Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases14 cases

11 to 14 of 14

  1. Symptoms

    On the evening of a long-overdue upgrade of a loveholidays production GKE cluster from 1.10.X to 1.12.5-gke.10, planned to take 2 to 2.5 hours, the master upgrade and the first two 7-node NodePools went smoothly. After that the NodePool upgrades slowed to a crawl. Each node is cordoned, drained and upgraded in turn. Even a 14-node cluster at about 5 minutes per node took over an hour, and with about 100 more nodes to go, some of them taking over 15 minutes to drain, the sequential drains were too slow to finish at a reasonable hour.

    Trigger

    A manual upgrade of the GKE masters and NodePools from 1.10.X to 1.12.5-gke.10, two versions at once, on 19 March 2019; GKE's release notes of 14 March had already said that version was no longer available for new clusters or master upgrades because masters showed elevated error rates, but it could still be selected.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The slow drains, zombie nodes and stuck NodePool were seen by the engineer running the upgrade; the broken Ingress was noticed after the upgrade and explained by Google support; the HPA problem was noticed the next day.

    Remediation
    • drained the remaining NodePool nodes ahead of the upgrade with kubectl drain --ignore-daemonsets --delete-local-data
    • deleted the zombie instances from the managed instance group with gcloud compute instance-groups managed delete-instances
    • cancelled the stuck UPGRADE_NODES operation with gcloud beta container operations cancel
    • used kubectl port-forward in place of the broken internal Ingresses
    • scaled down the older of two active ReplicaSets, or triggered a dummy deployment, to bring the HPA back
    Action items
    • Alert when a HorizontalPodAutoscaler is at 70% and at 100% of its capacity
    • Alert when a deployment has had two active ReplicaSets for 30 minutes and for 60 minutes
    • Re-evaluate termination grace periods that were set to arbitrary large values
    • Read the GKE release notes before every cluster upgrade
    • Use auto-upgrade in non-production environments, and manual cluster upgrades with automatic node upgrades in production
    • Keep environments as identical as possible, including resource names
    Lessons

    Read the release notes before upgrading: the target version had been withdrawn five days earlier. Drain time depends on pod configuration, so emptyDir volumes, long grace periods and missing disruption budgets turn a NodePool upgrade into hours. Pre-production only catches problems like the ingress bug if it matches production down to resource names. Auto-upgrades in non-production surface problems early, and a mix of manual cluster upgrades and automatic node upgrades in production keeps clusters current without much effort.

  2. Symptoms

    Datadog alerted the DevOps team to a high normalised load average, first on the staging cluster (Day 0, 21:06 EST) and the next day on the development cluster (Day 1, 16:53 EST). The load was first put down to a legitimate service that kept scaling up and down in both environments, and because of the volume of identical alerts they were muted until things settled.

    Trigger

    An automated crawler found the Weave Scope dashboard on a public load balancer that required no authentication. Weave Scope can open a shell in running containers, and its scope-agent containers ran privileged, as root and with the host's root filesystem mounted, so a command started there could run on the host.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Datadog alerts on high normalised load average, muted at first as noise from a legitimate service; on Day 3 an engineer ran top on a node and found the gcc process at 100% CPU.

    Remediation
    • stopped Weave Scope and removed its deployment from all Kubernetes clusters
    • checked access logs for unauthorised access to the instances
    • confirmed the miner's outbound connections went only to a mining pool
    • isolated one affected node for later investigation
    • rotated out every node in each cluster so all affected hosts were destroyed and rebuilt
    Action items
    • Audit all Kubernetes and deployment YAML files and security groups for services that are unintentionally public or misconfigured
    • Replace load-average alerts with more meaningful monitors and tune them to signal a real anomaly
    • Research tools such as falcon or sysdig for behavioural monitoring and anomaly and intrusion detection
    • Evaluate Istio and Linkerd for observing and controlling end-to-end network traffic
    • Analyse the cost of scanning Docker images and containers for known vulnerabilities
    • Set aside time in architecture discussions to revisit older choices such as running containers as root
    • Share knowledge of large projects, such as Kubernetes version migrations, across the whole team
    Lessons

    Load average was not a useful signal for spotting a problem in the clusters, and muted noisy alerts nearly hid the miner. A load balancer that Kubernetes creates belongs to Kubernetes: a manual security group edit in the AWS console is reverted, so internal exposure must be declared in the Kubernetes YAML. A dashboard that can open shells, in front of privileged agents that mount the host's root filesystem, gives whoever reaches it root on every node.

