Cases4 cases

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1. IL-0100 PostHog's feature flags pods were packed onto Kubernetes nodes that were too small for their CPU requests, and CPU saturation above 90% caused three outages in ten days through Redis overload, connection pool exhaustion and slow queries

   PostHog2025

   Symptoms

   On 21 October 2025 at 21:45 UTC a change to timeout handling was deployed to the feature flags service, and two minutes later automated monitoring reported higher error rates. The change was rolled back by 21:49, but error rates stayed high: about 38% of flag evaluation requests in the US datacenter returned errors. At 22:30 Redis metrics showed memory exhaustion on ElastiCache, at 22:35 Postgres connections spiked, and at 22:45 the team found a massive data transfer from Postgres into Redis. The main PostHog application was affected as well, because it shares the Redis instance with the flags service.

   Sustained high node CPUHigh error rateHigh latencyContainer crash loopDatabase overload

   Trigger

   On 21 October a deployment meant to reduce timeout errors (PR #39821); on 24 October the deployment of IP-based rate limiting (PR #40074) that saw all traffic as coming from the load balancer's IP; on 28 October an unrelated routine deployment that rolled the feature flag pods in the US region.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   Node poolPod scheduling and placementIn-memory cacheApplication database

   Contributing factor

   No alert on limitRetry stormIneffective rollbackSingle point of failureNo staged rolloutUnrepresentative staging

   Detection

   On 21 October automated monitoring detected higher error rates two minutes after the deploy. On 24 October no alert existed for 429 errors, and the team learned of the incident from customer reports that began at 18:10 UTC, a 62-minute detection delay. On 28 October on-call received a high error count alert. On 29 October the incident was reported with higher error rates and latency. No alert existed for CPU pressure, so the CPU saturation behind all three incidents was not seen directly.

   Remediation

   • rolled back the timeout handling change within 2 minutes on 21 October, which did not stop the errors
   • throttled connections and Redis writes on 21 October
   • halted the rollout on 28 October, scaled the US flags pods to zero until Redis recovered, then scaled them back gradually
   • rolled back hardware changes on 30 October at 00:03 UTC, which removed most errors but not the latency
   • increased the pod resource requests and adjusted the Kubernetes fleet size so fewer pods ran on each node
   • added retry limits to Envoy between the load balancer and the service
   • moved database connection timeouts and other critical settings to runtime configuration and raised the timeout values
   • added per-node and per-pod CPU alerts at 80% sustained for 5 minutes that page on-call

   Action items

   • Form a strike team from the flags, ingestion and infrastructure teams to review the application and infrastructure for remaining bottlenecks
   • Investigate separating the flags Redis instance from the application Redis instance
   • Before re-enabling ArgoCD sync, align the flags service chart configuration with the values in ArgoCD and define the deployment and Redis strategy
   • Make the feature flags team hard code-owners for flags-related code
   • Build a dashboard of key flag metrics with runbook links and update the feature flag runbooks
   • Add missing alerts on existing service and infrastructure metrics
   • Make readiness checks validate dependencies that degrade under load, for example by pinging the database
   • Rate-limit cache population so it cannot overwhelm Redis
   • Monitor connection pools with automatic throttling near exhaustion and limit concurrent connections
   • Build a production-scale load testing framework
   • Build progressive rollout infrastructure to limit blast radius
   • Document Postgres-to-Redis data flows and write runbooks for data transfer storms

   Lessons

   Nodes that are small relative to pod requests let the scheduler pack many pods on each node, and the resulting CPU saturation showed up three different ways: excessive parallelism, connection pool exhaustion and slow queries. Treating each symptom separately let the problem return; right-sizing the pods and nodes fixed all three. CPU must be alerted on from the start. Unbounded Envoy retries and unbounded cache population amplified the overload, and a Redis instance shared with the main application spread a flags problem to the main application. A rollback did not end the incident, because the data transfer and resource exhaustion it had started kept running.

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2. IL-0024 Expensive cache-backed API calls and uncancelled database requests overloaded MongoDB and took the Hugging Face Hub down three times

   Hugging Face2024

   Symptoms

   At 08:45 CET on 22 April 2024 the Hugging Face Hub became unstable, and by 09:30 it was unresponsive. For most users the website was slow or could not be reached at all.

   Service outageHigh latencyDatabase overload

   Trigger

   Bursts of requests to revision endpoints that read heavily from the *_info_cache collections: a call to https://huggingface.co/api/datasets/lighteval/mmlu/revision/main rose sharply right before the first crash, and a call to https://huggingface.co/api/models/sentence-transformers/all-mpnet-base-v2/revision/main, a model with 300+ associated spaces, lined up with the crash at 21:30 on 23 April.

   Root cause

   Software defect

   Component

   Application databaseModel hubCluster autoscaler

   Contributing factor

   No headroomRetry stormOverlapping failures

   Detection

   Instability started at 08:45 on 22 April and the Hub was unresponsive by 09:30; the team followed MongoDB Atlas metrics and a MongoDB support case. The root cause was found days later from a new graph of requests per URL.

