Incident Library
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Cases23 cases

11 to 15 of 23

  1. Symptoms

    On 7 July 2023 from 11:05 to 15:25 UTC many public Jenkins infrastructure services were completely down, including get.jenkins.io, plugins.jenkins.io, accounts.jenkins.io, javadoc.jenkins.io and incrementals.jenkins.io, while ci.jenkins.io, issues.jenkins.io, repo.jenkins-ci.org and www.jenkins.io were partly or completely disrupted.

    Trigger

    After the upgrade to Kubernetes 1.25 changed the range of the pods' originating IP and LDAP access was blocked, a fix (Azure PR 431) deployed at 10:55 UTC to set a proper set of pod IP ranges removed all node pools of the cluster.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    After the upgrade, at 10:30 UTC, the team noticed that services inside the cluster, such as accounts.jenkins.io, could not reach the LDAP service.

    Remediation
    • Created the cluster again from scratch with a fixed network setup
    • Set a custom pod CIDR in a range separate from the virtual network
    • Moved the services and their DNS records to new public IPs
    • Pushed a pull request that recorded the manual rebuild, including the IP setup, in code
    Action items
    • Protect the public IPs from deletion with a Management Lock
    • Keep the public IPs in a separate resource group and point the Kubernetes-managed load balancers to it with the service.beta.kubernetes.io/azure-load-balancer-resource-group annotation
    • Improve network diagrams and documentation so possible overlaps are visible when preparing operations
    • Avoid changing the configuration of all AKS node pools at once
    Lessons

    The team said that changing one node pool at a time would have shown the problem after the first pool and avoided a full outage, and that the public IPs should change as little as possible because users behind corporate firewalls with allow-lists depend on them. The team also noted that it could rebuild, in under 4 hours, the cluster that hosts almost all public services.

  2. Symptoms

    From 14:43 to 15:03 UTC on 24 October 2022, during regular maintenance of the Kubernetes cluster that hosts PyPI, PyPI's backends could not be reached over HTTPS. The CDN could not fetch pages, uploads to uploads.pypi.org were impossible, and other services such as the legacy file redirect service were interrupted.

    Trigger

    Regular maintenance did a rolling restart of every node in the cluster to roll out upgrades and new configuration; as the new Kubernetes API server hosts came up, Kubernetes validated and refreshed the Ingress configurations.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • Pointed the Ingress configuration at the new ACM TLS certificate, and Kubernetes restored the HTTPS listener on the ELB
    Action items
    • Investigate managing the hostnames on the ACM TLS certificates for PyPI's Ingress through Kubernetes resources instead of the AWS console
    Lessons

    When every resource is managed through the Kubernetes API, drift between the desired state and reality is less likely to build up and then surface during later maintenance.

  3. Symptoms

    LOTTE ON, Lotte E-commerce's online shopping mall of about 40 microservices on Amazon EKS, returned errors for a period of time whenever the Horizontal Pod Autoscaler (HPA) scaled pods in after load dropped. Requests reached containers that had already been deleted and failed with 502 errors.

    Trigger

    HPA scale-in deleting pods, and the deletion of Blue pods after a blue/green switch of the Service label selector.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • delayed container shutdown on pod deletion (a wait in the SIGTERM handler or a preStop sleep, capped by terminationGracePeriodSeconds) so containers stop only after the pod has left the Service endpoints
    • switched some workloads' Ingress-created ALBs from instance mode to IP mode so traffic goes straight to pod IPs without iptables and conntrack
    Action items
    • Move all workloads to ALB IP mode gradually
    Lessons

    Removing a pod from Service endpoints and stopping its containers happen at the same time in Kubernetes, so a pod can stop while traffic is still routed to it unless shutdown is delayed with a preStop hook or in the application. With an instance-mode ALB, traffic passes through node iptables and conntrack, and established connections can keep going to a pod IP after its iptables rules are gone. IP mode avoids that path, within the limit of 1000 targets per target group.

  4. Symptoms

    The graph of WebSocket connections to messaging-hub, the messaging platform used by the Japanese food delivery service Demaecan, showed sudden deep drops even outside peak traffic. The drops kept coming back at irregular intervals. Messages still reached clients, because messaging-hub switches to Firebase Cloud Messaging when a WebSocket is gone.

    Trigger

    Another service that shared the same L7 load balancer deployed its own load balancer configuration in the Verda dashboard, which reloaded HAProxy; 30 minutes later, at the hard-stop-after limit, the old HAProxy process exited and closed every WebSocket connection it still held.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The developer noticed deep, sudden drops in the WebSocket connection graph that were not tied to peak traffic and kept recurring irregularly. The Nginx packet drops were found through network monitoring.

    Remediation
    • separated the Merchant system's token issuance API into its own deployment so reconnect traffic did not delay other Merchant APIs
    • scaled out Nginx with pod anti-affinity and a label selector so each pod ran on a different node, which stopped the nf_conntrack packet drops
    • raised Ingress Nginx proxy-read-timeout and proxy-send-timeout and the load balancer timeout to 3600s, which did not stop the drops
    • moved messaging-hub from the shared L7 load balancer to an L4 load balancer, which ended the WebSocket drops
    Lessons

    A reload of a shared load balancer by a different team can cut long-lived connections, and with hard-stop-after the cut comes 30 minutes later, far from the change that caused it. The author's lesson is not to narrow the scope of the search too early: trusting that the infrastructure was fine kept the investigation inside the team's own systems for days. A reconnect wave from many WebSocket clients can overload the systems that issue connection tokens and fill nf_conntrack on proxy nodes. Scaling Nginx out only helps for conntrack if the pods land on different nodes, and anti-affinity leaves extra replicas Pending once they outnumber the nodes. That messaging-hub problems can still load the connected systems remains an open problem.

