Incident Library
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  • Component
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  • Contributing factor
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Cases3 cases

1 to 3 of 3

  1. Symptoms

    From 15:22 US/Pacific on 16 May 2024, new VMs and other new instances across Google Cloud came up without network programming, so the new instances could not open network connections, and VMs that were migrated or restarted lost connectivity. Changes to virtual network configuration, such as firewall rules and load balancers, were not applied. Internal monitoring alerted Google engineers at 15:41.

    Trigger

    Google's infrastructure team ran a routine maintenance action meant to shut down one unused VPC Controller in a single Google Cloud zone, and the automation shut down VPC controllers in all zones where the controllers were still in use.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Internal monitoring alerts reached Google engineers at 15:41 US/Pacific, and the investigation started immediately.

    Remediation
    • Paused maintenance operations to prevent the shutdown from repeating
    • Brought the affected VPC Controllers back into a serving state in every zone
    • Stopped the automation responsible for the shutdown until safeguards are in place
    • Recovered partial Apigee proxy deployments by hand
    • Cleaned up VMs left behind by failed Dataproc cluster deletions
    Action items
    • Add safety measures that check that maintenance operations carry correctly scoped zone information
    • Make the underlying tools reject maintenance operations that do not specify zones
    • Tighten on-demand access control so one maintenance invocation cannot work across multiple zones
    • Add safety checks, testing and validation for maintenance operations, including positive and negative test cases for the new safety measures
  2. Symptoms

    From September 2021, each rollout of an update to Datadog's metrics query service, which serves real-time and historical metric data to the web frontend and to monitor evaluation, came with a rise in errors. Clients retried failed queries, so few errors reached users, but the retries slowed dashboards and monitors. The service's logs showed DNS errors stopping it from connecting to the data stores it depends on.

    Trigger

    Rollouts of the metrics query service, which delete the old pods. The client behaviour behind the failures came from an August 2021 rollout of the metrics query clients that applied round_robin as the new default gRPC load balancing policy.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Errors rose during rollouts of the metrics query service, and the service's logs showed DNS errors when connecting to its data stores.

    Remediation
    • Raised the memory of the node-local-dns pods from 64 MB to 256 MB, which stopped the OOM kills but not the DNS errors
    • Tested larger instance types and confirmed that scaling up the service's infrastructure resolved the errors
    • Removed the custom gRPC reconnect parameters from the clients to restore the defaults
    Action items
    • Contribute a change to Cilium that adds an unreachable route for a deleted pod's IP so clients get an ICMP error
    Lessons

    The errors looked like DNS but were not. ENA metrics and VPC Flow Logs gave the visibility into VPC connection tracking that host metrics did not, and Cilium, Kubernetes and AWS networking interact in ways that can make reverse path filtering drop packets it should allow. DNS propagation time depends on many settings. The causes were changes Datadog had made itself, to work around a dependency bug, to resolve earlier incidents and to override default reconnect parameters, which looked safe at the time and showed their effects much later, when the link was hard to see.

  3. Symptoms

    From 7:30 AM JST on 2 September 2021, AWS Direct Connect customers saw intermittent connectivity problems and elevated packet loss on traffic going to their VPCs in the Tokyo (AP-NORTHEAST-1) Region. Internal AWS alarms on Direct Connect packet loss fired at the same time.

    Trigger

    Customer traffic consistently generated packets with a very specific set of attributes and contents, and these packets set off a latent defect in the network device operating system on one layer of the Direct Connect network in Tokyo.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Internal alarms alerted AWS engineers to elevated packet loss for Direct Connect customers connecting to the Tokyo Region at 7:30 AM JST. The automation that monitors network devices also saw a higher rate of failed devices than normal and alerted engineers.

    Remediation
    • Removed the failing network devices from service so healthy devices carried the traffic, which helped only for a time
    • Reset failed devices and brought them back into service slowly, without stopping the failures
    • Disabled the new protocol in a single Availability Zone, then across the Tokyo Region
    Action items
    • Apply the change carefully to all other AWS Regions, with a new way to detect and remediate the issue before customers are affected
Check your cluster for this

These 3 cases involve Cilium and Cloud load balancer. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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