Incident Library
Applied filters SymptomProbe failuresDomainKubernetesClear allEvery case under the filters, with no sentence; newest first.
Suggested filters Search, and the values found in your words appear here.

Graph

  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases18 cases

6 to 10 of 18

  1. Symptoms

    At 05:01 UTC on 9 October 2024 a page fired for GatewayBackendErrorsHigh, elevated 5xx errors from page-analytics_cluster in codfw, followed by a growing number of KubernetesCalicoDown alerts for WikiKube nodes not running the calico-node pod and by MediaWikiMemcachedHighErrorRate. For about an hour uncached MediaWiki requests, such as those of logged-in users, edits and API calls, saw high latency or errors.

    Trigger

    An operator used the new mwscript-k8s utility to run a batch of video transcode maintenance, the TimedMediaHandler requeueTranscodes.php script. mwscript-k8s deploys a whole helm release for every script invocation, so the batch created close to 2k Calico NetworkPolicies along with many other resources over several hours.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Automated monitoring detected the issue and paged the on-call SRE: GatewayBackendErrorsHigh at 05:01:36 UTC, 16 KubernetesCalicoDown alerts at 05:03:32 UTC and MediaWikiMemcachedHighErrorRate at 05:04:15 UTC.

    Remediation
    • Raised the resource limits of the Calico and Typha pods and applied the change with helmfile, which redeployed all Calico pods
    Action items
    • Stop mwscript-k8s from creating so many resources
    Lessons

    The incident came close to a full outage. Automated monitoring caught it and many responders found the cause, but end users were affected and responders were unsure whether they could switch over to eqiad. The problem was noticed just before the hand-off from Americas to EMEA SRE shifts, a period with a long-known lack of coverage, and it helped that the transcodes were not queued on a Friday evening in the US.

  2. Symptoms

    Between 14:20 and 15:16 UTC on 27 August 2024, some HubSpot customers could not log in to their accounts, reach their content or use HubSpot tools. Requests were slow or failed because HubSpot's internal load balancers, which run on Kubernetes and spread traffic across the backend services, were overloaded.

    Trigger

    Routine operation of a critical component of HubSpot's traffic management system, from about 14:08 UTC, ran path handling updates in the load balancer stack, and an issue in that stack made those updates block health check responses.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Monitoring detected widespread performance degradation across the platform at 14:23 UTC and the incident response team was mobilised. HubSpot says it had identified the issue internally by 14:20 UTC. The status page was not updated until 14:44 UTC, which left customers with outdated information.

    Remediation
    • Tried to increase the capacity of the remaining load balancer instances
    • Brought new load balancer instances online, which relieved the pressure and let traffic return to normal
    Action items
    • Change the health check configuration so health checks do not time out falsely
    • Redesign the health check system so health checks get priority and keep running during operations such as configuration updates
    • Increase the capacity of the load balancers for sudden traffic spikes
    • Change the load balancing architecture to detect traffic surges earlier and distribute load dynamically in real time
    • Update the status page automatically for large-scale outages
    • Integrate the monitoring systems more tightly with the communication tools
    • Expand load testing to simulate high-traffic scenarios
    • Introduce chaos engineering to test platform resilience regularly
    • Add traffic pattern metrics, including the ratio of current connections to the maximum allowed
    • Add auto-scaling that adjusts resource capacity to traffic patterns
    Lessons

    HubSpot concluded that earlier detection of the abnormal traffic surge could have prevented the cascading failure, and that health checks have to keep running during operations such as configuration updates so that working load balancers are not removed together. The late status page update caused confusion for customers.

  3. Symptoms

    After an upgrade of the kube-prometheus-stack Helm chart, several pods stayed not ready. Among them was prometheus-prometheus-operator-prometheus-0, showing 3/4 Running and a recent termination.

    Trigger

    During the kube-prometheus-stack Helm chart upgrade, Prometheus had to replay its write-ahead log on startup, and the replay needed more memory than its limit allowed.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The team noticed pods not ready after the Helm chart upgrade and found the OOMKilled termination with kubectl describe pod.

    Remediation
    • ran promtool tsdb analyze inside the Prometheus pod to find high-cardinality metrics such as haproxy_server_http_responses_total
    Action items
    • Verify that the memory overhead during WAL replay stays within acceptable limits, for example 10 to 15%, and do not run Prometheus close to its memory limit
    • Optimise storage, scraping and remote write configuration and upgrade to newer Prometheus releases
    • Recover automatically from OOM crash loops, for example by deleting the WAL on OOM events
    • Enforce scrape limits so Prometheus stops scraping targets when memory use passes a threshold
    Lessons

    Size Prometheus for its restart, not only for steady state: WAL replay can need far more memory than normal running, and a Prometheus that already runs near its limit can be OOM-killed during the replay. Much of Prometheus memory use comes from cardinality, which promtool tsdb analyze can measure even when Prometheus itself is down.