   Remediation

   • Added a firewall rule blocking all requests with a Java/* user agent
   • Disabled the quicksearch feature on the Hub
   • Scaled the MongoDB Atlas cluster by hand from tier 2 to tier 3
   • Switched the Hub to maintenance mode with a 503 page through AWS WAF and blocked incoming traffic
   • Scaled all Hub pods down to 0 and brought them back
   • Set an aggressive rate limit
   • Added timeouts to requests and reworked database queries that were slow or returned large bodies

   Action items

   • Add timeouts to requests based on their usual completion time
   • Optimise requests that took too long or returned a large body, and rework poorly designed database queries
   • Remove old unused indexes from the database
   • Build new dashboards and monitoring metrics
   • Move the *_info_cache collections to Redis
   • Make it possible to abort any database request when the client aborts theirs

   Lessons

   Finding the root cause took two to three days: the existing charts did not show it, and a per-URL request breakdown did. Not cancelling database work when a client goes away turns a strained database into a thundering herd. A close inspection of the database exposed architectural flaws and bottlenecks, such as a collection with large unused indexes, and taught the team which metrics need closer watching to anticipate crashes. Unrelated failures happening at the same time added to the stress and made restoring service harder.

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3. IL-0202 A burst of queries and database writes exhausted connection pools and memory on Honeycomb's ingest hosts, and Kubernetes crash-loop back-off kept failed hosts offline so ingest capacity stayed too low to recover

   Honeycomb2023sev1

   Symptoms

   Standard alerting paged Honeycomb's on-call engineers about the performance and stability of event ingestion, and the automated load-shedding mechanisms tripped and sent further notifications. The status page described a higher than normal error rate and response time on the ingestion service.

   High error rateHigh latencyContainer crash loopService outageDatabase overload

   Trigger

   An abnormally large number of queries arrived from many separate connections within a few minutes.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   Application databaseIn-memory cache

   Contributing factor

   Retry stormAutomation amplification

   Detection

   Standard alerting notified the on-call engineers about ingestion performance and stability, and the automated load-shedding mechanisms added notifications when they tripped. The first status post, about alerts on a higher than normal error rate and response time, went up at 18:28 PST (02:28 UTC), 13 minutes after the 02:15 UTC start.

   Remediation

   • Scaled the ingest fleet up manually and aggressively
   • Cut off most ingest for a few minutes so the ingest hosts could come back with enough capacity
   • Temporarily lowered the rate limits for the most aggressive traffic sources until their traffic subsided

   Action items

   • Keep the ingest fleet scaled up to prevent a repeat while longer-term fixes are worked on
   • Decide on the projects that will address these failure paths

   Lessons

   Load shedding and auto-scaling were in place, yet a burst that arrived faster than the cache could spread its writes still took the ingest hosts down. During recovery, Kubernetes' crash loop back-off worked against the operators: the hosts that had failed stayed offline while the fleet needed every host. Clients that retry whole OTel batches after a partial drop can multiply traffic many times over, so per-source rate limits were what finally stabilised ingest.

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4. IL-0177 WebSocket connections to LINE's messaging-hub on Kubernetes dropped all at once whenever another service's change reloaded a shared HAProxy L7 load balancer, and the reconnect wave overloaded a token API and filled nf_conntrack on Nginx

   LINE+2022

   Symptoms

   The graph of WebSocket connections to messaging-hub, the messaging platform used by the Japanese food delivery service Demaecan, showed sudden deep drops even outside peak traffic. The drops kept coming back at irregular intervals. Messages still reached clients, because messaging-hub switches to Firebase Cloud Messaging when a WebSocket is gone.

   Connection resetsDatabase overloadIntermittent connection failuresHigh latency

   Trigger

   Another service that shared the same L7 load balancer deployed its own load balancer configuration in the Verda dashboard, which reloaded HAProxy; 30 minutes later, at the hard-stop-after limit, the old HAProxy process exited and closed every WebSocket connection it still held.

   Root cause

   Configuration change

   Component

   HAProxyCloud load balancerconntrack tableIngress controller

   Contributing factor

   Change with a delayed effectExcessive blast radiusRetry stormUnverified assumption

   Detection

   The developer noticed deep, sudden drops in the WebSocket connection graph that were not tied to peak traffic and kept recurring irregularly. The Nginx packet drops were found through network monitoring.

   Remediation

   • separated the Merchant system's token issuance API into its own deployment so reconnect traffic did not delay other Merchant APIs
   • scaled out Nginx with pod anti-affinity and a label selector so each pod ran on a different node, which stopped the nf_conntrack packet drops
   • raised Ingress Nginx proxy-read-timeout and proxy-send-timeout and the load balancer timeout to 3600s, which did not stop the drops
   • moved messaging-hub from the shared L7 load balancer to an L4 load balancer, which ended the WebSocket drops

   Lessons

   A reload of a shared load balancer by a different team can cut long-lived connections, and with hard-stop-after the cut comes 30 minutes later, far from the change that caused it. The author's lesson is not to narrow the scope of the search too early: trusting that the infrastructure was fine kept the investigation inside the team's own systems for days. A reconnect wave from many WebSocket clients can overload the systems that issue connection tokens and fill nf_conntrack on proxy nodes. Scaling Nginx out only helps for conntrack if the pods land on different nodes, and anti-affinity leaves extra replicas Pending once they outnumber the nodes. That messaging-hub problems can still load the connected systems remains an open problem.

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