Incident Library
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Cases24 cases

2 to 6 of 24

  1. Symptoms

    An alert fired one day because an application's error rate had suddenly risen. The error log of the Aurora MySQL RDS instance for that time showed Aurora killing connections and declining queries to avoid running out of memory. The killed queries also made application latency worse.

    Trigger

    An application release added a batch job run every minute by a Kubernetes CronJob. Each run's short-lived pod connected to the database from a new pod IP.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    An alert fired on the application's error rate.

    Remediation
    • Set performance_schema to manual management and capped two related Performance Schema parameters, unlimited by default, at 100 in the parameter group, then restarted the RDS instance
    Lessons

    When system alerts fire but the database's load metrics look calm, Performance Schema growth is worth suspecting. The two parameters that were capped are unlimited by default, so connections from ever-changing source addresses keep adding to the records. Capping them has a cost: once the cap is exceeded, per-host figures in Performance Insights are missing. Putting RDS Proxy between the application and Aurora MySQL to keep source hosts stable is another possible measure.

  2. Symptoms

    On 3 March 2026, during a scheduled maintenance to replace a faulty switch in a cluster in IONOS Cloud's TXL data center, monitoring alerts fired and the hosts in that cluster lost network connectivity. Customers saw intermittent network degradation or outages, and the Data Center Designer (DCD) web frontend and the AI Model Hub became unreachable.

    Trigger

    During a scheduled maintenance to replace a faulty switch, Topology 2 of 2 in the affected cluster was disabled as planned, and a link flap on a switch in Topology 1 then flooded the InfiniBand control plane with alerts and started a fabric resweep.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    IONOS began investigating monitoring alerts in TXL; the first status update was posted at 11:36 UTC.

    Remediation
    • Switched from the affected control plane to its standby
    • Rebooted the locked-up gateways
    • Recovered Topology 1 from the scheduled maintenance
    • Paused provisioning in the cluster that had a backlog of queued jobs
    • Re-enabled provisioning once network connectivity improved and watched job execution
    • Re-established connectivity for the systems that support the DCD
    Action items
    • Adjusted the control-plane configuration to use less aggressive failover timers and reduced heavy sweep activity, lowering the load on the forwarding table
    • Reduced the number of multicast group memberships to relieve the forwarding table
    • Set up continuous monitoring of forwarding table use and control-plane memory with alerts before capacity limits are reached
    • Move the control plane to dedicated high-performance servers, separate from data-plane traffic
    • Audit IPv6 configurations and IPoIB driver settings
    • Modernise the interconnect fabric, including switches, gateways and drivers
    • Hardened IAM maintenance protocols so that critical identity services keep working when the primary Cloud APIs are temporarily unavailable
    • Move IAM to a dedicated platform without a dependency on the standard managed Kubernetes clusters
    • Introduce a dedicated provisioning provider for DBaaS and Managed Kubernetes
    • Add automated circuit breakers to the provisioning engine against overload and queue buildup from self-healing services
    • Improve visibility and control over job execution and prioritisation in the provisioning queue
    • Change the provisioning queue architecture to decouple services and reduce spillover
    Lessons

    IONOS identified the linking of services through the shared provisioning queue as a key reason the degradation lasted as long as it did. Alongside making each service more robust, it is decoupling the provisioning queue and addressing dependencies between services to reduce the blast radius of future incidents.

  3. Symptoms

    On 21 October 2025 at 21:45 UTC a change to timeout handling was deployed to the feature flags service, and two minutes later automated monitoring reported higher error rates. The change was rolled back by 21:49, but error rates stayed high: about 38% of flag evaluation requests in the US datacenter returned errors. At 22:30 Redis metrics showed memory exhaustion on ElastiCache, at 22:35 Postgres connections spiked, and at 22:45 the team found a massive data transfer from Postgres into Redis. The main PostHog application was affected as well, because it shares the Redis instance with the flags service.

    Trigger

    On 21 October a deployment meant to reduce timeout errors (PR #39821); on 24 October the deployment of IP-based rate limiting (PR #40074) that saw all traffic as coming from the load balancer's IP; on 28 October an unrelated routine deployment that rolled the feature flag pods in the US region.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    On 21 October automated monitoring detected higher error rates two minutes after the deploy. On 24 October no alert existed for 429 errors, and the team learned of the incident from customer reports that began at 18:10 UTC, a 62-minute detection delay. On 28 October on-call received a high error count alert. On 29 October the incident was reported with higher error rates and latency. No alert existed for CPU pressure, so the CPU saturation behind all three incidents was not seen directly.