  3. Symptoms

    The daily NRE Labs statistics showed lesson activity collapsing, and kubectl could not reach the cluster: `The connection to the server 1.2.3.4:6443 was refused - did you specify the right host or port?`

    Trigger

    Unknown. The liveness probe that kubeadm writes into the etcd static pod manifest (an `etcdctl get foo` against 127.0.0.1:2379, failureThreshold 8, timeoutSeconds 15) started failing. The author first suspected GCP maintenance the night before, but could not reproduce the probe failure by hand and does not know why it began.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The author saw lesson activity drop in the daily NRE Labs statistics during his morning routine.

    Remediation
    • removed the liveness probe section from the kubeadm-generated etcd static pod manifest and applied it between etcd restarts
    Action items
    • Add monitoring, especially for the single-node master
    • Run a basic "down for maintenance" page in Google Cloud Functions that points to Twitter for updates, to redirect to during outages
    Lessons

    Because all of the infrastructure is managed as code, the cluster could be rebuilt quickly, but destroying it before finding the cause also destroyed the evidence. Monitoring matters, especially with a single-node master. Read the restart counts in kubectl output, not just the Running status. Remember the fundamentals instead of expecting the issue to be more complicated than it is, and do not let the urgency of an outage push you into hasty decisions. Put up a maintenance page instead of leaving the site failing halfway.

  4. Symptoms

    While running the CI process on a local machine to test an application Helm chart, the SRE lead watched the pods with watch kubectl get pods. All pods reached Running, and then some went back to Pending. Two hours later the problem had grown and some pods showed the phase Unknown.

    Trigger

    A CI run installed the application's Helm charts for all four markets (Efritin.com, Tonaton.com, Ikman.lk and Bikroy.com) on the nonproduction cluster at the same time.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The SRE lead saw pods go from Running back to Pending while watching kubectl get pods during the CI run; no monitoring raised an alert, even when all three workers were not ready.

    Remediation
    • terminated the three worker nodes and let the auto scaling group replace them
    Action items
    • Fix the Datadog integration for the nonproduction AWS account and repeat the installs with telemetry
    • Increase the worker root EBS volumes from 20GB to 120GB
    • Keep common base images pulled on every node with a DaemonSet until kops supports user hooks
    • Configure different allocation limits for the different layers in Kubernetes
    • Discuss a highly available Tiller with the Helm team
    • Find a way to throttle the number of newly created pods
    Lessons

    An ordinary deploy of the application could collapse the cluster, because the default 20GB gp2 root volumes could not keep up with parallel image pulls and container starts. Without node metrics and pod phase metrics, three NotReady workers raised no alert. A single Tiller replica can block the deploy that would fix an outage.

Check your cluster for this

These 14 cases involve Kubernetes API server and Admission webhook. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause7

Software defect4 cases

  1. IL-0022 Three overlapping infrastructure bugs (context-window misrouting, TPU output corruption and an XLA top-k miscompilation) degraded Claude's responses
  2. IL-0138 A failed Nvidia driver build left broken kernel packages on the only Kubernetes master node, which hit a kernel panic on reboot after a power outage and took the homelab cluster down for six days
  3. IL-0032 Mutating admission controller generated broken JSON patches, silently blocking deploys for a week until a production service ran down to two pods
    Airbnb2020
  4. IL-0011 HAProxy ingress piled requests onto the same pods because a Go template visited the backend map in sorted pod IP order

DNS or network fault2 cases

Organisation
  1. IL-0083 Intermittent 5xx errors in a multi-tenant Kubernetes cluster came from internal DNS: the node-local dnsmasq hit its 150 concurrent query limit, did not cache cluster.local answers, and ndots search lookups flooded CoreDNS
  2. IL-0049 Partial DNS outage after CoreDNS scaled down and kube-proxy failed to delete stale conntrack entries
    Preply2020

Configuration change2 cases

  1. IL-0191 A label selector accidentally added to the Loki distributor Service matched only the new pods of a rollout, which took all write traffic, were OOM-killed and stalled the rollout
  2. IL-0052 A cryptocurrency miner ran on every node of the development and staging clusters through a public, unauthenticated Weave Scope dashboard

Certificate or credential expiry1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0107 Kyverno stuck in a crash loop behind a webhook with failurePolicy fail blocked every change to Kubernetes Service objects for 88 minutes
    DFDS2022

Capacity exhaustion3 cases

  1. IL-0026 Kubernetes nodes hit SystemOOM because fluentd-sumologic log shipper pods had no memory limits
  2. IL-0076 Kubernetes masters went down after Dex filled etcd with AuthRequest objects and deleting its namespace started an endless list-and-timeout loop
  3. IL-0040 Parallel Helm installs saturated small gp2 root volumes on a kops cluster and left all three workers NotReady with the kubelet or Docker down

Cloud provider outage1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0014 A GKE upgrade to a withdrawn version stalled on slow drains and a stuck node pool, then broke an ingress and confused the HPA

unknown1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0059 Single-master Kubernetes control plane kept dying because the kubelet restarted a healthy etcd on a failing kubeadm liveness probe