Cases43 cases

13 to 17 of 43

1. IL-0473 Jenkins infrastructure went fully down after a pod IP range fix deleted every AKS node pool and could not recreate them

   Jenkins project2023

   Symptoms

   On 7 July 2023 from 11:05 to 15:25 UTC many public Jenkins infrastructure services were completely down, including get.jenkins.io, plugins.jenkins.io, accounts.jenkins.io, javadoc.jenkins.io and incrementals.jenkins.io, while ci.jenkins.io, issues.jenkins.io, repo.jenkins-ci.org and www.jenkins.io were partly or completely disrupted.

   Network unreachableResources deletedCluster or node provisioning stallService outage

   Trigger

   After the upgrade to Kubernetes 1.25 changed the range of the pods' originating IP and LDAP access was blocked, a fix (Azure PR 431) deployed at 10:55 UTC to set a proper set of pod IP ranges removed all node pools of the cluster.

   Root cause

   Configuration change

   Component

   Node poolCNI pluginCloud load balancer

   Contributing factor

   Unverified assumptionNo staged rolloutNo safeguard on destructive change

   Detection

   After the upgrade, at 10:30 UTC, the team noticed that services inside the cluster, such as accounts.jenkins.io, could not reach the LDAP service.

   Remediation

   • Created the cluster again from scratch with a fixed network setup
   • Set a custom pod CIDR in a range separate from the virtual network
   • Moved the services and their DNS records to new public IPs
   • Pushed a pull request that recorded the manual rebuild, including the IP setup, in code

   Action items

   • Protect the public IPs from deletion with a Management Lock
   • Keep the public IPs in a separate resource group and point the Kubernetes-managed load balancers to it with the service.beta.kubernetes.io/azure-load-balancer-resource-group annotation
   • Improve network diagrams and documentation so possible overlaps are visible when preparing operations
   • Avoid changing the configuration of all AKS node pools at once

   Lessons

   The team said that changing one node pool at a time would have shown the problem after the first pool and avoided a full outage, and that the public IPs should change as little as possible because users behind corporate firewalls with allow-lists depend on them. The team also noted that it could rebuild, in under 4 hours, the cluster that hosts almost all public services.

   View case
2. IL-0083 Intermittent 5xx errors in a multi-tenant Kubernetes cluster came from internal DNS: the node-local dnsmasq hit its 150 concurrent query limit, did not cache cluster.local answers, and ndots search lookups flooded CoreDNS

   Adevinta2023

   Symptoms

   On a Friday afternoon a tenant of SCHIP, Adevinta's multi-tenant Kubernetes runtime, reported a spike of HTTP 5xx errors in some of its services. The drops in quality of service came back periodically through the following days, each one short, and were reported mostly around midnight.

   High error rateDNS resolution failuresHigh latency

   Root cause

   DNS or network fault

   Component

   CoreDNSClient-side DNS resolver and cacheTelemetry agent

   Contributing factor

   Unreviewed defaultsUnknown limitIgnored early signalUnverified assumption

   Detection

   A tenant reported a spike of HTTP 5xx errors in some of its services; the DNS Latency SLI had already been degraded for some time without being acted on.

   Remediation

   • raised the dnsmasq concurrent query limit from 150 to 1500
   • added a CoreDNS header block that sets the ra and aa flags and clears rd, so dnsmasq caches cluster.local answers
   • configured dnsmasq on each node to answer NXDOMAIN for unresolvable search-domain names instead of forwarding them to CoreDNS
   • changed the fluent-bit log router hostname to a fully qualified name
   • asked the affected tenants to use fully qualified names for internal calls

   Lessons

   The DNS Latency SLI had shown the problem long before anyone looked at it. An SLO only protects you when its SLIs are trusted and a drop is investigated. The investigation took a month partly because several on-call groups worked on it separately, without one place for observations and hypotheses, and sometimes chased hypotheses already discarded. Disprove one hypothesis before starting the next, and collect data the metrics system lacks: DNStop showed the garbage lookups that no dashboard did. With ndots:5, short service names multiply DNS traffic; a node-local cache only helps if it can cache the cluster DNS answers at all.

   View case
3. IL-0087 After a cold reboot of RKE2 nodes, pods could not get IP addresses because Multus could not reach the Kubernetes API, and further reboots spread the failure to every node

   Fyra Labs2023

   Symptoms

   At around 2 AM ICT on 2023-04-09 the team saw unusual CPU use on one cluster node, which throttled every other service on it and made them fail. They presumed an upstream container runtime bug in containerd and runc and decided to fully reboot the affected nodes, taking the cluster down for maintenance on the assumption that it was not in active use.

   Sustained high node CPUService outage

   Trigger

   A full cold reboot of the nodes that showed unusual CPU use, followed by upgrades and cold reboots of the other nodes.

   Root cause

   unknown

   Component

   Multus meta-CNICalicoContainer runtime

   Contributing factor

   Harmful manual actionUnverified assumption

   Detection

   The team saw unusual CPU use on a node around 2 AM ICT and failing services on the rebooted nodes around 2:30 ICT; developers reported the Terra repositories down at 6:31 ICT.

   Remediation

   • uninstalled Multus and Calico and replaced them with the Cilium CNI
   • rolled back most cluster settings except the CNI

   Lessons

   Rebooting nodes to clear one problem can expose another; here a CNI chain could not reach the API server after a cold start. Repeating the same reboot on more nodes while the first failure was not understood spread the outage from a few nodes to the whole cluster. The team also found that Cilium's real resource use in their cluster was acceptable, contrary to the benchmark they had relied on.

