Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases20 cases

6 to 10 of 20

  1. Symptoms

    At 10:01 UTC on 2024-03-13 a Kubernetes node entered NotReady state, with CPU requests at 78% and memory requests at 82%. An alert fired in Slack at 10:03 and was picked up at 10:05. An attempt to SSH into the node at 10:13 failed because it was unresponsive; it started responding again at 10:19.

    Trigger

    Pods of a dev container that used Hangfire to trigger jobs failed with OOM and crash-looped on a node where a Grafana Agent pod was already using a lot of memory.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A Slack alert fired two minutes after the node went NotReady and was picked up two minutes later; the second node's NotReady at 15:03 also raised a Slack alert.

    Remediation
    • marked the EC2 instance unhealthy so a new node started
    • cordoned and force-drained the NotReady node and terminated its EC2 instance
    • removed the new LimitRange from the Grafana Agent namespace and restarted the Grafana Agent pod
    • scaled the dev container to 0 replicas, after which EC2 network traffic returned to normal
    • after the second NotReady, scaled the dev container to 0 replicas again and added a new node
    • emailed the team that owns the dev container, which confirmed it was working on a fix
    Action items
    • Move grafana-agent to the monitoring node group
    • Add alerts for when bandwidth across the cluster reaches a certain threshold
    • Investigate whether memory limits can be set on the grafana-agent Helm chart
    • Investigate grafana-agent memory usage
    • Ask Grafana support whether grafana-agent should use a PVC
    • Consider pushing node logs to Loki with limited retention
    • Create a wiki page with common metrics and log queries to check when investigating issues with Kubernetes nodes
    Lessons

    Dev workloads mixed with production let one crash-looping dev container take down nodes that production also used, and a monitoring agent outside its dedicated node group added to the memory pressure. Scaling the suspect container back up before its owners had fixed it brought the failure back on the replacement node. The team also noted that action items from earlier post-mortems need follow-up, and that knowledge of useful CloudWatch metrics had not been shared, which made the diagnosis harder.

  2. Symptoms

    At 01:04 CET on 13 February 2024, the Kubernetes API behind Scaleway's managed Kubernetes services Kapsule and Kosmos in the Paris region (FR-PAR) spiked in RAM and CPU use and ran out of memory. Nodes in FR-PAR could no longer authenticate to their control plane, and some of them went "Not Ready". Customers on both shared (mutualized) and dedicated environments were affected.

    Trigger

    A new Kubernetes release was made available to all users on 12 February 2024, and during the night of 12 to 13 February many clusters triggered their auto-upgrade at the same time.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The timeline's first entry, at 01:04 CET, records the Kubernetes API's RAM and CPU spikes and out-of-memory state, with nodes unable to authenticate to their control plane and some becoming "Not Ready". The first recorded action, 42 minutes later at 01:46, was to increase the resources allocated to the API.

    Remediation
    • increased the resources allocated to the Kubernetes API at 01:46 and again at 02:20
    • applied API traffic restrictions at 02:30 to smooth the incoming traffic
    • removed the traffic restrictions progressively in 50-100 batches from 03:20
    • ran a script at 03:40 to replace the failing nodes created during the congestion
    • rolled back to the former node authentication mechanism, first on a subset of clusters from 15:45 and on all clusters by 19:41 on 19 February
    • disabled cluster upgrade and configuration update features until 10:30 on 20 February
    Action items
    • Increase the resources allocated to the Kubernetes API
    • Roll back to the former node authentication mechanism
    • Implement a local authentication cache on nodes
    • Rework the resource allocation strategy to behave better under load spikes
    • Add new request queuing mechanisms for Kubernetes
    • Separate the different components to reduce side effects under high load or failure
    • Monitor selected metrics closely to identify anomalous patterns earlier
    • Refund customers who deployed nodes during the incident but could not use them normally
    Lessons

    Letting many clusters auto-upgrade at the same moment after a release turns routine upgrades into one coordinated load spike on the shared Kubernetes API. A node authentication mechanism that retries without letting up turns a slow API into an unavailable one, and auto-healing that replaces NotReady nodes amplifies the problem. The congestion pattern had already appeared three weeks earlier, and short-term mitigations did not stop it from recurring, so Scaleway rolled back the new authentication mechanism. Scaleway notes that as the number of customer clusters and nodes grows sharply, traffic control mechanisms have to improve to prevent congestion.

