Incident Library
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Cases2 cases

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  1. Symptoms

    At 08:00 UTC on 2021-09-06 every service in DFDS's Kubernetes cluster answered with 404. Investigation started five minutes later.

    Trigger

    The automated Kubernetes node rollover on 2021-09-06 restarted all the Traefik v2 pods, five days after a malformed IngressRoute manifest had been applied.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    All services returned 404 from 08:00 UTC and root cause investigation started at 08:05. Time to detection was 5 minutes.

    Remediation
    • changed the ALB health check path, which made the targets healthy but did not stop the 404s
    • rolled back by hand to Traefik v1 as the main ingress controller
    • deleted the malformed IngressRoute by hand and confirmed the Traefik v2 bug
    • applied the changes upstream
    Action items
    • Upgrade Traefik to v2.5, where the bug is fixed, and verify that it removes the bug
    • Change the Traefik v2 health check path to something more robust
    • Set up an external liveness probe on the ingress controller
    • Consider workload segmentation to limit the blast zone
    • Look into monitoring the Traefik v2 API for rapid changes
    • Look into smoke testing during and after node rollover
    Lessons

    A malformed IngressRoute did nothing visible for five days and then took down all ingress when every Traefik v2 pod had restarted during a node rollover. Because Traefik v2 failed gracefully, the first signals pointed at the ALB health checks instead of at Traefik. On incident handling, the team concluded that appointing an incident manager could have helped, that the war room meeting should be recorded and a log book kept, that people not involved should only make suggestions in writing, and that a short first round of sharing thoughts and gut feelings is useful.

  2. Symptoms

    While the old nodes of a GKE cluster were being drained to move workloads to a newly created node pool, none of the services in the cluster could be reached through ingress-nginx any more.

    Trigger

    Cordoning and draining the old node pool removed those nodes from the GCP load balancer backend while the ingress-nginx pods were still running on them.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The team noticed during the drain that no service in the cluster was reachable through ingress-nginx.

    Remediation
    • deleted the nginx-ingress-controller pods still running on the old nodes so they were rescheduled on the new, ready nodes
    Lessons

    With externalTrafficPolicy: Local, the load balancer can only reach nodes that run an ingress pod, and cordoned nodes leave the load balancer backend immediately; if the ingress pods stay behind on cordoned nodes, all ingress traffic stops. Before any change that might touch traffic, look twice into the documentation.

Check your cluster for this

These 2 cases involve Ingress controller and Cloud load balancer. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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