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Cases18 cases

6 to 10 of 18

  1. Symptoms

    At 7:13 UTC on 20 October 2025, PlanetScale's continuous tests in production started failing because they could not create new database branches. The service that creates, resizes and configures database branches was unavailable, a near-total control plane outage, while existing database branches kept their capacity and connectivity.

    Trigger

    The incident started with a DNS misconfiguration at one of PlanetScale's service providers. An Amazon DynamoDB outage impacted AWS STS, and several hours of capacity constraints and network instability in AWS us-east-1 followed.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    –
    Detection

    PlanetScale's continuous testing in production started failing and alerted engineers at 7:13 UTC. At 10:05 UTC an alert fired for a Kubernetes operator in a large single-tenant customer installation exhausting its resources.

    Remediation
    • Disallowed new databases in us-east-1 and made us-east-2 the default region for new databases
    • Delayed new backups and cancelled pending backups that were waiting for an EC2 instance
    • Advised PlanetScale Managed customers with vtgate autoscaling to shed load
    • Paused draining and terminating EC2 instances older than 30 days
    • Kept vacant EC2 instances for reuse instead of terminating them
    • Bin-packed vtgate processes more tightly for customers with autoscaling
    • Sent manual reparent requests to move primaries to healthier availability zones
    • Restarted the edge load balancer and vtgate processes that did not recover after the partitions healed
    Action items
    • Understand and become resilient to the failure modes of SaaS dependencies for CI/CD, SSO, web application hosting and incident communication
    • Investigate more ambitious ways to reduce runtime dependence on internal and AWS services
    • Look into using all six us-east-1 availability zones to tolerate zonal outages and partitions
    Lessons

    Keeping the control plane separate from the data plane meant the control plane outage did not affect customer databases, and redundancy, automated failover and zonal traffic routing limited the effect of the network partitions. Network partitions are hard to reason about, test and tolerate: with three availability zones a system survives losing one zone only if the other two can still reach each other reliably.

  2. Symptoms

    At 21:40 UTC on 25 June 2025, Alertmanager alerted the OpenStreetMap operations team: minutely replication feed delayed - 6m 2s. Since 21:33 UTC every run of the osmdbt timer that produces the minutely replication diffs had failed with ERROR: invalid memory alloc request size 1243650064.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Alertmanager sent the first alert at 21:40 UTC, minutely replication feed delayed - 6m 2s, and several more followed, but none was a pager or SMS alert. A community report followed at 00:37 UTC and a social media report at 01:13 UTC.

    Remediation
    • Stopped the osmdbt timer
    • Put OpenStreetMap.org into a read-only maintenance window to suppress edits
    • Ran osmdbt by hand with fakelog to skip ahead of the PostgreSQL replication condition
    • Restarted the osmdbt timer for minutely diffs
    • Ended the read-only maintenance window
    Action items
    • Upgrade PostgreSQL to 17.x
    • Raise an issue with the PostgreSQL developers
    Lessons

    Communication with the osmdbt developer was crucial for working out the workaround, and the operations team's understanding of osmdbt was limited.

  3. Symptoms

    On 18 September 2024, while a cookbook was reconfiguring Wikimedia's core MariaDB databases from one-way eqiad -> codfw replication to circular replication ahead of a datacenter switchover, replication in the codfw -> eqiad direction broke on the x1 and es6 sections. Engineers watching the run noticed at 21:28 UTC that the x1 primary was not replicating.

    Trigger

    Running the cookbook sre.switchdc.databases.prepare, which set up codfw -> eqiad replication and started pt-heartbeat, on the row-based x1 and es sections.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Engineers watching the first run of the automation saw on orchestrator that the x1 primary was not replicating, because monitoring of circular replication was not yet enabled. The break in the eqiad -> codfw direction was reported by Icinga.

    Remediation
    • Skipped replication of the heartbeat tables with Replication_wild_ignore_table='heartbeat.%'
    • Inserted the missing heartbeat row with binary logging off on the es hosts
    • Inserted the missing heartbeat row with binary logging off on the x1 codfw hosts and removed the ignore rule
    Action items
    • Avoid the same issue again, probably by inserting the missing row when it is detected
    • Add a post-maintenance health check that replication works in both directions
    • Add options to run the maintenance in another order or on each section individually
    • Update the Phabricator task for each section rather than only at the end
    • Fix the monitoring gaps for circular replication
    • Made pt-heartbeat-wikimedia use STATEMENT format for its session on the x1 and row-based read-write es hosts, fixed in a later deploy
    Lessons

    Circular replication is not a normal working mode, so the first fix only moved the break to the other side; TRUNCATE would have worked better than DELETE because it always replicates as a statement, but it was not considered because it is more dangerous. Running sql_skip_slave_counter was avoided, since it could have made things worse or lost data. The check of the replication channel should also run once all tasks are complete, not only right after setup. The combination of row-based replication, pt-heartbeat and differing heartbeat rows was not described in earlier maintenance or documentation.

  4. Symptoms

    At 11:59AM CDT on Friday 28 August 2020, Basecamp's Ops team received a flood of alerts from PagerDuty, Nagios and Prometheus. Monitoring showed that the newer of the two metro links between the data centers in Ashburn, VA and Chicago, IL had been lost for about 20-30 seconds, and BC3 kept responding slowly after the link came back.