    Remediation
    • rolled back the timeout handling change within 2 minutes on 21 October, which did not stop the errors
    • throttled connections and Redis writes on 21 October
    • halted the rollout on 28 October, scaled the US flags pods to zero until Redis recovered, then scaled them back gradually
    • rolled back hardware changes on 30 October at 00:03 UTC, which removed most errors but not the latency
    • increased the pod resource requests and adjusted the Kubernetes fleet size so fewer pods ran on each node
    • added retry limits to Envoy between the load balancer and the service
    • moved database connection timeouts and other critical settings to runtime configuration and raised the timeout values
    • added per-node and per-pod CPU alerts at 80% sustained for 5 minutes that page on-call
    Action items
    • Form a strike team from the flags, ingestion and infrastructure teams to review the application and infrastructure for remaining bottlenecks
    • Investigate separating the flags Redis instance from the application Redis instance
    • Before re-enabling ArgoCD sync, align the flags service chart configuration with the values in ArgoCD and define the deployment and Redis strategy
    • Make the feature flags team hard code-owners for flags-related code
    • Build a dashboard of key flag metrics with runbook links and update the feature flag runbooks
    • Add missing alerts on existing service and infrastructure metrics
    • Make readiness checks validate dependencies that degrade under load, for example by pinging the database
    • Rate-limit cache population so it cannot overwhelm Redis
    • Monitor connection pools with automatic throttling near exhaustion and limit concurrent connections
    • Build a production-scale load testing framework
    • Build progressive rollout infrastructure to limit blast radius
    • Document Postgres-to-Redis data flows and write runbooks for data transfer storms
    Lessons

    Nodes that are small relative to pod requests let the scheduler pack many pods on each node, and the resulting CPU saturation showed up three different ways: excessive parallelism, connection pool exhaustion and slow queries. Treating each symptom separately let the problem return; right-sizing the pods and nodes fixed all three. CPU must be alerted on from the start. Unbounded Envoy retries and unbounded cache population amplified the overload, and a Redis instance shared with the main application spread a flags problem to the main application. A rollback did not end the incident, because the data transfer and resource exhaustion it had started kept running.

  4. Symptoms

    At 11:48 PM PDT on 19 October 2025, every system that reached DynamoDB in us-east-1 through the public regional endpoint started getting DNS failures and could not connect. This included customer traffic and internal AWS services that depend on DynamoDB. DynamoDB global table replicas in other regions still answered but fell behind in replication to and from us-east-1.

    Trigger

    One DNS Enactor, slowed by unusually high retry delays, applied a much older DNS plan to the regional DynamoDB endpoint just as another Enactor that had applied the newest plan ran its clean-up, which deleted that older plan and with it every IP address of the endpoint.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    DNS failures to DynamoDB began immediately at 11:48 PM PDT and the engineering teams of affected AWS services were engaged at once; by 12:38 AM they had identified DynamoDB's DNS state as the source. The later NLB health check problem was detected by monitoring at 6:52 AM.

    Remediation
    • applied temporary mitigations by 1:15 AM that let some internal services reach DynamoDB and repaired key internal tooling
    • restored all DynamoDB DNS information by 2:25 AM through manual operator intervention
    • throttled incoming work and selectively restarted DWFM hosts from 4:14 AM so droplet leases could be re-established
    • reduced the load on Network Manager to bring network configuration propagation times back to normal by 10:36 AM
    • disabled automatic health check failover for NLB at 9:36 AM, and re-enabled it at 2:09 PM after EC2 recovered
    • relaxed the EC2 request throttles from 11:23 AM until all EC2 APIs and launches were normal at 1:50 PM
    Action items
    • Disable the DynamoDB DNS Planner and DNS Enactor automation worldwide
    • Fix the race condition and add protections against applying incorrect DNS plans before re-enabling the DNS automation
    • Add a velocity control to NLB that limits how much capacity a single load balancer can remove when health check failures cause availability zone failover
    • Build an additional EC2 test suite that exercises the DWFM recovery workflow at scale
    • Improve throttling in EC2 data propagation systems so incoming work is rate limited by the size of the waiting queue
    Lessons

    A single DNS record that automation can empty is enough to take a widely used regional endpoint off the network, and every service built on it fails in turn. A check made once at the start of a long operation can be stale by the time the operation writes its result. Recovery of the dependency is not recovery of the dependents: systems that lost state during the outage, such as EC2's droplet leases and network propagation backlog, can collapse under their own catch-up work, and container services that rely on new instance launches keep failing to launch and scale until that work is done.

  5. Symptoms

    On 1 April 2025 users of Linode Kubernetes Engine (LKE) began having trouble connecting to their clusters' control planes, and the LKE Dashboard was affected as well. Services inside the clusters kept working. The first status update was posted at 20:28 UTC; at 21:33 UTC Linode said it was investigating an issue with DNS functionality within LKE.

    Trigger

    An earlier update to a database that the LKE DNS system depends on caused the DNS service to hang.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    –
    Detection

    The first status update, at 20:28 UTC on 1 April, said Linode was investigating and that users might have difficulty connecting to their cluster control plane. At 21:33 UTC Linode said the issue affected DNS functionality within LKE, and at 22:29 UTC that it had identified the underlying cause.

