Incident Library
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Cases5 cases

1 to 5 of 5

  1. Symptoms

    On 3 March 2026, during a scheduled maintenance to replace a faulty switch in a cluster in IONOS Cloud's TXL data center, monitoring alerts fired and the hosts in that cluster lost network connectivity. Customers saw intermittent network degradation or outages, and the Data Center Designer (DCD) web frontend and the AI Model Hub became unreachable.

    Trigger

    During a scheduled maintenance to replace a faulty switch, Topology 2 of 2 in the affected cluster was disabled as planned, and a link flap on a switch in Topology 1 then flooded the InfiniBand control plane with alerts and started a fabric resweep.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    IONOS began investigating monitoring alerts in TXL; the first status update was posted at 11:36 UTC.

    Remediation
    • Switched from the affected control plane to its standby
    • Rebooted the locked-up gateways
    • Recovered Topology 1 from the scheduled maintenance
    • Paused provisioning in the cluster that had a backlog of queued jobs
    • Re-enabled provisioning once network connectivity improved and watched job execution
    • Re-established connectivity for the systems that support the DCD
    Action items
    • Adjusted the control-plane configuration to use less aggressive failover timers and reduced heavy sweep activity, lowering the load on the forwarding table
    • Reduced the number of multicast group memberships to relieve the forwarding table
    • Set up continuous monitoring of forwarding table use and control-plane memory with alerts before capacity limits are reached
    • Move the control plane to dedicated high-performance servers, separate from data-plane traffic
    • Audit IPv6 configurations and IPoIB driver settings
    • Modernise the interconnect fabric, including switches, gateways and drivers
    • Hardened IAM maintenance protocols so that critical identity services keep working when the primary Cloud APIs are temporarily unavailable
    • Move IAM to a dedicated platform without a dependency on the standard managed Kubernetes clusters
    • Introduce a dedicated provisioning provider for DBaaS and Managed Kubernetes
    • Add automated circuit breakers to the provisioning engine against overload and queue buildup from self-healing services
    • Improve visibility and control over job execution and prioritisation in the provisioning queue
    • Change the provisioning queue architecture to decouple services and reduce spillover
    Lessons

    IONOS identified the linking of services through the shared provisioning queue as a key reason the degradation lasted as long as it did. Alongside making each service more robust, it is decoupling the provisioning queue and addressing dependencies between services to reduce the blast radius of future incidents.

  2. Symptoms

    At 7:13 UTC on 20 October 2025, PlanetScale's continuous tests in production started failing because they could not create new database branches. The service that creates, resizes and configures database branches was unavailable, a near-total control plane outage, while existing database branches kept their capacity and connectivity.

    Trigger

    The incident started with a DNS misconfiguration at one of PlanetScale's service providers. An Amazon DynamoDB outage impacted AWS STS, and several hours of capacity constraints and network instability in AWS us-east-1 followed.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    –
    Detection

    PlanetScale's continuous testing in production started failing and alerted engineers at 7:13 UTC. At 10:05 UTC an alert fired for a Kubernetes operator in a large single-tenant customer installation exhausting its resources.

    Remediation
    • Disallowed new databases in us-east-1 and made us-east-2 the default region for new databases
    • Delayed new backups and cancelled pending backups that were waiting for an EC2 instance
    • Advised PlanetScale Managed customers with vtgate autoscaling to shed load
    • Paused draining and terminating EC2 instances older than 30 days
    • Kept vacant EC2 instances for reuse instead of terminating them
    • Bin-packed vtgate processes more tightly for customers with autoscaling
    • Sent manual reparent requests to move primaries to healthier availability zones
    • Restarted the edge load balancer and vtgate processes that did not recover after the partitions healed
    Action items
    • Understand and become resilient to the failure modes of SaaS dependencies for CI/CD, SSO, web application hosting and incident communication
    • Investigate more ambitious ways to reduce runtime dependence on internal and AWS services
    • Look into using all six us-east-1 availability zones to tolerate zonal outages and partitions
    Lessons

    Keeping the control plane separate from the data plane meant the control plane outage did not affect customer databases, and redundancy, automated failover and zonal traffic routing limited the effect of the network partitions. Network partitions are hard to reason about, test and tolerate: with three availability zones a system survives losing one zone only if the other two can still reach each other reliably.

  3. Symptoms

    On 18 October 2024, from 7:50 to 8:01 UTC, about 25% of the hypervisors in Scaleway's FR-PAR-1 availability zone lost VPC connectivity with the rest of the region, and products that use VPC failed with them. Public internet connectivity and Elastic Metal VPC connectivity were not affected.

    Trigger

    At 6:20 UTC a Top of Rack switch in FR-PAR-1 had a software crash. One of the two BGP route reflectors for VPC ran on a hypervisor in that rack and was left in an abnormal state.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Health-check monitoring on both route reflectors detected the anomaly, and the Scaleway Customer Excellence and SRE teams detected the customer impact and opened an incident.

    Remediation
    • Fixed both VPC route reflectors by manual action
    Action items
    • Fixed the autohealing mechanism that had failed to fix route reflectors stuck in a stale state; the fix is https://github.com/FRRouting/frr/pull/17163
    • Run different software versions on the route reflectors so a single bug cannot stop several instances
    • Investigate the software issue that left the route reflectors in a stale state
  4. Symptoms

    On 7 August 2017, while checking the application after the maintenance that moved Mackerel from an on-premises data center to AWS, the team found that data updated during a specific time window was missing. Everything written to the PostgreSQL database between 14:30 and 15:30 JST was gone.

