Incident Library
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  • Root cause
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Cases12 cases

1 to 5 of 12

  1. Symptoms

    On 19 August 2026 the first equipment-level signs in Nebius's us-central1 region appeared around 09:40 UTC: the InfiniBand fabric degraded and GPU over-temperature alerts began to accumulate. Customer reports followed shortly after 10:00. At 10:15 on-call engineers were paged on critical component temperature alerts, and the incident was declared at 10:21.

    Trigger

    A storm-related event at the data center building took the building management system offline and shut down the chilled-water cooling loop.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    No facility-level alert fired, because the storm also disabled the building management system that monitors the facility. Engineers acted on component over-temperature alerts that paged on-call at 10:15 UTC, after InfiniBand degradation, GPU over-temperature alerts and customer reports; the temperature rise from about 09:15 was visible on dashboards but had no alert.

    Remediation
    • had the facility operator switch cooling to manual bypass mode and opened rack rear doors to vent heat
    • re-energised tripped racks, control-plane racks first
    • restored the regional infrastructure control plane by manual intervention
    • restarted block-storage host components to clear stale disk attachment state
    • raised the VM recovery rate limits by hand for the region-scale recovery
    • started the affected Managed Kubernetes control-plane instances by hand
    • applied a controlled stop and start to control-plane instances whose data disk had been left unattached
    • identified and started 104 customer VMs that the incident had stopped
    Action items
    • Complete a joint resilience review with the facility operator covering redundancy of facility-management and monitoring systems, cooling that keeps running when those fail, electrical protection of cooling equipment and on-site response
    • Add facility-level environmental alerting on cooling plant state and room temperature trend that pages on-call independently of the building management system
    • Set up a documented emergency escalation path with the facility operator, with an on-call contact tree and guaranteed response times
    • Define an emergency heat-load reduction procedure with criteria, ownership and mechanics for shutting down or degrading workloads during a cooling loss
    • Establish a dependency-ordered region cold-start procedure with clear ownership for each service layer
    • Run regular region-scale recovery drills that cover VMs, storage attachments and Managed Kubernetes clusters
    • Fix the disk-attachment bug that extended the Managed Kubernetes outage and deploy the fix to all production regions
    • Improve the recovery policies Compute users can configure, and move all Managed Kubernetes control-plane nodes to the improved policy
    • Automate reconciliation of stale storage attachment state after abrupt host failures
    • Remove in-region dependencies from monitoring startup and recovery, and extend cross-region monitoring
    • Make regional health checks used for global traffic management reflect real service availability
    Lessons

    Facility monitoring that runs on the same system it watches goes silent in exactly the failure it should report, and with no alert on the room temperature trend there was no practical window to shed heat load in a controlled way. A cold start of a whole region exercised recovery paths built for isolated failures: single-attempt VM recovery, conservative rate limits and stale disk attachments all needed manual work. The longest part of the outage was restoring customer resources, Managed Kubernetes control planes above all, so Nebius is extending its recovery drills to that layer.

  2. Symptoms

    On 21 October 2025 at 21:45 UTC a change to timeout handling was deployed to the feature flags service, and two minutes later automated monitoring reported higher error rates. The change was rolled back by 21:49, but error rates stayed high: about 38% of flag evaluation requests in the US datacenter returned errors. At 22:30 Redis metrics showed memory exhaustion on ElastiCache, at 22:35 Postgres connections spiked, and at 22:45 the team found a massive data transfer from Postgres into Redis. The main PostHog application was affected as well, because it shares the Redis instance with the flags service.

    Trigger

    On 21 October a deployment meant to reduce timeout errors (PR #39821); on 24 October the deployment of IP-based rate limiting (PR #40074) that saw all traffic as coming from the load balancer's IP; on 28 October an unrelated routine deployment that rolled the feature flag pods in the US region.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    On 21 October automated monitoring detected higher error rates two minutes after the deploy. On 24 October no alert existed for 429 errors, and the team learned of the incident from customer reports that began at 18:10 UTC, a 62-minute detection delay. On 28 October on-call received a high error count alert. On 29 October the incident was reported with higher error rates and latency. No alert existed for CPU pressure, so the CPU saturation behind all three incidents was not seen directly.