    Remediation
    • restarted the affected LKE DNS services
    Action items
    • Improve how the DNS services recover from transient connectivity failures to their dependencies
    • Improve monitoring to detect similar problems sooner
    • Update the deployment process to better coordinate changes between dependent systems
    Lessons

    A change to a database that the DNS service depends on can make the DNS service hang, which here cut off external access to the clusters and the LKE Dashboard while services inside the clusters kept working. The DNS service should recover by itself from transient failures of its dependencies, and changes to dependent systems need to be coordinated.

Check your cluster for this

These 24 cases involve Database and Persistent volumes and stateful sets. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause7

Configuration change1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0179 With DEBUG logging and synchronous log output, a high-traffic service filled the 64 KB stdout pipe, so request threads blocked in write() while holding database connections and HikariCP ran dry, failing requests in 30-second bursts

Capacity exhaustion10 cases

  1. IL-0435 Error rates rose as Aurora MySQL killed connections and declined queries to avoid OOM while load metrics stayed flat
  2. IL-0350 Hosts in an IONOS TXL cluster lost connectivity when an InfiniBand fabric resweep failed on a full multicast table
  3. IL-0100 PostHog's feature flags pods were packed onto Kubernetes nodes that were too small for their CPU requests, and CPU saturation above 90% caused three outages in ten days through Redis overload, connection pool exhaustion and slow queries
  4. IL-0110 A Grafana Agent pod's high memory use and crash-looping Hangfire pods drove a Kubernetes node into system OOM and NotReady, twice in one day
    DFDS2024
  5. IL-0202 A burst of queries and database writes exhausted connection pools and memory on Honeycomb's ingest hosts, and Kubernetes crash-loop back-off kept failed hosts offline so ingest capacity stayed too low to recover
  6. IL-0386 After a move to Google Cloud, Postgres connection timeouts and memcached i/o timeouts spiked on GKE nodes
  7. IL-0500 UToronto JupyterHub logins and server starts returned 500 errors when the hub's sqlite database disk filled up
    2i2c2022
  8. IL-0206 Consul agents in GitLab.com's GKE pods were repeatedly OOM-killed, so the Rails pods lost database replica discovery and sent every query to the primary
    GitLab2022
  9. IL-0037 Image registry rate-limited a whole region after a crash-looping DaemonSet with imagePullPolicy Always pulled through three NAT instances
  10. IL-0064 CPU-heavy pods packed onto one Google Cloud node drove it to kernel panics, and the crash moved from node to node until the site was down

Software defect4 cases

  1. IL-0150 A latent race condition in DynamoDB's DNS automation left an empty DNS record for dynamodb.us-east-1.amazonaws.com, and the DynamoDB and EC2 launch failures that followed caused EKS, ECS and Fargate container launch failures and cluster scaling delays in us-east-1
  2. IL-0347 About 25% of Scaleway FR-PAR-1 hypervisors lost VPC connectivity when both VPC BGP route reflectors got stuck
  3. IL-0462 Some MySQL pods on Shopify's GKE clusters took up to 30 minutes to start, slowing instance replacement
  4. IL-0196 Adding a second Redis replica and lowering memory limits in one RedisFailover change restarted the only Redis pod that held data, and Sentinel promoted the empty new replica, erasing the data
    Palark2020

Dependency failure2 cases

  1. IL-0162 LKE users could not reach their cluster control planes or the LKE Dashboard because an earlier database update made the internal LKE DNS service hang
    Linode2025
  2. IL-0489 Rejoining a failed node of Magic Pages' three-node MySQL cluster broke its metadata and took customer websites down

Faulty deployment1 case

  1. IL-0324 Three MediaWiki deployments lost Memcached after a PHP 8.1 rollout and overloaded the External Storage database cluster

Cloud provider outage4 cases

  1. IL-0119 ChatGPT web service pods crash-looped on failing health checks after a Cosmos DB failure, leaving too few healthy pods to serve the web layer
    OpenAI2025
  2. IL-0145 A power sag and chiller failure in one Australia East availability zone took down the AKS control plane's compute and its non-zone-redundant SQL Database operation queue, blocking AKS create, update and delete operations in Australia East and Australia Southeast
  3. IL-0172 An AWS Tokyo data centre cooling failure took down 6 of 60 CockroachDB nodes on Kubernetes within 22 minutes, and ranges lost quorum because the Helm-deployed cluster had no availability zone locality configured
  4. IL-0193 A GCP persistent disk degradation took down a Cassandra StatefulSet whose OrderedReady policy blocked recovery, and Metrictank could not reconnect to the recreated pods, causing a 23-hour Graphite query outage

Operator error2 cases

  1. IL-0207 A routine task run from an engineer's local environment switched to production and deleted GitLab.com's Consul release, so Patroni lost Consul and GitLab.com returned 5xx errors to all traffic
    GitLab2022
  2. IL-0506 UC Berkeley DataHub logins failed and students got empty home directories after the JupyterHub database was overwritten