    Trigger

    One hour after the application was switched to the newly promoted primary db001, db001 lost network connectivity and the database failed over to the standby db002.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The team found the missing data while checking how the application behaved after the migration work.

    Remediation
    • Tried to restore the lost updates by hand from the table data left on db001 and gave up
    • Tried point-in-time recovery from the base backup and WAL and gave up
    • Built a new replica db003 with db002 as primary to restore redundancy
    • Kept db001 in maintenance state for investigation
    • Watched db002 for some time to confirm the problem did not recur, then completed the migration
    Action items
    • Change the PostgreSQL replica creation script to set recovery_target_timeline = 'latest' in recovery.conf by default
    • Add a check to a server configuration test tool such as Serverspec that recovery.conf contains recovery_target_timeline = 'latest'
    Lessons

    A setting needed only for a rare layout, such as a grandchild replica during a migration, was applied by hand through a script option and was forgotten. Because recovery_target_timeline = 'latest' is harmless on ordinary standbys too, Hatena now sets it by default whenever a replica is created. The staging rehearsal used the same layout and steps but had the setting right, so it could not catch the mistake. Hatena notes that a similar layout may be used again for a future PostgreSQL upgrade or a move to another region.

  5. Symptoms

    From 12:47 AM PDT on 21 April 2011, a subset of Amazon EBS volumes in one Availability Zone of the US East Region could no longer serve reads or writes, and EC2 instances that tried to use them got stuck as well. AWS called these "stuck" volumes. EBS API calls across the whole US East Region also returned high error rates and latencies during two periods on the first day.

    Trigger

    During a routine network change to upgrade the capacity of the primary EBS network in one Availability Zone, traffic was to be shifted off one of the redundant routers. The shift was executed incorrectly and sent the traffic onto the lower-capacity replication network instead of the other primary router, which could not carry it.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • Rolled back the incorrect traffic shift, which restored network connectivity
    • Disabled all new Create Volume requests in the affected Availability Zone at 2:40 AM PDT
    • Disabled all communication between the degraded EBS cluster and the EBS control plane from 8:20 AM PDT
    • Stopped EBS servers in the degraded cluster from futilely contacting other servers for free space
    • Changed the EBS control plane so new EBS-backed instance launches stopped failing
    • Moved spare server capacity physically from across the US East Region into the degraded cluster
    • Adjusted the negotiation throttles so the new servers could join without flooding the old ones
    • Built a separate EBS control plane partitioned to the affected zone and finer-grained throttles, then processed the backlog
    • Restored the remaining volumes from S3 snapshots taken early in the event
    • Restored volumes on failed machines that had no snapshot after forensic work
    • Intervened by hand on the RDS multi-AZ instances that did not fail over automatically
    Action items
    • Audit the change process and add automation to prevent the traffic shift mistake
    • Change capacity planning and alarming to keep the extra safety capacity needed for large recovery events
    • Change the retry logic in EBS nodes to back off harder and reconnect to previous replicas instead of searching for new nodes
    • Test and deploy the fix for the race condition that crashed EBS nodes
    • Fix the RDS bug that kept multi-AZ instances from failing over automatically
    • Improve the EBS control plane timeout logic to prevent thread exhaustion when one zone's cluster is slow
    • Make the EBS control plane aware of Availability Zones so it sheds load when over capacity
    • Move more EBS control plane functions into per-cluster services that run in the same zone as the cluster
    • Offer multiple Availability Zones to Amazon VPC customers
    • Provide better tools for building multi-AZ applications that survive the loss of a zone
    • Host free webinars and publish whitepapers on fault-tolerant architecture
    • Build the fine-grained control and throttling used in recovery into the EBS nodes and automate the recovery models
    • Look at changes that keep volumes working while a cluster is degraded, including the ability to take a snapshot of a stuck volume
    • Send more frequent and detailed customer updates and staff developer support more widely during events
    • Develop tools that show through the APIs whether instances are impaired
    Lessons

    AWS writes that with more spare capacity the cluster would have absorbed the re-mirroring requests without a storm, and that it now understands how much capacity large recovery events need. The event also showed that the EBS control plane let a failure in one Availability Zone affect the others, so more work is needed to make zones behave as if completely independent. AWS adds that some customers had critical components in a single zone, and that multi-AZ deployments need to become easier to design and run.

Check your cluster for this

These 5 cases involve Database and BGP routing. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause4

Capacity exhaustion1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0350 Hosts in an IONOS TXL cluster lost connectivity when an InfiniBand fabric resweep failed on a full multicast table

Cloud provider outage1 case

Contributing factor
–
Organisation
  1. IL-0368 PlanetScale's control plane went down and some database branches failed queries during the AWS us-east-1 outage

Software defect1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0347 About 25% of Scaleway FR-PAR-1 hypervisors lost VPC connectivity when both VPC BGP route reflectors got stuck

Operator error2 cases

  1. IL-0431 During Mackerel's move to AWS, PostgreSQL failed over to a replica that had stopped replicating, losing an hour of data
    Hatena2017
  2. IL-0337 EBS volumes in one US East Availability Zone got stuck after a network change cut EBS nodes off from their replicas