the fix took long. Under Pulumi the instance would not have used an AWS default parameter group, and the fix would have been a change to an attached group.

Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Database and Object storage. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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