   View case
4. IL-0231 Deleting EKS managed node groups also deleted Karpenter's instance profile, and every Stytch worker node shut down

   Stytch2023

   Symptoms

   On 23 February 2023 Stytch's EKS worker nodes went Ready:Unknown one after another, Karpenter failed to launch replacement nodes, and with fewer and fewer pods scheduled the Live Stytch API went down for 14 minutes, returning 5XX on every call.

   Node NotReadyScale-up failurePod evictionPods PendingService outage

   Trigger

   At 14:21 UTC Stytch landed a change to remove unused EKS managed node groups, because it had decided to run its data plane applications fully on nodes provisioned by Karpenter. Because Crossplane resources use an orphan deletion policy, engineers deleted the node groups in the AWS console, first in staging and then in production.

   Root cause

   Configuration change

   Component

   KarpenterNode poolConfiguration templating

   Contributing factor

   Unverified assumptionShared credentialChange with a delayed effectIgnored early signal

   Detection

   Low-urgency alerts that Karpenter could not find the instance profile fired in staging at 16:06 UTC and in production at 17:48 UTC but were not treated as an incident. The incident process started at 20:26 UTC when node launch failures spiked the Karpenter error rate, and Kubernetes monitoring alerts in production followed at 20:44 UTC. The support team flagged the outage at 21:14 UTC.

   Remediation

   • Reverted the node group deletion, which recreated the managed node groups
   • Manually scaled up one of the Live API node groups with more and much larger nodes and removed its taints
   • Removed node selectors from the applications one after another so their pods could be scheduled

   Action items

   • Treat Karpenter errors as high-urgency alerts that page the on-call engineer
   • Tune cluster alerting thresholds to send a high-urgency page earlier
   • Add alerts for nodes that stay NotReady or Unknown for long periods
   • Raise the thresholds of other deployment alerts, such as unschedulable pods and replicas not available
   • Give Karpenter its own IAM instance profile, separate from the one used by the node groups
   • Separate other AWS resources that were shared between uses, specifically IAM and security groups
   • Rework the EKS and Karpenter configuration so system instance profiles are unique, static per cluster and generated by Karpenter
   • Introduce a cloud visualization tool for engineers making infrastructure changes
   • Add live system and product metrics to the status page
   • Ask AWS to confirm the undocumented actions and side effects of deleting a node group
   • Correct the shared use of IAM roles and security groups across the infrastructure

   Lessons

   The IAM role for Karpenter's self-managed nodes should never have been the same as the one for the managed node groups; sharing it is what let the node group deletion break Karpenter, and the roles had been left combined for speed and simplicity when Karpenter was first set up. The hours-long delay between the configuration change and its effect made the incident hard to assess, and AWS confirmed that this delay is expected, so Stytch will allow for it in future IAM instance profile changes.

   View case
5. IL-0177 WebSocket connections to LINE's messaging-hub on Kubernetes dropped all at once whenever another service's change reloaded a shared HAProxy L7 load balancer, and the reconnect wave overloaded a token API and filled nf_conntrack on Nginx

   LINE Plus2022

   Symptoms

   The graph of WebSocket connections to messaging-hub, the messaging platform used by the Japanese food delivery service Demaecan, showed sudden deep drops even outside peak traffic. The drops kept coming back at irregular intervals. Messages still reached clients, because messaging-hub switches to Firebase Cloud Messaging when a WebSocket is gone.

   Connection resetsDatabase overloadIntermittent connection failuresHigh latency

   Trigger

   Another service that shared the same L7 load balancer deployed its own load balancer configuration in the Verda dashboard, which reloaded HAProxy; 30 minutes later, at the hard-stop-after limit, the old HAProxy process exited and closed every WebSocket connection it still held.

   Root cause

   Configuration change

   Component

   HAProxyCloud load balancerconntrack tableIngress controller

   Contributing factor

   Change with a delayed effectExcessive blast radiusRetry stormUnverified assumption

   Detection

   The developer noticed deep, sudden drops in the WebSocket connection graph that were not tied to peak traffic and kept recurring irregularly. The Nginx packet drops were found through network monitoring.

   Remediation

   • separated the Merchant system's token issuance API into its own deployment so reconnect traffic did not delay other Merchant APIs
   • scaled out Nginx with pod anti-affinity and a label selector so each pod ran on a different node, which stopped the nf_conntrack packet drops
   • raised Ingress Nginx proxy-read-timeout and proxy-send-timeout and the load balancer timeout to 3600s, which did not stop the drops
   • moved messaging-hub from the shared L7 load balancer to an L4 load balancer, which ended the WebSocket drops

   Lessons

   A reload of a shared load balancer by a different team can cut long-lived connections, and with hard-stop-after the cut comes 30 minutes later, far from the change that caused it. The author's lesson is not to narrow the scope of the search too early: trusting that the infrastructure was fine kept the investigation inside the team's own systems for days. A reconnect wave from many WebSocket clients can overload the systems that issue connection tokens and fill nf_conntrack on proxy nodes. Scaling Nginx out only helps for conntrack if the pods land on different nodes, and anti-affinity leaves extra replicas Pending once they outnumber the nodes. That messaging-hub problems can still load the connected systems remains an open problem.

   View case

By root cause10