Incident Library
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  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
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Cases36 cases

6 to 10 of 36

  1. Symptoms

    On 3 March 2026, during a scheduled maintenance to replace a faulty switch in a cluster in IONOS Cloud's TXL data center, monitoring alerts fired and the hosts in that cluster lost network connectivity. Customers saw intermittent network degradation or outages, and the Data Center Designer (DCD) web frontend and the AI Model Hub became unreachable.

    Trigger

    During a scheduled maintenance to replace a faulty switch, Topology 2 of 2 in the affected cluster was disabled as planned, and a link flap on a switch in Topology 1 then flooded the InfiniBand control plane with alerts and started a fabric resweep.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    IONOS began investigating monitoring alerts in TXL; the first status update was posted at 11:36 UTC.

    Remediation
    • Switched from the affected control plane to its standby
    • Rebooted the locked-up gateways
    • Recovered Topology 1 from the scheduled maintenance
    • Paused provisioning in the cluster that had a backlog of queued jobs
    • Re-enabled provisioning once network connectivity improved and watched job execution
    • Re-established connectivity for the systems that support the DCD
    Action items
    • Adjusted the control-plane configuration to use less aggressive failover timers and reduced heavy sweep activity, lowering the load on the forwarding table
    • Reduced the number of multicast group memberships to relieve the forwarding table
    • Set up continuous monitoring of forwarding table use and control-plane memory with alerts before capacity limits are reached
    • Move the control plane to dedicated high-performance servers, separate from data-plane traffic
    • Audit IPv6 configurations and IPoIB driver settings
    • Modernise the interconnect fabric, including switches, gateways and drivers
    • Hardened IAM maintenance protocols so that critical identity services keep working when the primary Cloud APIs are temporarily unavailable
    • Move IAM to a dedicated platform without a dependency on the standard managed Kubernetes clusters
    • Introduce a dedicated provisioning provider for DBaaS and Managed Kubernetes
    • Add automated circuit breakers to the provisioning engine against overload and queue buildup from self-healing services
    • Improve visibility and control over job execution and prioritisation in the provisioning queue
    • Change the provisioning queue architecture to decouple services and reduce spillover
    Lessons

    IONOS identified the linking of services through the shared provisioning queue as a key reason the degradation lasted as long as it did. Alongside making each service more robust, it is decoupling the provisioning queue and addressing dependencies between services to reduce the blast radius of future incidents.

  2. Symptoms

    While the Spring Cloud Config Server was briefly down for an upgrade, every client application began to answer its liveness probe with a failure saying it could not reach the config server.

    Trigger

    A downtime upgrade of the Spring Cloud Config Server made it stop responding for a short time.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Lessons

    A liveness probe that includes an external dependency turns a short outage of that dependency into a restart loop of every client. Keep external dependencies out of liveness checks and handle temporary problems with readiness probes. Libraries can add health indicators to Spring Boot's actuator health endpoint automatically, so check what the probe path actually reports. The author ran another Kubernetes environment for two years without liveness probes, relying on strict readiness probes and on the application terminating itself on unrecoverable faults.

  3. Symptoms

    From 7:43 PM to 8:38 PM PDT on July 15, 2025, a small percentage of ChatGPT users saw more errors in their conversations.

    Trigger

    An internal engineer applied a configuration change that contained an invalid value.

    Root cause
    Component
    –
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • reverted the configuration to the correct value
    • started a rolling restart of the affected pods to force them to resynchronise
    Action items
    • Roll out future critical configuration changes for the service to a single cluster first, with automated health guards that stop the rollout if availability drops
    • Move to a service-specific configuration value instead of one shared between services
    • Improve deployment safeguards
  4. Symptoms

    This is a vulnerability report, not an outage, so nothing failed visibly. A cluster is exposed if it runs Ingress NGINX Controller older than 1.12.1 or 1.11.5 with its validating admission webhook enabled. Wiz suggests `kubectl get pods --all-namespaces --selector app.kubernetes.io/name=ingress-nginx` to find it. The webhook accepts AdmissionReview requests over HTTP without authentication from any pod, and Wiz found more than 6,500 clusters exposing it to the public internet.

    Trigger

    Wiz Research reviewed the code of the Ingress NGINX admission controller and reported the first findings to Kubernetes on 31 December 2024.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Found by Wiz Research in a code review of the admission controller, not by an operator.

