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Cases33 cases

16 to 20 of 33

  1. Symptoms

    At 03:23 UTC on 27 March 2022, BattleMetrics' primary PostgreSQL database, which holds all account, server and player information, went into read-only mode. Users first saw the website fail to load, and soon RCON updates and queries began to fail as well.

    Trigger

    A corruption of the index on the player identifiers table, which BattleMetrics' logs place at about 26 February 2022, made every vacuum job fail, so transaction IDs kept climbing until Postgres stopped accepting writes on 27 March.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Users failed to load the website and reported it as their API keys expired, then RCON updates and queries began to fail, and the team found that the main database no longer accepted writes.

    Remediation
    • Shut the database down and dropped the corrupted player identifiers index in single-user mode
    • Ran the vacuum again, which succeeded and let the database accept writes
    • Rebuilt the player identifier index, which took about two hours
    • Shut down the query workers and gave RCON updates priority
    • Pointed services at the new Postgres primary
    • Bootstrapped new replicas one after another to take load off the primary
    • Restarted queries with throttling, prioritised by server population and rank, after RCON updates had caught up
    Action items
    • Monitor errors in the Postgres logs
    • Monitor and alert on transaction IDs
    • Set up a logical replica in addition to physical replication
    • Build a faster network to speed up recovery from failure
    Lessons

    BattleMetrics names skipping health checks on transaction ID size as its critical mistake: the index corruption silently broke vacuum for a month, and without monitoring of transaction IDs nobody saw the database approach wraparound. Because the corruption had been replicated to the replicas, failing over did not help, and the backup servers and downloadable backups carried the same corruption. The team also found that, contrary to the error message, a full vacuum on a server in wraparound protection does not need single-user mode, and chose to run a slow, delayed service over no service while replicas were rebuilt.

  2. Symptoms

    On 2 November 2020 the Cloudflare API and dashboard were degraded for six hours and 33 minutes. The success rate of API queries dropped at times to 75%, and the dashboard was up to 80 times slower than normal, while Cloudflare's edge network kept working.

    Trigger

    At 14:43 UTC a network switch in a control plane data center partly failed: it kept LACP and BGP running but stopped forwarding some packets, and it recovered on its own six minutes later.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    At 14:43 UTC alerts fired because the misbehaving switch was unreachable to pings. Engineers then saw that the primary authentication database was overwhelmed.

    Remediation
    • Shed load from the primary authentication database by slowing SSL certificate pushes to the edge, emails and other features
    • Moved API traffic that could use read replicas to the secondary data center by hand
    • Sent authentication calls fully back to the primary data center when the dashboard got worse
    • Rebuilt the first database replica, which put itself back into service at 21:20 UTC and returned performance to normal
    • Ramped the turned-down services back up so asynchronous processing could catch up
    Action items
    • Remove the cluster management limitation that requires rebuilding all replicas after a primary is promoted
    • Redesign the user sessions system so dashboard traffic can be steered between data centers
    • Change the auto-remediation configuration so a database replica is not promoted so quickly
    • Tune each system involved to be more resilient to failures of its dependencies
    Lessons

    Every system in the chain had redundancy and none failed completely; each only degraded, which made the chain of events much harder to model and foresee. Automating replica promotion so that it could trigger on a minute's notice had been a point of pride, but for at least one database a fast promotion can do more harm than the failure it answers. Most general-purpose cluster managers use Raft or Paxos rather than Byzantine fault tolerant protocols, accepting a rare failure mode in exchange for a protocol that is simpler to implement correctly and debug.

  3. Symptoms

    At 11:59AM CDT on Friday 28 August 2020, Basecamp's Ops team received a flood of alerts from PagerDuty, Nagios and Prometheus. Monitoring showed that the newer of the two metro links between the data centers in Ashburn, VA and Chicago, IL had been lost for about 20-30 seconds, and BC3 kept responding slowly after the link came back.