  3. Symptoms

    At 23:48 CET on 24 January 2024 the Scaleway Kubernetes API for the FR-PAR region ran out of memory. At the same minute Scaleway saw requests to its API Gateway spike.

    Trigger

    Simultaneous deployments in the FR-PAR region pushed the Scaleway Kubernetes API out of memory.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Increased load on the API Gateway was detected at 23:48, the minute the incident began, and the incident was escalated to on-call engineers at 00:00:10.

    Remediation
    • raised the memory limit and garbage collection thresholds of the Kubernetes managed services
    • deployed additional replicas of key services
    • purged the registry cache and monitored the clusters as they stabilised
    • adjusted service configurations after the incident to keep the platform stable
    Action items
    • Implement a local authentication cache
    • Further develop node authentication
    • Enhance monitoring, adjust rate limiting strategies and improve incident response protocols
    Lessons

    Because the Kubernetes API also handled node authentication, its memory exhaustion made some nodes NotReady, and the endless retries of those nodes added load on the API Gateway. Scaleway plans a local authentication cache and further work on node authentication.

  4. Symptoms

    At 14:05 on 25 July 2023, a high-priority PagerDuty alert from Pingdom reported that the "Prometheus - live healthcheck" was DOWN. Prometheus on the live cluster was unavailable, and the Cloud Platform lost its monitoring for a while.

    Trigger

    The growing number of namespaces and Prometheus rules raised Prometheus' memory needs beyond what its node instance size could hold.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A Pingdom health check on Prometheus failed and raised a high-priority PagerDuty alert.

    Remediation
    • drained the monitoring node, moving Prometheus to another monitoring node
    • changed the node instance size to r6i.4xlarge
    • raised the Prometheus memory limit to 100Gi
    • set the Prometheus container limits to 12 CPU cores and 110Gi of memory
    Action items
    • Add an alert on node memory usage and on a pod using up most of a node's memory (issue #4538)
  5. Symptoms

    A tech support engineer called Palark to say that a customer's cluster, production environment included, had practically stopped working. On the control plane nodes the kube-apiserver processes had used up all the memory and were crashing and restarting over and over, so the Kubernetes API was unreachable and completely non-functional.

    Trigger

    Cilium agent pods on more than 200 nodes sent LIST requests to the Kubernetes API en masse at the same time.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    A tech support engineer phoned the team to report that the customer's cluster was practically non-operational.

    Remediation
    • added CPU and memory to the control plane nodes in two steps, from 8 CPUs and 16 GB of RAM to 16 CPUs and 64 GB, until the API stabilised
    • restarted the Cilium agents in a test window agreed with the customer to reproduce the memory growth
    • deployed a FlowSchema and a PriorityLevelConfiguration named cilium-pods that limit and queue LIST requests from the Cilium service accounts to cilium.io resources
    • reduced the control plane nodes back to their original resources
    Action items
    • Make an API Priority and Fairness configuration a standard part of Palark's Kubernetes platform
    Lessons

    In a large cluster, many agents sending LIST requests at once can exhaust kube-apiserver memory, and with several API servers the crash moves from one to the next. APF can hold back such a client: a FlowSchema matches its requests and a PriorityLevelConfiguration gives them a small concurrency share and a queue, so the requests run more slowly instead of all at once. With APF enabled, the total concurrency it divides is the sum of --max-requests-inflight (default 400) and --max-mutating-requests-inflight (default 200), shared among priority levels in proportion to their assured concurrency shares, so raising one level's share lowers every other level's limit. Long-running requests such as logs and exec, and WATCH requests, are not subject to APF. The response headers X-Kubernetes-PF-FlowSchema-UID and X-Kubernetes-PF-PriorityLevel-UID show where a request landed, and the metrics Apiserver_flowcontrol_rejected_requests_total, Apiserver_current_inqueue_requests and Apiserver_flowcontrol_request_execution_seconds, with the debug endpoints /debug/api_priority_and_fairness/dump_priority_levels and /debug/api_priority_and_fairness/dump_queues, show how the queues behave.

