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1. IL-0001 Cluster-wide DNS outage after CoreDNS pods were OOM-killed again and again under a burst of DNS queries

   Zalando2019

   Symptoms

   Customers of the Zalando Fashion Store got a high rate of errors on all web product pages and outfit pages for more than an hour. The errors came from the main data aggregation layer service, which runs in one of Zalando's Kubernetes clusters.

   High error rateDNS resolution failuresOOMKilledMonitoring outage

   Trigger

   Calls from the aggregation layer to a single, not very important downstream service started timing out. The aggregation layer returned 404s for them, clients retried, and the resulting spike in requests became a spike in DNS queries to CoreDNS.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   CoreDNSContainer memory limitClient-side DNS resolver and cache

   Contributing factor

   Unknown limitNo cachingRetry stormUnreviewed defaultsExcessive blast radiusMonitoring blind spot

   Detection

   The on-call engineer for the aggregation layer phoned the on-call Kubernetes engineer. Automatic paging did not happen because the cluster's monitoring and alerting ran inside the cluster and failed along with DNS. The Kubernetes engineer then saw that the CoreDNS pods were being OOM-killed.

   Remediation

   • Raised the CoreDNS memory requests and limits by hand from 100Mi to 2000Mi

   Action items

   • Introduce a more resilient DNS setup: CoreDNS fronted by dnsmasq on every node
   • Improve high-level alerting from outside the clusters, so that a cluster problem is known before or at the same time as applications are affected
   • Improve incident response processes and tooling so that any on-call engineer can escalate directly to other teams when automatic paging fails, for example through a chat bot

   Lessons

   The Kubernetes DNS setup was far from resilient enough: a single application could take down DNS for everything in the cluster. The blast radius of one application sending more DNS queries should be limited to one node at most, ideally to single pods. Known Kubernetes DNS problems, such as Linux kernel races in conntrack handling and the ndots 5 problem, were familiar to the team and partly mitigated, but their combined effect on the DNS infrastructure was worse than the team had understood. Monitoring that runs inside the cluster was not robust enough: when the cluster's DNS broke, it could not page anyone, and recovery took longer than it should have.

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