    Trigger

    Both redundant metro links between Basecamp's Ashburn and Chicago data centers dropped for short periods; monitoring showed the newer link down for about 20-30 seconds.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A flood of alerts from PagerDuty, Nagios and Prometheus, with monitoring showing the lost metro link. A lingering alert for one Redis DB instance later pointed to the replication problem.

    Remediation
    • Turned chat off at the load balancer layer so the rest of BC3 could stabilise
    • Restarted Redis on the replica that was stuck in the resynchronization loop
    Action items
    • Make the documented Redis configuration changes for the known replication issue
    • Make concrete plans to remove the shared physical path under the two metro links
    • Prove the failover systems in production at peak load
    • Make explicit room for post-incident follow-up work and push other work out
    Lessons

    Planned redundancy and live testing had given Basecamp a false sense of security, especially at peak load: moving between redundant network links or shifting load across data centers should work without issue, and Basecamp would rather find out in a controlled test with the full team ready. The follow-up from an outage needs urgency and explicitly cleared time, not just a place on a list.

  4. Symptoms

    On a Friday evening in December 2019, Razorpay's internal monitoring alerted on an unusually high number of 5xx errors. The SRE team found that the main application, called API, could not connect to its RDS MySQL database, but within about 110 seconds the application recovered by itself and the alerts stopped. The RDS logs showed that the master instance had gone through a Multi-AZ failover.

    Trigger

    The master instance of the API application's RDS MySQL database went through a Multi-AZ failover to its standby in another availability zone.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    –
    Detection

    An internal monitoring alert on unusually high 5xx errors, then alerts that replication had failed on all replicas. The data loss was found the next day by matching the database against the application trace logs.

    Remediation
    • Moved all read replica traffic to the master instance
    • Recreated all five read replicas after a six-hour full snapshot and moved traffic back to them
    • Recovered the missing queries from the binary logs and corrected the data stored in RDS
    • Changed innodb_flush_log_at_trx_commit on the master from 2 to 1
    Lessons

    With innodb_flush_log_at_trx_commit set to 2, Razorpay had been open to data loss on any failover all along, even though RDS Multi-AZ copies everything on the primary's disk to the standby. The incident also taught the team how RDS runs a Multi-AZ setup and its failovers.

  5. Symptoms

    A reader of Repro's Aurora MySQL cluster restarted for no known reason, and right after that the writer's insert latency rose to about seven times normal and writer performance stayed badly degraded for a long time. This happened more than once, twice within two weeks by 11 November 2019. While the writer was slow, the applications that process data collected by the Repro SDK fell behind, and the team could only watch until the writer recovered.

    Trigger

    Long-running queries on the reader; the author recalls that the cause was a query sent to the reader from Redash.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • Waited for writer performance to return, since the rollback segment release could not be sped up
    Action items
    • Add a monitor on the rollback segment, mysql.innodb.history_list_length in Datadog
    • Kill queries that run long enough to make the reader restart as soon as they are found
    • Set max_execution_time so queries are stopped after a fixed time
    Lessons

    Once the rollback segment has grown large, nothing speeds up its release across the cluster, so the way to avoid the latency is to keep transactions small and stop long-running queries before the rollback segment grows.

Check your cluster for this

These 33 cases involve Database replication and Database. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause11

Capacity exhaustion6 cases

  1. IL-0379 InfluxDB Cloud queries in Azure West Europe slowed and timed out as storage pods fell behind and kept restarting
  2. IL-0288 ZooKeeperWait rose to thousands of seconds on three redundant ClickHouse instances, degrading a CDN77 data pipeline
    CDN772026
  3. IL-0305 Replicas of one Intercom Vitess shard hit 100% CPU and fell up to 2.2 hours behind, serving stale inbox data
  4. IL-0443 A Repro Aurora MySQL reader restarted unexpectedly and writer insert latency rose about sevenfold for a day or more
    Repro2019
  5. IL-0334 Instapaper's RDS MySQL bookmarks table hit the 2TB ext3 file size limit, inserts failed and the service went down
  6. IL-0296 Transloadit's us-east Redis cluster lost queued jobs and heartbeats, raising WORKER_JOB_ERROR errors for 81 customers