  5. Symptoms

    On 11 July 2022 users reported in the #ask-cloud-platform Slack channel that their applications on the Ministry of Justice Cloud Platform were slow some of the time. About 25% of ingress traffic was affected: after an AWS incident the day before, one of the three network interfaces of the 'default' ingress controllers performed slowly, and clients timed out when they tried to connect to one of the Elastic IPs of the Network Load Balancer (NLB) in front of them.

    Trigger

    Some instances of the AWS NLB health checking subsystem were restarted, which set off a latent software race condition in that subsystem.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    –
    Detection

    Users reported slow performance of their applications in the #ask-cloud-platform Slack channel.

    Remediation
    • AWS restarted the NLB health checking subsystem, which refreshed its list of targets and recovered the NLB in the affected Availability Zone
    Action items
    • Raised mitigation tickets after a post-incident review, filed as post-aws-incident issues in the ministryofjustice/cloud-platform repository
Check your cluster for this

These 23 cases involve Cloud load balancer and Ingress controller. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause7

Cloud provider outage4 cases

  1. IL-0438 Builder Work became almost entirely unreachable with 504 errors when the Amazon CloudFront VPC Origins feature failed
    ANDPAD2026
  2. IL-0463 Secure Connect connectors timed out after a GKE control plane upgrade left Harness's internal load balancer unreachable
  3. IL-0542 Twingate authentication and authorization requests failed at higher rates after traffic moved onto a smaller GKE cluster
  4. IL-0364 A quarter of Cloud Platform ingress traffic was slow because an AWS NLB stopped health-checking targets in one zone

Breaking change in an upgrade3 cases

  1. IL-0405 An expired AWS Load Balancer Controller webhook certificate left no healthy targets and took BSEE SaaS down
  2. IL-0079 A GKE node auto-upgrade to an ubuntu_containerd image with a kernel regression left kube-proxy unable to apply its ip6tables rules, so load balancer health checks failed and several clusters lost all ingress traffic
  3. IL-0203 A routine Kubernetes cluster system update made the AWS Load Balancer Controller fail, so new pods were never registered with the ALB and Honeycomb's EU1 ingest and UI went down once the last old pods were replaced

Faulty deployment2 cases

  1. IL-0188 Rolling updates on EKS returned 502 errors for about 30 seconds because Kubernetes deleted old pods as soon as new pods passed readiness, before the ALB had marked the new pod targets healthy
  2. IL-0530 Virtual router controllers in us-central1 ran out of memory in a loop, cutting networking for new and migrated VMs

Software defect3 cases

  1. IL-0150 A latent race condition in DynamoDB's DNS automation left an empty DNS record for dynamodb.us-east-1.amazonaws.com, and the DynamoDB and EC2 launch failures that followed caused EKS, ECS and Fargate container launch failures and cluster scaling delays in us-east-1
  2. IL-0106 A malformed Traefik IngressRoute triggered a Traefik v2 bug once a node rollover restarted every Traefik pod, and all Kubernetes services returned 404
    DFDS2021
  3. IL-0030 Most nodes of a cluster went NotReady together for 15 minutes while the API server sat behind an AWS ELB

Configuration change9 cases

  1. IL-0192 A Crossplane composition merge-policy change for a TLS policy update switched Kubernetes Services from LoadBalancer to ClusterIP and deleted the load balancers behind about 25% of Grafana Cloud services
  2. IL-0473 Jenkins infrastructure went fully down after a pod IP range fix deleted every AKS node pool and could not recreate them
  3. IL-0513 PyPI backends on Kubernetes were unreachable over HTTPS for 20 minutes when the Ingress ELB lost its HTTPS listener
  4. IL-0177 WebSocket connections to LINE's messaging-hub on Kubernetes dropped all at once whenever another service's change reloaded a shared HAProxy L7 load balancer, and the reconnect wave overloaded a token API and filled nf_conntrack on Nginx
  5. IL-0208 A GitLab chart bump that renamed Kubernetes Service and Deployment ports made the GCP load balancer reconfigure, and GitLab.com slowed down and returned intermittent 50x errors
    GitLab2022
  6. IL-0111 Switching the main Kubernetes ingress controller from Traefik v1 to v2 stopped X-Forwarded headers being passed, which broke the Okta login flow for every service using Okta and stopped DFDS online bookings for over an hour
    DFDS2021
  7. IL-0105 Replacing the AWS VPC CNI during a Terraform refactoring detached the ALB target groups, and every service in the Kubernetes cluster returned 503
    DFDS2021
  8. IL-0365 A Terraform change to auto-scaling groups detached all worker nodes from both ALBs and cut off every cluster service
    DFDS2020
  9. IL-0052 A cryptocurrency miner ran on every node of the development and staging clusters through a public, unauthenticated Weave Scope dashboard

DNS or network fault1 case

Contributing factor
Organisation
  1. IL-0178 On EKS, HPA scale-in returned 502 errors because containers stopped before their pod IPs left the Service endpoints, and after blue/green switches conntrack kept sending established connections to deleted pods behind an instance-mode ALB

Operator error1 case

  1. IL-0089 A test cluster deletion script run with the kube context pointing at the live-1 production cluster deleted its ingress controller, monitoring, logging, cert-manager, kiam and external-dns