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Cases25 cases

11 to 15 of 25

  1. Symptoms

    The graph of WebSocket connections to messaging-hub, the messaging platform used by the Japanese food delivery service Demaecan, showed sudden deep drops even outside peak traffic. The drops kept coming back at irregular intervals. Messages still reached clients, because messaging-hub switches to Firebase Cloud Messaging when a WebSocket is gone.

    Trigger

    Another service that shared the same L7 load balancer deployed its own load balancer configuration in the Verda dashboard, which reloaded HAProxy; 30 minutes later, at the hard-stop-after limit, the old HAProxy process exited and closed every WebSocket connection it still held.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The developer noticed deep, sudden drops in the WebSocket connection graph that were not tied to peak traffic and kept recurring irregularly. The Nginx packet drops were found through network monitoring.

    Remediation
    • separated the Merchant system's token issuance API into its own deployment so reconnect traffic did not delay other Merchant APIs
    • scaled out Nginx with pod anti-affinity and a label selector so each pod ran on a different node, which stopped the nf_conntrack packet drops
    • raised Ingress Nginx proxy-read-timeout and proxy-send-timeout and the load balancer timeout to 3600s, which did not stop the drops
    • moved messaging-hub from the shared L7 load balancer to an L4 load balancer, which ended the WebSocket drops
    Lessons

    A reload of a shared load balancer by a different team can cut long-lived connections, and with hard-stop-after the cut comes 30 minutes later, far from the change that caused it. The author's lesson is not to narrow the scope of the search too early: trusting that the infrastructure was fine kept the investigation inside the team's own systems for days. A reconnect wave from many WebSocket clients can overload the systems that issue connection tokens and fill nf_conntrack on proxy nodes. Scaling Nginx out only helps for conntrack if the pods land on different nodes, and anti-affinity leaves extra replicas Pending once they outnumber the nodes. That messaging-hub problems can still load the connected systems remains an open problem.

  2. Symptoms

    At 18:56 PDT on 23 June 2022 (01:56 UTC on 24 June) several models went offline at once: some fine-tuned curie and davinci models, the Codex beta models code-davinci-001 and code-cushman-001, the legacy GPT models curie, babbage and ada, and all Embeddings models.

    Trigger

    A destructive operation on one of the three production clusters, caused by human error that the existing safeguards did not catch, took the whole cluster offline.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • re-allocated the models from the lost cluster to the remaining two clusters
    • rebuilt the VPN link with Azure support after losing the connection to AKS during cluster setup
    • built workarounds with Azure support after losing the connection to Azure Private Link
    • tore down the cluster and rebuilt it from scratch after the upgraded Kubernetes version broke the ingress
    • moved traffic back into the rebuilt cluster between 05:30 and 06:30 PDT
    Action items
    • Add checks and locks so that this and similar production-critical infrastructure cannot be modified by accident
    • Add better visibility into the operations being performed and make parts of the system more lexicographically distinct
    • Keep working with Azure on the AKS network connectivity issues so they do not disrupt new cluster operations
    • Update playbooks with the new cluster failure modes and change the setup steps for new clusters and infrastructure
    • Upgrade Kubernetes systematically and set aside time so the clusters do not fall behind again
    • Shard fine-tuned models across multiple clusters and work towards more automatic cross-cluster replication
    • Distribute and replicate Azure Blob Storage so fine-tuned models load faster and more reliably
    • Finish rolling out node-to-node caching to relieve Azure Blob Storage bottlenecks
    • Change how model weights are stored so they are more efficient and faster to load
    Lessons

    Losing one of three clusters exhausted the GPU headroom, and GPUs could not be added on short notice, so full recovery depended on bringing the same cluster back. Rebuilding it exposed a deferred Kubernetes upgrade: the newer version broke the ingress, and because AKS cannot downgrade there was no way back except a full rebuild. Recovering many large models at once is limited by the bandwidth of the storage they load from, and the caches that normally hide this do not help when everything moves to a different cluster.

  3. Symptoms

    At 08:00 UTC on 2021-09-06 every service in DFDS's Kubernetes cluster answered with 404. Investigation started five minutes later.