    Remediation
    • Kubernetes patched the injection flaws CVE-2025-1097, CVE-2025-1098 and CVE-2025-24514
    • Kubernetes removed NGINX configuration testing from the ingress-nginx admission controller, resolving CVE-2025-1974
    • released Ingress NGINX Controller 1.12.1 and 1.11.5
    Lessons

    Admission webhooks often run as web servers inside the cluster without authentication and with relatively high privileges, so any pod can reach them, and the flaws pair well with SSRF in an application. Wiz concludes that `nginx -t` should be considered harmful when it processes unsanitized user input. Wiz recommends upgrading, keeping the webhook off the internet and allowing only the API server to reach it with network policies. If upgrading must wait, disable the webhook (Helm: controller.admissionWebhooks.enabled=false; manual installs: delete the ValidatingWebhookConfiguration ingress-nginx-admission and remove --validating-webhook from the controller) and enable it again after the upgrade.

  5. Symptoms

    At 08:41 UTC on 18 February 2025, several Grafana Labs application teams noticed that some of their endpoints were no longer available. The investigation quickly found that the load balancers for those endpoints were gone.

    Trigger

    A change to the merge policy of a Crossplane composition, made so that the default TLS policy of the load balancers could be overridden, was applied to development, staging and production at the same time.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Application teams noticed at 08:41 UTC that some of their endpoints were no longer available.

    Remediation
    • rolled back the Crossplane composition change
    • recreated the affected Kubernetes Services so that Kubernetes recreated their load balancers
    Action items
    • Add a CI check that blocks a deployment to more than one wave, so any exception to the dev, staging, canary, production order is caught
    • Give higher priority to a more sophisticated wave design that was already under discussion
    • Enable deletion protection on the load balancers, one layer below Crossplane
    • Enable deletion protection on other critical cloud provider resources
    • Develop the Crossplane Managed Resources exporter for change validation and visibility, now in beta testing within Platform engineering; simulated against the change that caused this outage, it shows a clear diff
    • Complete and test support for reconfiguring the TLS policy so application teams can deploy it
    Lessons

    A change that looked small and low-risk had a side effect that only a full end-to-end test through Crossplane and the cloud provider's load balancer controller would have shown; seeing the intended override work was not that test. Staged rollout and blast-radius limits that exist only as process can be skipped, so Grafana Labs moved to enforce waves in CI and to add deletion protection on the load balancers themselves, beneath the Crossplane layer.

Check your cluster for this

These 36 cases involve Database and Kubernetes API server. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause8

Configuration change11 cases

  1. IL-0179 With DEBUG logging and synchronous log output, a high-traffic service filled the 64 KB stdout pipe, so request threads blocked in write() while holding database connections and HikariCP ran dry, failing requests in 30-second bursts
  2. IL-0122 An invalid value in a configuration shared by several ChatGPT services put pods into crash loops and raised error rates
    OpenAI2025
  3. IL-0192 A Crossplane composition merge-policy change for a TLS policy update switched Kubernetes Services from LoadBalancer to ClusterIP and deleted the load balancers behind about 25% of Grafana Cloud services
  4. IL-0118 A global change to Kubernetes namespace labels made the networking layer recompute metadata and overwhelmed the control planes of three of OpenAI's largest GPU clusters
    OpenAI2024
  5. IL-0152 An incorrect configuration applied during maintenance made an internal infrastructure cluster automatically delete the control planes of 200 DOKS clusters in FRA1
  6. IL-0091 Changing the worker node instance type through Terraform recycled all nodes at once and deleted users' production pods together
  7. IL-0177 WebSocket connections to LINE's messaging-hub on Kubernetes dropped all at once whenever another service's change reloaded a shared HAProxy L7 load balancer, and the reconnect wave overloaded a token API and filled nf_conntrack on Nginx
  8. IL-0010 A templating change that dropped its {{ }} delimiters made Argo CD delete all 478 Skyscanner services in every region
  9. IL-0008 An unresponsive OPA validating webhook crash-looped the API server during a GKE master upgrade, and node auto-repair then recreated every node
  10. IL-0052 A cryptocurrency miner ran on every node of the development and staging clusters through a public, unauthenticated Weave Scope dashboard
  11. IL-0035 Worker nodes went NotReady after a new ElastAlert rule without memory limits used up node memory
    NU.nl2019