    Trigger

    Both redundant metro links between Basecamp's Ashburn and Chicago data centers dropped for short periods; monitoring showed the newer link down for about 20-30 seconds.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A flood of alerts from PagerDuty, Nagios and Prometheus, with monitoring showing the lost metro link. A lingering alert for one Redis DB instance later pointed to the replication problem.

    Remediation
    • Turned chat off at the load balancer layer so the rest of BC3 could stabilise
    • Restarted Redis on the replica that was stuck in the resynchronization loop
    Action items
    • Make the documented Redis configuration changes for the known replication issue
    • Make concrete plans to remove the shared physical path under the two metro links
    • Prove the failover systems in production at peak load
    • Make explicit room for post-incident follow-up work and push other work out
    Lessons

    Planned redundancy and live testing had given Basecamp a false sense of security, especially at peak load: moving between redundant network links or shifting load across data centers should work without issue, and Basecamp would rather find out in a controlled test with the full team ready. The follow-up from an outage needs urgency and explicitly cleared time, not just a place on a list.

  5. Symptoms

    On a Friday evening in December 2019, Razorpay's internal monitoring alerted on an unusually high number of 5xx errors. The SRE team found that the main application, called API, could not connect to its RDS MySQL database, but within about 110 seconds the application recovered by itself and the alerts stopped. The RDS logs showed that the master instance had gone through a Multi-AZ failover.

    Trigger

    The master instance of the API application's RDS MySQL database went through a Multi-AZ failover to its standby in another availability zone.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    –
    Detection

    An internal monitoring alert on unusually high 5xx errors, then alerts that replication had failed on all replicas. The data loss was found the next day by matching the database against the application trace logs.

    Remediation
    • Moved all read replica traffic to the master instance
    • Recreated all five read replicas after a six-hour full snapshot and moved traffic back to them
    • Recovered the missing queries from the binary logs and corrected the data stored in RDS
    • Changed innodb_flush_log_at_trx_commit on the master from 2 to 1
    Lessons

    With innodb_flush_log_at_trx_commit set to 2, Razorpay had been open to data loss on any failover all along, even though RDS Multi-AZ copies everything on the primary's disk to the standby. The incident also taught the team how RDS runs a Multi-AZ setup and its failovers.

Check your cluster for this

These 18 cases involve Database and Database replication. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause9

Capacity exhaustion4 cases

  1. IL-0379 InfluxDB Cloud queries in Azure West Europe slowed and timed out as storage pods fell behind and kept restarting
  2. IL-0288 ZooKeeperWait rose to thousands of seconds on three redundant ClickHouse instances, degrading a CDN77 data pipeline
    CDN772026
  3. IL-0305 Replicas of one Intercom Vitess shard hit 100% CPU and fell up to 2.2 hours behind, serving stale inbox data
  4. IL-0443 A Repro Aurora MySQL reader restarted unexpectedly and writer insert latency rose about sevenfold for a day or more
    Repro2019

Cloud provider outage2 cases

  1. IL-0322 A GCP storage incident degraded the disk under GitLab.com's primary PostgreSQL and caused two bursts of site-wide 503s
    GitLab2026
  2. IL-0368 PlanetScale's control plane went down and some database branches failed queries during the AWS us-east-1 outage

Breaking change in an upgrade1 case

Contributing factor
Organisation
  1. IL-0569 After an MHA master failover, one of three MySQL replicas failed with a malformed binlog error and could not catch up
    DeNA2026

Software defect3 cases

  1. IL-0527 OpenStreetMap.org made no replication diffs for 16 hours as PostgreSQL logical decoding failed on a memory alloc error
  2. IL-0589 Every Kickstarter MySQL replica on Amazon RDS stopped replicating on a duplicate-key error in the backings table
  3. IL-0303 GitHub's MySQL master failed over to a node with a cold buffer pool during a schema migration and GitHub.com went down
    GitHub2012

Configuration change2 cases

  1. IL-0392 MariaDB replication of section x1 between eqiad and codfw broke on a missing heartbeat row during a cookbook run
  2. IL-0331 An RDS MySQL Multi-AZ failover lost 5 seconds of committed data and broke replication on all five read replicas

Dependency failure1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0255 Basecamp's two redundant links between data centers dropped together and a Redis replica resync loop stalled chat

Hardware failure1 case

  1. IL-0323 A RAID battery backup unit failure crashed db1075, the MariaDB primary of section s3, and every s3 wiki went read-only

DNS or network fault1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0210 GitHub's MySQL clusters failed over to the US West Coast and the site served slow, stale, inconsistent data for 24 hours
    GitHub2018

Operator error3 cases

  1. IL-0431 During Mackerel's move to AWS, PostgreSQL failed over to a replica that had stopped replicating, losing an hour of data
    Hatena2017
  2. IL-0218 GitLab.com's primary PostgreSQL data was wiped by mistake and, with no working backup, the site was down about 18 hours
    GitLab2017
  3. IL-0319 Dropping databases on the MySQL replica mysql2 also dropped them on mysql1, as the pair actually ran master-master