    Trigger

    The automated Kubernetes node rollover on 2021-09-06 restarted all the Traefik v2 pods, five days after a malformed IngressRoute manifest had been applied.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    All services returned 404 from 08:00 UTC and root cause investigation started at 08:05. Time to detection was 5 minutes.

    Remediation
    • changed the ALB health check path, which made the targets healthy but did not stop the 404s
    • rolled back by hand to Traefik v1 as the main ingress controller
    • deleted the malformed IngressRoute by hand and confirmed the Traefik v2 bug
    • applied the changes upstream
    Action items
    • Upgrade Traefik to v2.5, where the bug is fixed, and verify that it removes the bug
    • Change the Traefik v2 health check path to something more robust
    • Set up an external liveness probe on the ingress controller
    • Consider workload segmentation to limit the blast zone
    • Look into monitoring the Traefik v2 API for rapid changes
    • Look into smoke testing during and after node rollover
    Lessons

    A malformed IngressRoute did nothing visible for five days and then took down all ingress when every Traefik v2 pod had restarted during a node rollover. Because Traefik v2 failed gracefully, the first signals pointed at the ALB health checks instead of at Traefik. On incident handling, the team concluded that appointing an incident manager could have helped, that the war room meeting should be recorded and a log book kept, that people not involved should only make suggestions in writing, and that a short first round of sharing thoughts and gut feelings is useful.

  4. Symptoms

    After the switch to Traefik v2, functional tests indicated that everything was fine, and this was reported on Slack at 08:44 UTC. The first sign of trouble came at 09:26 UTC, when a developer reported a high count of HTTP 307 redirects, especially on the Okta service. At 09:32 UTC the team learned that the online booking system was down.

    Trigger

    At 08:22 UTC the AWS load balancers were updated to send requests to the new Traefik v2 reverse proxy as part of the migration away from Traefik v1.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A developer reported a high count of HTTP 307 redirects, in particular on the Okta service, at 09:26 UTC, 64 minutes after the change; six minutes later the team was told the online booking system was down. The functional tests run after the switch had not caught it.

    Remediation
    • Rolled back the switch to Traefik v2, putting rollback ahead of investigation because of how critical the booking system is
    Action items
    • Consider how critical announcements can be made more visible
    • Consider whether the ALBs used for testing should have been shared with the teams so they could test their own scenarios
    Lessons

    Cloud Engineering cannot test every application scenario on its own, even after testing its own applications for weeks. A header that changes value behind a new ingress controller, here x-forwarded-proto going from https to http, can break an authentication flow while basic functional tests still pass. DFDS asks whether diffing request headers before and after the migration would have shown the problem in advance.

  5. Symptoms

    At 13:15 on 9 June 2021 a user reported in the #ask-cloud-platform channel that deploying a UAT application failed on its Ingress resource.

    Trigger

    The Cloud Platform team upgraded the ModSec ingress controller module to v3.33.0; the deployment appeared to succeed.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A user reported the deployment error in the #ask-cloud-platform Slack channel at 13:15.

    Remediation
    • rolled back the ModSec ingress controller module to v0.0.7
    Action items
    • Find out why the issue was not flagged in the test cluster and try to reproduce it, possibly with a new test (ticket #2972)
    • Add a smoke test that checks the alerts in Alertmanager (ticket #2973)
    • Add a helloworld app that uses the ModSec controller so smoke tests can check that traffic works (ticket #2974)
    • Make a new version of the ModSec module work on EKS for both live-1 and live; neither the old nor the new version works on live (ticket #2975)
Check your cluster for this

These 25 cases involve Ingress controller and Cloud load balancer. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause8

Breaking change in an upgrade5 cases

  1. IL-0098 After 2i2c moved from ingress-nginx to nginx-ingress, a hub's Ingress took priority over cert-manager's temporary Ingress for the same host, so new hubs could not get TLS certificates
    2i2c2026
  2. IL-0092 Upgrading ingress-nginx from 1.12.0 to 1.14.3 brought a newer ModSecurity and OWASP Core Rule Set whose false positives blocked HMPPS Auth, so users could not sign in to their applications
  3. IL-0117 A scheduled maintenance and an ingress upgrade on OpenAI's user-facing clusters caused a networking control plane regression that briefly broke the data plane, and the services that restarted then overwhelmed a backend persistence store with a heavy first-start query
    OpenAI2024
  4. IL-0203 A routine Kubernetes cluster system update made the AWS Load Balancer Controller fail, so new pods were never registered with the ALB and Honeycomb's EU1 ingest and UI went down once the last old pods were replaced
  5. IL-0090 After an upgrade of the ModSec ingress controller module, its validating webhook served a certificate for the wrong service name and blocked every Ingress create and change