Capacity exhaustion10 cases

  1. IL-0471 GitHub Actions runs failed or sat queued for 9 hours after a routine deployment's pod replacement saturated capacity
    GitHub2026
  2. IL-0464 IONOS Managed Kubernetes control planes went unreachable for minutes at a time as their shared etcd grew and fragmented
  3. IL-0350 Hosts in an IONOS TXL cluster lost connectivity when an InfiniBand fabric resweep failed on a full multicast table
  4. IL-0110 A Grafana Agent pod's high memory use and crash-looping Hangfire pods drove a Kubernetes node into system OOM and NotReady, twice in one day
    DFDS2024
  5. IL-0070 Critical pods on core nodes evicted when Prometheus began scraping about 200 nodes after a dask-gateway scale-up
    2i2c2023
  6. IL-0094 Student pods filled the shared nodes of a JupyterHub cluster and starved the hub's core pods, freezing the hub
    2i2c2020
  7. IL-0037 Image registry rate-limited a whole region after a crash-looping DaemonSet with imagePullPolicy Always pulled through three NAT instances
  8. IL-0001 Cluster-wide DNS outage after CoreDNS pods were OOM-killed again and again under a burst of DNS queries
  9. IL-0031 Kubernetes API server OOM-killed, leaving the Skipper ingress without routes; the talk points to a misconfigured CronJob manifest
  10. IL-0036 A reindex Job that kept failing exhausted one node after another until the whole cluster was down

Faulty deployment4 cases

  1. IL-0234 An onboarding operator deployed without its scope file installed dev applications on other IONOS Kubernetes clusters
  2. IL-0530 Virtual router controllers in us-central1 ran out of memory in a loop, cutting networking for new and migrated VMs
  3. IL-0086 A deployment meant for a CircleCI test Kubernetes cluster also removed Traefik and Calico resources from the production cluster, taking down the CircleCI UI and runner.circleci.com
  4. IL-0034 A crashing stats agent sidecar marked every pod unready and the service mesh pulled all services out of traffic
    Airbnb2019

Credential exposure1 case

Contributing factor
  1. IL-0069 Attackers stole a high-privilege service account token from a production Kubernetes cluster and used it to reach a cryptocurrency exchange's financial systems

Dependency failure2 cases

  1. IL-0187 A brief Spring Cloud Config Server downtime failed every client application's liveness probe, because the actuator health check included the config server, and Kubernetes restarted the pods in a kill loop
  2. IL-0073 Intermittent Kafka connectivity overloaded Docker daemons, set off a node rescheduling cascade and poisoned the Consul gossip mesh
    Target2019

Software defect5 cases

  1. IL-0053 Unauthenticated ingress-nginx admission webhook let anyone on the pod network run code and read every Secret in the cluster (IngressNightmare, CVE-2025-1974)
    Wiz2025
  2. IL-0347 About 25% of Scaleway FR-PAR-1 hypervisors lost VPC connectivity when both VPC BGP route reflectors got stuck
  3. IL-0065 Any pod could take over the cluster by rewriting Argo CD's unauthenticated Redis cache (CVE-2024-31989)
    Cycode2024
  4. IL-0106 A malformed Traefik IngressRoute triggered a Traefik v2 bug once a node rollover restarted every Traefik pod, and all Kubernetes services returned 404
    DFDS2021
  5. IL-0038 kubelet rollout hit a Kubernetes bug and left every node in a cluster NotReady, triggering mass pod eviction
    Oath2018

Cloud provider outage2 cases

  1. IL-0145 A power sag and chiller failure in one Australia East availability zone took down the AKS control plane's compute and its non-zone-redundant SQL Database operation queue, blocking AKS create, update and delete operations in Australia East and Australia Southeast
  2. IL-0172 An AWS Tokyo data centre cooling failure took down 6 of 60 CockroachDB nodes on Kubernetes within 22 minutes, and ranges lost quorum because the Helm-deployed cluster had no availability zone locality configured

Breaking change in an upgrade1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0144 A systemd security update installed by unattended-upgrades lost the DNS configuration of Ubuntu 18.04 VMs, so AKS kubelets could not resolve registry names and pods failed with ImagePullBackOff