Incident Library
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  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
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Cases22 cases

5 to 9 of 22

  1. Symptoms

    Every service in the homelab Kubernetes cluster stopped answering: the V-Rising server, Grafana, Jellyfin and Linkding were all unreachable, and the Kubernetes API was down, so the cluster could not be managed at all. The outage was found by hand, about 3 hours after it began, when someone tried to use the services.

    Trigger

    A power outage forced the Kubernetes master node to reboot.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Manually, when someone tried to access the services; there were no automated alerts.

    Remediation
    • Connected a monitor to the master node and read the boot logs, which showed the kernel panic
    • Booted the previous kernel version, which brought the system back
    • Removed the broken Nvidia packages with sudo apt-get remove --purge '^nvidia-.*' and ran sudo dpkg --configure -a
    • Found remaining broken packages with dpkg -l | grep -v ^ii and removed them by hand
    • Ran sudo apt-get install -f and reinstalled linux-headers-$(uname -r)
    • Rebooted and confirmed the kernel panic was gone
    Action items
    • Make sure GPU driver installations fully succeed, or revert immediately when they fail
    • Move the cluster to a high-availability control plane
    • Expose the Kubernetes API through a load balancer in the HA setup
    • Set up a ticketing system to record incidents and their resolution
    • Write predefined troubleshooting workflows to shorten response time
    • Add infrastructure monitoring such as Prometheus and Grafana
    • Add blackbox HTTP and TCP checks from outside the cluster for critical services
    Lessons

    A driver installation that fails half-way can leave kernel packages broken without any visible effect until the next reboot, which may come weeks later and at the worst time. A failed DKMS build should be fixed or reverted at once. With a single master node and no monitoring from outside the cluster, one unbootable machine meant a total outage that nobody was told about; the fix itself was simple once the boot logs were seen.

  2. Symptoms

    In January 2022 an etcd memory spike overloaded the Kubernetes control plane of one of Render's clusters in Frankfurt. At first only operations that need the control plane failed: new deploys and cron job runs.

    Trigger

    A memory spike in etcd overloaded the cluster's control plane.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Action items
    • Run CoreDNS on data plane nodes instead of control plane nodes
    • Run etcd on dedicated nodes
    Lessons

    CoreDNS can keep answering from its in-memory cache while the API server is down, but it cannot initialise without it. With CoreDNS on the control plane nodes, a reboot or restart during a control plane outage turned a failure of deploys and cron jobs into a failure of requests to services that were already running. The core problem was that the data plane was not isolated enough from the control plane: even without the reboot, the etcd memory spike alone could have forced CoreDNS to restart.

  3. Symptoms

    Alerts fired at 3:13 PM PST on 11 December 2024, and from 3:16 PM every OpenAI service was significantly degraded or completely unavailable, including ChatGPT, the API and Sora. The status page reported API calls returning errors and difficulties logging in to platform.openai.com and ChatGPT. Customer impact peaked at 3:40 PM.

    Trigger

    At 2:23 PM PST a change introducing a new telemetry service, which collects detailed Kubernetes control plane metrics, was merged and the deployment pipeline started. Between 2:51 PM and 3:20 PM the change was applied to all clusters.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    OpenAI's detection tools worked: alerts fired at 3:13 PM PST, a few minutes before customer impact began at 3:16 PM, and the root cause was identified at 3:16 PM.

    Remediation
    • Scaled clusters down to reduce the total Kubernetes API load
    • Blocked network access to the Kubernetes admin APIs so no new expensive requests arrived
    • Scaled up the Kubernetes API servers
    • Removed the telemetry service once enough control was back
    • Moved traffic from impacted clusters to healthy ones
    • Intervened manually in clusters where simultaneous resource downloads saturated resource limits
    Action items
    • Put every infrastructure configuration change through a phased rollout with continuous monitoring of both the service workloads and the clusters, including the Kubernetes control plane
    • Run fault injection tests in which the data plane runs without the control plane for longer, and tests that roll out bad changes on purpose to check detection and rollback
    • Build break-glass mechanisms so engineers can reach the Kubernetes API servers in any circumstances
    • Decouple the Kubernetes data plane from the control plane so that service discovery for critical workloads does not depend on the control plane
    • Speed up recovery with better caching and dynamic rate limiters for resources needed at cluster startup, and regular drills that rapidly replace an entire cluster
    Lessons

    Several systems and processes failed at once and interacted in unexpected ways: tests did not catch the change's effect on the Kubernetes control plane, DNS caching put a delay between the change and the failures, and being locked out of the control plane made remediation very slow. Because service discovery used Kubernetes DNS, the control plane was carrying load for product traffic even though the data plane was meant to be independent of it.

  4. Symptoms

    From 10:15 am PT on 25 November 2024 a large share of both API and ChatGPT traffic failed with timeouts and 503 errors.

    Trigger

    A global change to Kubernetes namespace labels caused the networking layer to recompute metadata. The change had rolled out to the small clusters without problems.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • moved workloads out of the impacted clusters by hand
    • with the cloud provider, scaled up the number of control plane nodes while scaling down the number of data plane nodes, which let the control planes recover
    Action items
    • Lock namespace changes so this incident cannot recur
    • Freeze certain types of infrastructure deploys
    • Allowlist identities to prevent a recurrence of this class of incidents
    • Improve the GPU load balancing logic so traffic is re-routed automatically and more effectively when possible
    • Improve change management for fleet-wide infrastructure changes
  5. Symptoms

    From 22:25 to 22:50 UTC every DigitalOcean service in the SFO3 region had network connectivity problems, as traffic between the datacenter and the backbone dropped. Traffic through the router was back by 22:30 and SFO3's control plane systems had reconnected by 22:50, and most services recovered then.

