Incident Library
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Cases2 cases

1 to 2 of 2

  1. Symptoms

    At 08:41 UTC on 18 February 2025, several Grafana Labs application teams noticed that some of their endpoints were no longer available. The investigation quickly found that the load balancers for those endpoints were gone.

    Trigger

    A change to the merge policy of a Crossplane composition, made so that the default TLS policy of the load balancers could be overridden, was applied to development, staging and production at the same time.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Application teams noticed at 08:41 UTC that some of their endpoints were no longer available.

    Remediation
    • rolled back the Crossplane composition change
    • recreated the affected Kubernetes Services so that Kubernetes recreated their load balancers
    Action items
    • Add a CI check that blocks a deployment to more than one wave, so any exception to the dev, staging, canary, production order is caught
    • Give higher priority to a more sophisticated wave design that was already under discussion
    • Enable deletion protection on the load balancers, one layer below Crossplane
    • Enable deletion protection on other critical cloud provider resources
    • Develop the Crossplane Managed Resources exporter for change validation and visibility, now in beta testing within Platform engineering; simulated against the change that caused this outage, it shows a clear diff
    • Complete and test support for reconfiguring the TLS policy so application teams can deploy it
    Lessons

    A change that looked small and low-risk had a side effect that only a full end-to-end test through Crossplane and the cloud provider's load balancer controller would have shown; seeing the intended override work was not that test. Staged rollout and blast-radius limits that exist only as process can be skipped, so Grafana Labs moved to enforce waves in CI and to add deletion protection on the load balancers themselves, beneath the Crossplane layer.

  2. Symptoms

    At 18:27 on 21 September 2020 the Cloud Platform team detected that some services running on the live-1 production cluster had gone down, and some users could not reach them. The incident was declared at 18:40.

    Trigger

    A script for deleting a test cluster was triggered while the kube context was pointing at the live-1 production cluster instead of the test cluster.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The first detection was at 18:27, and the incident was declared 13 minutes later, at 18:40.

    Remediation
    • restored the default ingress controller together with external-dns and kiam, which it depends on
    • corrected the owner field in the Formbuilder Route 53 TXT records so external-dns pointed their A records at the new NLB
    • restored the remaining components with a targeted apply
    • ran the apply pipeline to restore all certificates, ServiceMonitors and Prometheus rules from the environment repository
Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Cloud load balancer and Configuration templating. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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