Incident Library
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  • Component
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Cases9 cases

7 to 9 of 9

  1. Symptoms

    In the week of 10 October 2022, Linode Object Storage in Newark had two incidents of reduced performance and availability, on 10 and 16 October, and in some cases the front-end gateways returned 504 gateway timeouts to customers. The second incident began while the first was still being investigated.

    Trigger

    One back-end Object Storage node had a hardware problem that was not an outright failure, so the node kept going up and down.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • Removed the failed back-end infrastructure from the Object Storage cluster
    Action items
    • Improve detection so subtle problems with failing or misbehaving hardware are found and triaged before they affect the wider cluster
    • Describe Ceph-related events more accurately to on-call administrators and define alerts more clearly
    Lessons

    Hardware that misbehaves without failing outright can cause service-wide problems, and Linode's internal monitoring had gaps in spotting such subtle issues before they affected the wider cluster.

  2. Symptoms

    From 20:18 UTC on 11 June 2022, OpenStreetMap.org was unavailable: all of its services hosted in Amsterdam, including www, the API, the wiki and planet, had no connectivity to the Internet. The outage began 18 minutes into Equinix's planned maintenance of power feed A at the Amsterdam data centre.

    Trigger

    Equinix's planned 5-year maintenance of power feed A in Amsterdam, which started at 20:00 UTC on 11 June 2022.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • Waited for the end of the Equinix power feed A maintenance window instead of failing over to Dublin or moving the uplink; connectivity returned at 03:45 UTC
    Action items
    • Acknowledge ongoing outages faster
    • Add monitoring and alerting of switch PSU and FAN states
    • Replace the Cisco SG550X-48 switches and the Redundant Power System with Juniper EX4300 switches with redundant power supplies
    • Install out-of-band access equipment with dual power feeds in Amsterdam
    • Install redundant uplinks
    • Make site failover easier, less manual and lower risk
    • Introduce an on-call pager system for the operations SRE
    • Expand the SRE team
    • Continue and formalise fail-over tests for power, network, upstream link and service outages
  3. Symptoms

    After many hours of training, one job of the tr1-13B Slurm job array crashed at iteration 43680 of 311541 during the backward pass. The next job in the array started by itself and crashed right away, before training began.

    Trigger

    One GPU on one node of the allocation developed a hardware problem that produced uncorrectable ECC errors.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Nobody was around to notice the first crash, and the Slurm scheduler started the next job in the array on its own, which crashed too.

    Remediation
    • Contacted the JZ administrators, who confirmed one of the nodes was faulty
    • Continued training with the next job, which was not placed on the faulty node
    Action items
    • Add %N to the Slurm output setting (#SBATCH --output=%x-%j-%N.out) so each node writes its own log file and the node with a corrupt GPU can be identified
    • Exclude a node known to be faulty from the allocation with sbatch --exclude
    Lessons

    Without a way to link an exception to the hostname of the node that raised it, the scheduler can keep placing the training on the faulty node and the training keeps crashing; per-node log files make the faulty node visible so it can be excluded.

Check your cluster for this

These 9 cases involve GPU hardware and memory and NCCL. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause1

Hardware failure9 cases

  1. IL-0416 Defective GPUs silently corrupted ByteDance's LLM training, showing as loss spikes, NaN and misleading code errors
  2. IL-0478 A failed GPU network adapter made NCCL silently reroute through GPU 0's adapter and slowed MoE training steps
    Amazon2026
  3. IL-0421 Errors, mostly GPU faults, crashed Alibaba LLM training jobs as NCCL errors; a job lost 31.19% of its time in June 2023
  4. IL-0479 Accelerator nodes with silent data corruption changed LLM training outputs, gradients and weights with no error signal
  5. IL-0411 Lemon nodes in Meta's RSC-1 and RSC-2 GPU clusters failed job after job without being caught by health checks
    Meta2024
  6. IL-0540 Korea's local government administrative services and Government24 went down as a router port dropped most large packets
  7. IL-0381 A misbehaving back-end node in Linode's Newark Object Storage slowed the service and caused 504 gateway timeouts
    Linode2022
  8. IL-0525 OpenStreetMap.org went offline for 7h 27m when its uplink switch lost power during a data-centre power feed maintenance
  9. IL-0427 A GPU with uncorrectable ECC errors crashed tr1-13B training, and Slurm's next job went to the same node and crashed too