Check your cluster for this

These 20 cases involve Container memory limit and CoreDNS. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause4

Capacity exhaustion13 cases

  1. IL-0102 CoreDNS pods on a production EKS cluster ran out of memory under a burst of new pods, endpoints and nodes, taking down the Buildkite web UI, APIs and job dispatch
  2. IL-0027 All CoreDNS pods landed on one node, the node ran out of memory, and DNS for the whole service went down
  3. IL-0044 Prometheus OOMKilled in a loop while replaying its write-ahead log after a kube-prometheus-stack upgrade
  4. IL-0110 A Grafana Agent pod's high memory use and crash-looping Hangfire pods drove a Kubernetes node into system OOM and NotReady, twice in one day
    DFDS2024
  5. IL-0168 Simultaneous cluster auto-upgrades overloaded Scaleway's Kubernetes API, and a node authentication retry loop kept Kapsule and Kosmos nodes NotReady in FR-PAR
  6. IL-0169 The Scaleway Kubernetes API in FR-PAR ran out of memory under simultaneous deployments, and because it also handled node authentication, Kapsule and Kosmos nodes went NotReady
  7. IL-0016 Prometheus on the live cluster ran out of memory and was OOMKilled, and the monitoring node it ran on went NotReady
  8. IL-0195 The kube-apiservers of a cluster with more than 200 nodes ran out of memory and crashed one after another under mass LIST requests from Cilium agents
    Palark2023
  9. IL-0206 Consul agents in GitLab.com's GKE pods were repeatedly OOM-killed, so the Rails pods lost database replica discovery and sent every query to the primary
    GitLab2022
  10. IL-0176 Prometheus in a 235-node Kubernetes cluster crash-looped because over two million series exhausted host memory and the kernel OOM killer chose it first, as Burstable QoS gave it oom_score_adj 999
    LINE2020
  11. IL-0026 Kubernetes nodes hit SystemOOM because fluentd-sumologic log shipper pods had no memory limits
  12. IL-0001 Cluster-wide DNS outage after CoreDNS pods were OOM-killed again and again under a burst of DNS queries
  13. IL-0031 Kubernetes API server OOM-killed, leaving the Skipper ingress without routes; the talk points to a misconfigured CronJob manifest

Configuration change4 cases

  1. IL-0063 VPN outage after recreating a Redis StatefulSet restarted the whole Redis cluster without readiness checks
  2. IL-0191 A label selector accidentally added to the Loki distributor Service matched only the new pods of a rollout, which took all write traffic, were OOM-killed and stalled the rollout
  3. IL-0004 A new default pod priority let a new Cortex cluster preempt every production ingester in a cascade, taking Grafana Cloud Hosted Prometheus down
  4. IL-0035 Worker nodes went NotReady after a new ElastAlert rule without memory limits used up node memory
    NU.nl2019

Software defect2 cases

  1. IL-0104 After a CoreDNS pod was OOMKilled, the talk names three causes: Istio's aggressive DNS cache refresh on one reused client port, kube-proxy not cleaning up conntrack entries of terminated pods, and the 2-minute UDP conntrack timeout
  2. IL-0011 HAProxy ingress piled requests onto the same pods because a Go template visited the backend map in sorted pod IP order

DNS or network fault1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0199 A non-essential container exceeding its memory limit made GitHub's production pods unavailable, and their restarts failed because a DNS maintenance change had left the clusters unable to reach the image registry
    GitHub2020