  4. Symptoms

    At 12:32 Prometheus on the Cloud Platform was not available after a planned change, and the Prometheus pod had restarted several times. The platform lost its monitoring and had missing metrics for the period.

    Trigger

    A planned change restarted Prometheus at a time when the WAL count was high.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The team saw that the Prometheus pod had restarted several times after the planned change.

    Remediation
    • raised the Prometheus startupProbe threshold to 30 minutes
    Action items
    • Perform planned Prometheus restarts when the WAL count is lower
    • Set the default CPU and memory requests to meet maximum usage
    • Create a test setup that recreates the live WAL count
    • Explore the memory-snapshot-on-shutdown and auto-gomaxprocs feature flags
    • Explore storing WAL files remotely in a different location
    • Look into a blue-green Prometheus to test changes on a live-like setup before applying them to live
    • Spike into Amazon Managed Prometheus
  5. Symptoms

    At 10:15 on 1 November 2023 a Pingdom check raised a PagerDuty high-priority alert that the "Prometheus - live healthcheck is DOWN". The same alert fired for the third time within a few minutes, and the incident was declared at 10:41.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    –
    Detection

    A Pingdom health check on the live Prometheus failed and raised a PagerDuty high-priority alert.

    Remediation
    • increased the Prometheus readiness probe timeout from 3 to 6 seconds
    Action items
    • Inspect more closely to identify this kind of failure earlier
    • Investigate whether the ingestion of data into the database is too big or too long
    • Check whether executing some queries makes Prometheus work harder and stop responding to the readiness probe
    • Check whether any other service probing Prometheus triggers the restart
    • Check whether regular Velero backups disturb EBS reads and writes and cause the restart
Check your cluster for this

These 18 cases involve Ingress controller and Container memory limit. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause8

Configuration change2 cases

  1. IL-0063 VPN outage after recreating a Redis StatefulSet restarted the whole Redis cluster without readiness checks
  2. IL-0191 A label selector accidentally added to the Loki distributor Service matched only the new pods of a rollout, which took all write traffic, were OOM-killed and stalled the rollout

Capacity exhaustion6 cases

  1. IL-0581 29CM product display servers lost pods and saturated Netty event loops on the first day of the Igu Week sale
  2. IL-0232 Calico pods in the codfw WikiKube cluster hit their resource limits and crash-looped, taking nodes out one by one
  3. IL-0044 Prometheus OOMKilled in a loop while replaying its write-ahead log after a kube-prometheus-stack upgrade
  4. IL-0046 Prometheus restarted again and again because its WAL replay took longer than the startup probe allowed
  5. IL-0176 Prometheus in a 235-node Kubernetes cluster crash-looped because over two million series exhausted host memory and the kernel OOM killer chose it first, as Burstable QoS gave it oom_score_adj 999
    LINE2020
  6. IL-0503 mybinder.org launches failed after a GKE node ran out of memory and its nginx-ingress proxy pod crash-looped

Dependency failure2 cases

  1. IL-0187 A brief Spring Cloud Config Server downtime failed every client application's liveness probe, because the actuator health check included the config server, and Kubernetes restarted the pods in a kill loop
  2. IL-0103 During an EKS node AMI update, Istio sidecars crash-looped because hundreds of pods restarting at once overloaded the external certificate authority behind istiod

Cloud provider outage1 case

Component
Organisation
  1. IL-0119 ChatGPT web service pods crash-looped on failing health checks after a Cosmos DB failure, leaving too few healthy pods to serve the web layer
    OpenAI2025

Software defect3 cases

Organisation
  1. IL-0495 HubSpot's internal load balancers on Kubernetes were falsely marked unhealthy and the rest collapsed under the traffic
  2. IL-0106 A malformed Traefik IngressRoute triggered a Traefik v2 bug once a node rollover restarted every Traefik pod, and all Kubernetes services returned 404
    DFDS2021
  3. IL-0012 CPU limits and an unpatched kernel CFS quota bug throttled multi-threaded services into stalls, failed health checks and timeouts
    Omio2020

unknown2 cases

  1. IL-0045 Prometheus on the live cluster restarted several times after readiness probe failures, leaving gaps in metrics
  2. IL-0059 Single-master Kubernetes control plane kept dying because the kubelet restarted a healthy etcd on a failing kubeadm liveness probe

Faulty deployment1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0034 A crashing stats agent sidecar marked every pod unready and the service mesh pulled all services out of traffic
    Airbnb2019

Operator error1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0054 All ingress traffic lost while draining a GKE node pool because the load balancer only targeted new nodes without ingress-nginx pods