Faulty deployment3 cases

  1. IL-0188 Rolling updates on EKS returned 502 errors for about 30 seconds because Kubernetes deleted old pods as soon as new pods passed readiness, before the ALB had marked the new pod targets healthy
  2. IL-0086 A deployment meant for a CircleCI test Kubernetes cluster also removed Traefik and Calico resources from the production cluster, taking down the CircleCI UI and runner.circleci.com
  3. IL-0088 A validating admission webhook added by a new ingress controller module version made the live-1 cluster reject every new Ingress with an x509 error

Operator error4 cases

  1. IL-0095 An engineer deleted the prod namespace of the LEAP JupyterHub while believing the kubeconfig pointed at a new cluster, and the hub was down for about an hour
    2i2c2025
  2. IL-0115 One of OpenAI's three production AKS clusters went offline through a human error, and rebuilding it took 10½ hours because an AKS Kubernetes upgrade broke the ingress and AKS cannot be downgraded
    OpenAI2022
  3. IL-0089 A test cluster deletion script run with the kube context pointing at the live-1 production cluster deleted its ingress controller, monitoring, logging, cert-manager, kiam and external-dns
  4. IL-0054 All ingress traffic lost while draining a GKE node pool because the load balancer only targeted new nodes without ingress-nginx pods

Capacity exhaustion3 cases

  1. IL-0170 During a Lunar New Year event, traffic more than three times normal filled the nf_conntrack table on the EKS node running the Istio ingress gateway, dropping packets and taking down Backpackr's web and app services
  2. IL-0093 Ingress controller pods crash-looped one after another because the leader pod had exhausted its shared memory
  3. IL-0031 Kubernetes API server OOM-killed, leaving the Skipper ingress without routes; the talk points to a misconfigured CronJob manifest

Software defect6 cases

  1. IL-0053 Unauthenticated ingress-nginx admission webhook let anyone on the pod network run code and read every Secret in the cluster (IngressNightmare, CVE-2025-1974)
    Wiz2025
  2. IL-0081 API requests timed out during deployment rollouts because the ingress-nginx enable-serial-reloads option held back endpoint updates while a long NGINX reload was running
    Cresta2025
  3. IL-0106 A malformed Traefik IngressRoute triggered a Traefik v2 bug once a node rollover restarted every Traefik pod, and all Kubernetes services returned 404
    DFDS2021
  4. IL-0062 Intermittent 502 errors behind a GKE Ingress because pods shut down before the load balancer stopped sending them traffic
  5. IL-0011 HAProxy ingress piled requests onto the same pods because a Go template visited the backend map in sorted pod IP order
  6. IL-0072 High etcd write latency made the API servers return stale data, and the production cluster flipped between two views of its state

DNS or network fault1 case

Contributing factor
Organisation
  1. IL-0178 On EKS, HPA scale-in returned 502 errors because containers stopped before their pod IPs left the Service endpoints, and after blue/green switches conntrack kept sending established connections to deleted pods behind an instance-mode ALB

Configuration change2 cases

Organisation
  1. IL-0177 WebSocket connections to LINE's messaging-hub on Kubernetes dropped all at once whenever another service's change reloaded a shared HAProxy L7 load balancer, and the reconnect wave overloaded a token API and filled nf_conntrack on Nginx
    LINE+2022
  2. IL-0111 Switching the main Kubernetes ingress controller from Traefik v1 to v2 stopped X-Forwarded headers being passed, which broke the Okta login flow for every service using Okta and stopped DFDS online bookings for over an hour
    DFDS2021

Cloud provider outage1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0014 A GKE upgrade to a withdrawn version stalled on slow drains and a stuck node pool, then broke an ingress and confused the HPA