Breaking change in an upgrade2 cases

Organisation
  1. IL-0569 After an MHA master failover, one of three MySQL replicas failed with a malformed binlog error and could not catch up
    DeNA2026
  2. IL-0308 Most RevenueCat backend systems failed after cutover to a new Aurora PostgreSQL 14 cluster as queries became very slow

Certificate or credential expiry1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0490 Records were missing from LootLocker's new MySQL database after a migration cutover and the service degraded for 3 hours

Software defect5 cases

  1. IL-0281 PostHog's Logs ClickHouse cluster silently deleted almost all its S3 data, losing US logs older than 3 days
  2. IL-0527 OpenStreetMap.org made no replication diffs for 16 hours as PostgreSQL logical decoding failed on a memory alloc error
  3. IL-0376 A maintenance update set off needless full syncs between Upstash Redis replicas in eu-west-1, slowing the databases
  4. IL-0589 Every Kickstarter MySQL replica on Amazon RDS stopped replicating on a duplicate-key error in the backings table
  5. IL-0303 GitHub's MySQL master failed over to a node with a cold buffer pool during a schema migration and GitHub.com went down
    GitHub2012

Cloud provider outage2 cases

Contributing factor
Organisation
  1. IL-0368 PlanetScale's control plane went down and some database branches failed queries during the AWS us-east-1 outage
  2. IL-0488 Kit's RDS MySQL write latency rose 100x and running threads jumped from 9 to 900, backing up Sidekiq job queues
    Kit2022

Operator error4 cases

  1. IL-0242 Both PostgreSQL servers behind matrix.org were lost during a disk expansion, and the homeserver was down for 24 hours
  2. IL-0431 During Mackerel's move to AWS, PostgreSQL failed over to a replica that had stopped replicating, losing an hour of data
    Hatena2017
  3. IL-0218 GitLab.com's primary PostgreSQL data was wiped by mistake and, with no working backup, the site was down about 18 hours
    GitLab2017
  4. IL-0319 Dropping databases on the MySQL replica mysql2 also dropped them on mysql1, as the pair actually ran master-master

Dependency failure2 cases

  1. IL-0526 OpenStreetMap.org went offline, then read-only, for 56 hours after HE.net routing equipment cut both fibre uplinks
  2. IL-0255 Basecamp's two redundant links between data centers dropped together and a Redis replica resync loop stalled chat

Configuration change6 cases

  1. IL-0392 MariaDB replication of section x1 between eqiad and codfw broke on a missing heartbeat row during a cookbook run
  2. IL-0374 DigitalOcean creates and management actions failed globally when its service discovery datastore lost quorum
  3. IL-0331 An RDS MySQL Multi-AZ failover lost 5 seconds of committed data and broke replication on all five read replicas
  4. IL-0430 Mackerel's Redis stopped answering during a replication setup, keepalived failed over by mistake, and Mackerel degraded
    Hatena2018
  5. IL-0325 DigitalOcean's control panel and API were down for 4 hours 56 minutes after the production primary database was deleted
  6. IL-0215 Twilio's billing Redis master lost all balances and went read-only, and auto-recharge charged customer cards repeatedly
    Twilio2013

Data loss or corruption1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0311 BattleMetrics' primary PostgreSQL went read-only at transaction ID wraparound, breaking the website and RCON updates

DNS or network fault3 cases

  1. IL-0240 Cloudflare API requests failed and the dashboard slowed for hours after the authentication database lost its replicas
  2. IL-0210 GitHub's MySQL clusters failed over to the US West Coast and the site served slow, stale, inconsistent data for 24 hours
    GitHub2018
  3. IL-0590 F5 load balancers cached a path MTU of 296 after Rackspace reboots, and Mailgun connections failed intermittently

Hardware failure1 case

  1. IL-0323 A RAID battery backup unit failure crashed db1075, the MariaDB primary of section s3, and every s3 wiki went read-only