    Remediation
    • rolled back the timeout handling change within 2 minutes on 21 October, which did not stop the errors
    • throttled connections and Redis writes on 21 October
    • halted the rollout on 28 October, scaled the US flags pods to zero until Redis recovered, then scaled them back gradually
    • rolled back hardware changes on 30 October at 00:03 UTC, which removed most errors but not the latency
    • increased the pod resource requests and adjusted the Kubernetes fleet size so fewer pods ran on each node
    • added retry limits to Envoy between the load balancer and the service
    • moved database connection timeouts and other critical settings to runtime configuration and raised the timeout values
    • added per-node and per-pod CPU alerts at 80% sustained for 5 minutes that page on-call
    Action items
    • Form a strike team from the flags, ingestion and infrastructure teams to review the application and infrastructure for remaining bottlenecks
    • Investigate separating the flags Redis instance from the application Redis instance
    • Before re-enabling ArgoCD sync, align the flags service chart configuration with the values in ArgoCD and define the deployment and Redis strategy
    • Make the feature flags team hard code-owners for flags-related code
    • Build a dashboard of key flag metrics with runbook links and update the feature flag runbooks
    • Add missing alerts on existing service and infrastructure metrics
    • Make readiness checks validate dependencies that degrade under load, for example by pinging the database
    • Rate-limit cache population so it cannot overwhelm Redis
    • Monitor connection pools with automatic throttling near exhaustion and limit concurrent connections
    • Build a production-scale load testing framework
    • Build progressive rollout infrastructure to limit blast radius
    • Document Postgres-to-Redis data flows and write runbooks for data transfer storms
    Lessons

    Nodes that are small relative to pod requests let the scheduler pack many pods on each node, and the resulting CPU saturation showed up three different ways: excessive parallelism, connection pool exhaustion and slow queries. Treating each symptom separately let the problem return; right-sizing the pods and nodes fixed all three. CPU must be alerted on from the start. Unbounded Envoy retries and unbounded cache population amplified the overload, and a Redis instance shared with the main application spread a flags problem to the main application. A rollback did not end the incident, because the data transfer and resource exhaustion it had started kept running.

  3. Symptoms

    At 09:36 on 18 March 2025, during the upgrade of the live cluster to EKS 1.30, users reported that their pods were being terminated and were not restarting automatically, in both production and non-production environments. Automated infrastructure alerts fired as well, and production services had outages.

    Trigger

    Upgrading the live EKS cluster from 1.29 to 1.30, during which the descheduler attempted to reschedule all pods on the cordoned nodes simultaneously.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Users reported at 09:36 that pods were being terminated and not restarting, and automated infrastructure alerts fired.

    Remediation
    • Removed the cordon annotation so pods could be rescheduled
    • Deleted stuck 1.30 nodes to force their recreation
    • Added a new node group of 20 nodes running 1.30 by hand
    • Cordoned and drained all old 1.29 nodes onto the new 1.30 nodes
    Action items
    • Raise an AWS Production System Down support case (Case ID: 174229643100496)
    • Get guidance from AWS support on querying control-plane logs to find the root cause of similar issues
    • Document a runbook for emergency scaling of a new node group in case of unexpected capacity shortages
    • Alert on an imbalance between the autoscaling group and the Kubernetes nodes
    • Review the descheduler configuration to understand why it throws pods off cordoned nodes, and fix it where possible
    • Alert on spikes in the pending pod count
    Lessons

    The write-up lists review actions rather than lessons. They show the team had no documented way to add an emergency node group, no alert on a mismatch between the autoscaling group and the nodes Kubernetes sees, no alert on a spike in pending pods, and no clear understanding of how the descheduler treats cordoned nodes.

  4. Symptoms

    Kibana stopped showing new application logs at 13:45. At 14:27 a user told the Cloud Platform team in the #ask-cloud-platform channel that Kibana had received no logs since then.