    Trigger

    Most of the line cards on one SFO3 core router rebooted at the same time at 22:21 UTC because of hardware errors on the device.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    –
    Remediation
    • The crashed line cards came back online and traffic on the core router was restored
    • Manually recycled all affected nodes across the SFO3 DOKS fleet
    Action items
    • Work with the router vendor's support team to find the root cause of the line card crash
    • Upgrade software on the core routers in SFO3
    • Raise thresholds for automated remediation so affected nodes are restored without manual action
    Lessons

    A short network fault can leave Kubernetes nodes broken long after the network itself is healthy, when the guest networking on the machines does not recover by itself. Checking node health and the API servers after the network returns, and having automated remediation that is allowed to replace many nodes at once, shortens that tail.

Check your cluster for this

These 22 cases involve Kubernetes API server and etcd. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause9

Dependency failure2 cases

Organisation
  1. IL-0133 A storm shut down cooling at Nebius's us-central1 data center, and a disk hot-plug bug kept Managed Kubernetes control planes down for hours after power returned
    Nebius2026
  2. IL-0162 LKE users could not reach their cluster control planes or the LKE Dashboard because an earlier database update made the internal LKE DNS service hang
    Linode2025

Faulty deployment1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0160 A repaired legacy GPU monitoring script sent a firmware query that triggers a race condition in the GPU System Processor of NVIDIA RTX 4000 Ada GPUs, locking up GPU Linodes and LKE worker nodes in several regions
    Linode2026

Certificate or credential expiry3 cases

  1. IL-0183 kubeadm's one-year leaf certificates expired, so kube-apiserver could not reach etcd, restarted in a loop and left the cluster unreachable
  2. IL-0113 The managed GKE control plane of Webhook Relay's main cluster failed because its API server certificates had never been rotated, and a manual credential rotation reported success without taking effect
  3. IL-0184 JupyterHub's KubeSpawner could not create containers and kubectl was refused because the API server and other internal certificates of a kubeadm cluster had expired
    dbhang2021

Software defect2 cases

  1. IL-0138 A failed Nvidia driver build left broken kernel packages on the only Kubernetes master node, which hit a kernel panic on reboot after a power outage and took the homelab cluster down for six days
  2. IL-0077 EKS cluster went read-only for over seven hours after Kyverno ephemeralreports filled the etcd database past its size limit

Capacity exhaustion7 cases

  1. IL-0204 An etcd memory spike overloaded the control plane of a Render Frankfurt cluster, and DNS then failed because CoreDNS ran on the rebooted control plane nodes and could not start without the API server
    Render2024
  2. IL-0195 The kube-apiservers of a cluster with more than 200 nodes ran out of memory and crashed one after another under mass LIST requests from Cilium agents
    Palark2023
  3. IL-0165 Some LKE users in Frankfurt could not reach their kube-apiservers with kubectl after backend services failed under memory constraints
    Linode2023
  4. IL-0194 After a kube-apiserver restart, pod LIST requests from every pod of a Vector DaemonSet nearly tripled etcd memory and restarted all master nodes
    Palark2023
  5. IL-0076 Kubernetes masters went down after Dex filled etcd with AuthRequest objects and deleting its namespace started an endless list-and-timeout loop
  6. IL-0075 Kubernetes API servers pegged on CPU when the cluster grew to about 290 nodes, traced to Datadog agents polling the API
  7. IL-0031 Kubernetes API server OOM-killed, leaving the Skipper ingress without routes; the talk points to a misconfigured CronJob manifest

Configuration change4 cases

  1. IL-0005 A new telemetry service overloaded the Kubernetes API servers of large clusters and broke DNS-based service discovery for all OpenAI services
    OpenAI2024
  2. IL-0118 A global change to Kubernetes namespace labels made the networking layer recompute metadata and overwhelmed the control planes of three of OpenAI's largest GPU clusters
    OpenAI2024
  3. IL-0152 An incorrect configuration applied during maintenance made an internal infrastructure cluster automatically delete the control planes of 200 DOKS clusters in FRA1
  4. IL-0008 An unresponsive OPA validating webhook crash-looped the API server during a GKE master upgrade, and node auto-repair then recreated every node

DNS or network fault1 case

Contributing factor
–
Organisation
  1. IL-0154 Line cards on an SFO3 core router rebooted together and halved backbone capacity, and DOKS nodes whose guest networking did not recover stayed NotReady with degraded API servers until all affected nodes in the SFO3 DOKS fleet were recycled

Cloud provider outage1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0145 A power sag and chiller failure in one Australia East availability zone took down the AKS control plane's compute and its non-zone-redundant SQL Database operation queue, blocking AKS create, update and delete operations in Australia East and Australia Southeast

unknown1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0059 Single-master Kubernetes control plane kept dying because the kubelet restarted a healthy etcd on a failing kubeadm liveness probe