Cases5 cases

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1. IL-0100 PostHog's feature flags pods were packed onto Kubernetes nodes that were too small for their CPU requests, and CPU saturation above 90% caused three outages in ten days through Redis overload, connection pool exhaustion and slow queries

   PostHog2025

   Symptoms

   On 21 October 2025 at 21:45 UTC a change to timeout handling was deployed to the feature flags service, and two minutes later automated monitoring reported higher error rates. The change was rolled back by 21:49, but error rates stayed high: about 38% of flag evaluation requests in the US datacenter returned errors. At 22:30 Redis metrics showed memory exhaustion on ElastiCache, at 22:35 Postgres connections spiked, and at 22:45 the team found a massive data transfer from Postgres into Redis. The main PostHog application was affected as well, because it shares the Redis instance with the flags service.

   Sustained high node CPUHigh error rateHigh latencyContainer crash loopDatabase overload

   Trigger

   On 21 October a deployment meant to reduce timeout errors (PR #39821); on 24 October the deployment of IP-based rate limiting (PR #40074) that saw all traffic as coming from the load balancer's IP; on 28 October an unrelated routine deployment that rolled the feature flag pods in the US region.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   Node poolPod scheduling and placementIn-memory cacheApplication database

   Contributing factor

   No alert on limitRetry stormIneffective rollbackSingle point of failureNo staged rolloutUnrepresentative staging

   Detection

   On 21 October automated monitoring detected higher error rates two minutes after the deploy. On 24 October no alert existed for 429 errors, and the team learned of the incident from customer reports that began at 18:10 UTC, a 62-minute detection delay. On 28 October on-call received a high error count alert. On 29 October the incident was reported with higher error rates and latency. No alert existed for CPU pressure, so the CPU saturation behind all three incidents was not seen directly.

   Remediation

   • rolled back the timeout handling change within 2 minutes on 21 October, which did not stop the errors
   • throttled connections and Redis writes on 21 October
   • halted the rollout on 28 October, scaled the US flags pods to zero until Redis recovered, then scaled them back gradually
   • rolled back hardware changes on 30 October at 00:03 UTC, which removed most errors but not the latency
   • increased the pod resource requests and adjusted the Kubernetes fleet size so fewer pods ran on each node
   • added retry limits to Envoy between the load balancer and the service
   • moved database connection timeouts and other critical settings to runtime configuration and raised the timeout values
   • added per-node and per-pod CPU alerts at 80% sustained for 5 minutes that page on-call

   Action items

   • Form a strike team from the flags, ingestion and infrastructure teams to review the application and infrastructure for remaining bottlenecks
   • Investigate separating the flags Redis instance from the application Redis instance
   • Before re-enabling ArgoCD sync, align the flags service chart configuration with the values in ArgoCD and define the deployment and Redis strategy
   • Make the feature flags team hard code-owners for flags-related code
   • Build a dashboard of key flag metrics with runbook links and update the feature flag runbooks
   • Add missing alerts on existing service and infrastructure metrics
   • Make readiness checks validate dependencies that degrade under load, for example by pinging the database
   • Rate-limit cache population so it cannot overwhelm Redis
   • Monitor connection pools with automatic throttling near exhaustion and limit concurrent connections
   • Build a production-scale load testing framework
   • Build progressive rollout infrastructure to limit blast radius
   • Document Postgres-to-Redis data flows and write runbooks for data transfer storms

   Lessons

   Nodes that are small relative to pod requests let the scheduler pack many pods on each node, and the resulting CPU saturation showed up three different ways: excessive parallelism, connection pool exhaustion and slow queries. Treating each symptom separately let the problem return; right-sizing the pods and nodes fixed all three. CPU must be alerted on from the start. Unbounded Envoy retries and unbounded cache population amplified the overload, and a Redis instance shared with the main application spread a flags problem to the main application. A rollback did not end the incident, because the data transfer and resource exhaustion it had started kept running.

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2. IL-0087 After a cold reboot of RKE2 nodes, pods could not get IP addresses because Multus could not reach the Kubernetes API, and further reboots spread the failure to every node

   Fyra Labs2023

   Symptoms

   At around 2 AM ICT on 2023-04-09 the team saw unusual CPU use on one cluster node, which throttled every other service on it and made them fail. They presumed an upstream container runtime bug in containerd and runc and decided to fully reboot the affected nodes, taking the cluster down for maintenance on the assumption that it was not in active use.

   Sustained high node CPUService outage

   Trigger

   A full cold reboot of the nodes that showed unusual CPU use, followed by upgrades and cold reboots of the other nodes.

   Root cause

   unknown

   Component

   Multus meta-CNICalicoContainer runtime

   Contributing factor

   Harmful manual actionUnverified assumption

   Detection

   The team saw unusual CPU use on a node around 2 AM ICT and failing services on the rebooted nodes around 2:30 ICT; developers reported the Terra repositories down at 6:31 ICT.

   Remediation

   • uninstalled Multus and Calico and replaced them with the Cilium CNI
   • rolled back most cluster settings except the CNI

   Lessons

   Rebooting nodes to clear one problem can expose another; here a CNI chain could not reach the API server after a cold start. Repeating the same reboot on more nodes while the first failure was not understood spread the outage from a few nodes to the whole cluster. The team also found that Cilium's real resource use in their cluster was acceptable, contrary to the benchmark they had relied on.