    Trigger

    OpenSearch ran out of disk space and index writes were blocked.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A user reported in #ask-cloud-platform at 14:27 that Kibana had received no logs since 13:45. The report records 12:10, when the ClusterIndexWritesBlocked alert first fired, as the first detection.

    Remediation
    • restarted all fluent-bit containers (logs flowed for a few minutes, then the error came back)
    • increased OpenSearch disk space from 8000 to 12000
    • configured fluent-bit to stop sending logs to OpenSearch while the root cause was investigated
    Action items
    • Look into index dating issues in OpenSearch and Elasticsearch
    • Add high-priority alerts for Elasticsearch and OpenSearch
    • Re-introduce OpenSearch into live logging
    • Investigate the fluent-bit "failed to flush chunk" error
  5. Symptoms

    A production EKS cluster on Kubernetes 1.30 went into read-only mode: the API server rejected every request that would change an object, such as creating pods or scaling deployments, and deleting objects to free space did not work either.

    Trigger

    Kyverno 1.12 kept creating ephemeralreports objects that piled up in etcd until the database passed EKS's size limit.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The cluster rejected writes; the audit logs carried the "etcdserver: mvcc: database space exceeded" error.

    Remediation
    • AWS raised the etcd storage limit from 8/10GB to 12GB to unlock writes
    • an AWS engineer deleted the leaked Kyverno ephemeralreports objects directly from etcd
    Action items
    • Monitor the etcd database size with apiserver_storage_size_bytes and never let it reach 8GB
    • Upgrade Kyverno 1.12 to 1.12.4, which fixes the ephemeralreports pile-up, or disable reporting for admission events and tune --aggregationWorkers
    Lessons

    On EKS, once etcd hits its size limit the cluster becomes read-only and only AWS can clean it up, so cleanup scripts must run before the limit is reached. Watch the etcd database size and object counts per resource, especially for controllers that create report objects.

Check your cluster for this

These 12 cases involve Node pool and Container memory limit. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause6

Dependency failure1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0133 A storm shut down cooling at Nebius's us-central1 data center, and a disk hot-plug bug kept Managed Kubernetes control planes down for hours after power returned
    Nebius2026

Capacity exhaustion5 cases

  1. IL-0100 PostHog's feature flags pods were packed onto Kubernetes nodes that were too small for their CPU requests, and CPU saturation above 90% caused three outages in ten days through Redis overload, connection pool exhaustion and slow queries
  2. IL-0042 Application logs stopped reaching Elasticsearch and OpenSearch for hours and were lost when OpenSearch ran out of disk space
  3. IL-0043 Application logs missing in Kibana after a newer Fluent Bit version changed its chunk drop strategy
  4. IL-0016 Prometheus on the live cluster ran out of memory and was OOMKilled, and the monitoring node it ran on went NotReady
  5. IL-0013 The conntrack table filled up on downsized GKE nodes and a high-traffic aggregation proxy saw climbing connection resets

Faulty deployment1 case

  1. IL-0020 During an EKS 1.30 upgrade the descheduler tried to reschedule every pod on the cordoned nodes at once and production workloads went down

Software defect2 cases

  1. IL-0077 EKS cluster went read-only for over seven hours after Kyverno ephemeralreports filled the etcd database past its size limit
  2. IL-0123 A response buffer allocated anew in a loop made OpenAI's routing layer nodes hit their memory limits and fail readiness checks on a morning with more completions than any day before, causing 502 and 503 errors across all models
    OpenAI2023

Configuration change2 cases

  1. IL-0019 An EKS Terraform module upgrade shrank node root disks from 100 GB to 20 GB and image pulls failed with no space left on device
  2. IL-0035 Worker nodes went NotReady after a new ElastAlert rule without memory limits used up node memory
    NU.nl2019

Certificate or credential expiry1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0184 JupyterHub's KubeSpawner could not create containers and kubectl was refused because the API server and other internal certificates of a kubeadm cluster had expired
    dbhang2021