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3. IL-0094 Student pods filled the shared nodes of a JupyterHub cluster and starved the hub's core pods, freezing the hub

   2i2c2020

   Symptoms

   At 08:52 PM IST a report came in from WER that many students could not access the JupyterHub and that it was frozen; pages were stuck and nothing was usable. A rise in activity was visible by 09:02 PM, but the usual fixes, such as opening an incognito window and restarting servers, did not help.

   Service outageSustained high node CPU

   Trigger

   WER students' pods used a good chunk of their memory limit (tests had shown they almost always use just under 1G of their 2G limit, against a 512M guarantee) on nodes shared with the hub's core pods.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   Node poolContainer memory limit

   Contributing factor

   No resource requests or limitsUnverified assumptionExcessive blast radius

   Detection

   WER reported stuck pages and students unable to reach the hub in a GitHub issue (2i2c-org/docs#27).

   Remediation

   • removed memory overcommit for the WER students
   • raised resource guarantees for all core pods, which restarted them and moved some to a new node

   Action items

   • Put user pods in a separate pool so they do not create pressure on the core pods (infrastructure#89)
   • Set limits on the support infrastructure (Prometheus, Grafana, ingress) as well (infrastructure#90)
   • Document and think about overcommit ratios for memory usage (infrastructure#91)
   • Set up better Grafana dashboards to monitor resource usage (infrastructure#92)
   • Document how people can get kubectl access to the cluster so others can look into issues too (infrastructure#87)

   Lessons

   Core pods without resource guarantees get whatever is left on a node, so when user pods on the same nodes fill the CPU and memory, the hub that serves everyone freezes. The memory overcommit ratio has to come from measured use: WER students used just under 1G against a 512M guarantee, which a 4x overcommit could not hold.

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4. IL-0052 A cryptocurrency miner ran on every node of the development and staging clusters through a public, unauthenticated Weave Scope dashboard

   JW Player2019

   Symptoms

   Datadog alerted the DevOps team to a high normalised load average, first on the staging cluster (Day 0, 21:06 EST) and the next day on the development cluster (Day 1, 16:53 EST). The load was first put down to a legitimate service that kept scaling up and down in both environments, and because of the volume of identical alerts they were muted until things settled.

   Sustained high node CPUUnauthorised access or a foreign workload

   Trigger

   An automated crawler found the Weave Scope dashboard on a public load balancer that required no authentication. Weave Scope can open a shell in running containers, and its scope-agent containers ran privileged, as root and with the host's root filesystem mounted, so a command started there could run on the host.

   Root cause

   Configuration change

   Component

   Cluster dashboardCloud load balancer

   Contributing factor

   Ignored early signalUnreviewed defaultsExcessive blast radiusMonitoring blind spot

   Detection

   Datadog alerts on high normalised load average, muted at first as noise from a legitimate service; on Day 3 an engineer ran top on a node and found the gcc process at 100% CPU.

   Remediation

   • stopped Weave Scope and removed its deployment from all Kubernetes clusters
   • checked access logs for unauthorised access to the instances
   • confirmed the miner's outbound connections went only to a mining pool
   • isolated one affected node for later investigation
   • rotated out every node in each cluster so all affected hosts were destroyed and rebuilt

   Action items

   • Audit all Kubernetes and deployment YAML files and security groups for services that are unintentionally public or misconfigured
   • Replace load-average alerts with more meaningful monitors and tune them to signal a real anomaly
   • Research tools such as falcon or sysdig for behavioural monitoring and anomaly and intrusion detection
   • Evaluate Istio and Linkerd for observing and controlling end-to-end network traffic
   • Analyse the cost of scanning Docker images and containers for known vulnerabilities
   • Set aside time in architecture discussions to revisit older choices such as running containers as root
   • Share knowledge of large projects, such as Kubernetes version migrations, across the whole team

   Lessons

   Load average was not a useful signal for spotting a problem in the clusters, and muted noisy alerts nearly hid the miner. A load balancer that Kubernetes creates belongs to Kubernetes: a manual security group edit in the AWS console is reverted, so internal exposure must be declared in the Kubernetes YAML. A dashboard that can open shells, in front of privileged agents that mount the host's root filesystem, gives whoever reaches it root on every node.

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5. IL-0064 CPU-heavy pods packed onto one Google Cloud node drove it to kernel panics, and the crash moved from node to node until the site was down

   Moonlight2019

   Symptoms

   On Friday, January 18, Moonlight's API began returning occasional errors that looked like connection problems with its Redis database. The API checks Redis on every authenticated request to validate the session. At the same time the Kubernetes monitoring reported some nodes and pods as unresponsive.

   High error rateIntermittent connection failuresNode NotReadyService outageSustained high node CPU

   Trigger

   The Kubernetes scheduler put several CPU-heavy pods on the same node, including all three replicas of the website and the server-side rendering pods.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   Pod scheduling and placementLinux kernelApplication database

   Contributing factor

   Single point of failureUnverified assumptionAutomation amplification

   Detection

   API errors that looked like Redis connectivity problems, and Kubernetes monitoring that showed nodes and pods as unresponsive. Google Cloud Support later found the link between sustained 100% CPU and kernel panics.

   Remediation

   • added anti-affinity rules to all major deployments so their pods spread across nodes

   Action items

   • Keep working with Google Cloud support to find and fix the cause of the node kernel panics

   Lessons

   Three replicas give no fault tolerance if the scheduler places them all on one node; anti-affinity rules make the spread explicit. A node failure that comes from the workload itself moves with the workload when the scheduler reschedules it.

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