Cases7 cases

1 to 5 of 7

1. IL-0394 A Cloudflare router in Miami leaked IPv6 BGP routes to peers and providers for 25 minutes, congesting the backbone

   Cloudflare2026

   Symptoms

   On 22 January 2026 from 20:25 UTC, a Cloudflare edge router in Miami sent unintended BGP advertisements of IPv6 prefixes to its transit providers and peers. External networks' traffic was funnelled into the Miami data center, the backbone between Miami and Atlanta became congested, and some Cloudflare customer traffic saw elevated loss and higher latency.

   Packet lossHigh latency

   Trigger

   At 20:25 UTC Cloudflare's policy automation pushed a change, merged at 19:52 UTC, that removed the BGP announcements from Miami for a data center in Bogotá, Colombia, by deleting the prefix-list 6-BOG04-SITE-LOCAL from several export policy terms.

   Root cause

   Configuration change

   Component

   BGP routingBackbone network (WAN)

   Contributing factor

   No configuration tests

   Detection

   The network team began investigating unintended route advertisements from Miami at 20:40 UTC, and an incident was raised at 20:44 UTC.

   Remediation

   • A network operator reverted the bad configuration change on the Miami router by hand
   • Paused the automation for the router so it could not run again
   • Reverted the triggering change in the network automation code repository
   • Unpaused the automation on the Miami router after confirming it ran without the routing policy bug

   Action items

   • Patch the failure in the routing policy automation that caused the leak
   • Add BGP community-based safeguards that reject routes received from providers and peers on external export policies
   • Add automatic routing policy evaluation to the CI/CD pipelines that looks for empty or erroneous policy terms
   • Detect problems in network configurations and the effects of automated changes earlier
   • Validate routing equipment vendors' implementations of RFC9234 before rolling out BGP roles and the Only-to-Customer Attribute
   • Encourage long-term adoption of RPKI Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA)

   Lessons

   Removing only the prefix lists from export policy terms left terms that were too permissive, because a match on route-type internal accepts IBGP routes as well. Cloudflare states that route leaks are easy to cause by accident and that RFC9234 is the only way, independent of routing policy, to prevent route leaks caused at the local AS.

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2. IL-0348 Scaleway's FR-PAR region lost public internet connectivity when one 100 Gbps backbone link was saturated

   Scaleway2025

   Symptoms

   On 10 March 2025 at 16:22 UTC, public internet connectivity in Scaleway's FR-PAR region broke for all products. Most internet traffic between the FR-PAR-2 availability zone and the rest of the PAR region was blackholed for about five minutes, while VPC traffic and Dedibox RPN kept working.

   Packet lossService outageHigh latency

   Trigger

   While Scaleway's network team connected a new data center to the FR-PAR backbone, a human mistake in a router configuration rerouted more than 1 Tbps of traffic between OpCore DC3 and DC5 through a single 100 Gbps link.

   Root cause

   Operator error

   Component

   Backbone network (WAN)Object storageAuthoritative DNS servers and records

   Contributing factor

   Automation amplification

   Detection

   The router configuration error was detected quickly and rolled back within four minutes.

   Remediation

   • Rolled back the router configuration, restoring the correct configuration at 16:27 UTC

   Action items

   • Harden the peer review and production communication process for changes
   • Add failsafes and tests before network configuration is applied at backbone level
   • Deploy the fix for the Object Storage synchronisation software issue

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3. IL-0225 An IGP purge command made every Microsoft WAN router recompute routes, causing global latency, timeouts and packet loss

   Microsoft Azure2023

   Symptoms

   From 07:08 UTC on 25 January 2023, customers saw long network latency and timeouts when connecting to resources in Azure regions and to other Microsoft services such as Microsoft 365 and Power Platform. Microsoft's monitoring detected DNS and WAN issues from 07:11 UTC.

   High latencyIntermittent timeoutsIntermittent connection failuresPacket lossNetwork unreachable

   Trigger

   A network engineer adding capacity to the global WAN in Madrid ran a step of a recently changed standard operating procedure that purged the IGP database; on the router manufacturer involved, that command runs on all IGP-joined routers instead of only the local one.

   Root cause

   Configuration change

   Component

   Backbone network (WAN)Interior routing (IGP)BGP routing

   Contributing factor

   No configuration testsUnverified assumptionExcessive blast radiusHarmful manual action

   Detection

   Monitoring detected DNS and WAN issues from 07:11 UTC and alerted the on-call engineers within 5 minutes of the command being run. The team reviewed all recent changes and identified the command by 08:20 UTC. The engineer making the change was not informed of the alerts because of the unqualified changes to the SOP.

   Remediation

   • Restarted by hand the paused WAN health and traffic engineering systems, which ended the remaining packet loss

   Action items

   • Audit and block similar widespread-impact commands across all three vendors for all WAN router roles
   • Give on-call engineers real-time visibility of approved and unqualified activity on network devices
   • Run regular mandatory operational training and attestation of following all SOPs
   • Have the Change Advisory Board review all SOPs still pending qualification within 30 days

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4. IL-0256 Basecamp was fully down twice in two days as hardware load balancers crashed and routers lost sync after failover

   37signals2020

   Symptoms

   On Tuesday 1 September 2020 Basecamp could not be loaded at all for 17 minutes, from 9:51am to 10:08am Central Time (14:51–15:08 UTC), and nothing seemed to work. On Wednesday 2 September it happened again for 15 minutes, from 10:50am to 11:05am Central Time (15:50–16:05 UTC).

   Service outageLink flappingHigh latency

   Trigger

   On 1 September the network links between the data centers went offline, and during the recovery a hardware load balancer crashed. On 2 September the primary load balancer in Virginia crashed again, and later its secondary crashed too.

   Root cause

   Software defect

   Component

   On-premises load balancerBackbone network (WAN)

   Contributing factor

   Overlapping failuresNo headroom

   Remediation

   • On 1 September, intervened by hand to get the network routers working with the standby load balancer
   • On 2 September, fixed the same router and load balancer desynchronization by hand

   Action items

   • Find the cause of the load balancer crash with the vendor and apply its bugfix
   • Replace the hardware load balancers
   • Reroute the redundant cross-datacenter network paths for proper circuit diversity
   • Evaluate moving from hardware to software load balancers, which can be deployed in minutes
   • Evaluate decentralizing the load balancer architecture to limit the impact of one failure
   • Assess the systems for resilience, fragility and risk, and review the assessment process itself

   Lessons

   Basecamp plans for failures like these and practises responses to catastrophic failures in its live systems, but three obscure issues in five days chained into overlapping failures. What caught the team by surprise were cascading failures that exposed unexpected fragility and hard paths to recovery, which Basecamp says it can prepare for.

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5. IL-0255 Basecamp's two redundant links between data centers dropped together and a Redis replica resync loop stalled chat

   37signals2020

   Symptoms

   At 11:59AM CDT on Friday 28 August 2020, Basecamp's Ops team received a flood of alerts from PagerDuty, Nagios and Prometheus. Monitoring showed that the newer of the two metro links between the data centers in Ashburn, VA and Chicago, IL had been lost for about 20-30 seconds, and BC3 kept responding slowly after the link came back.

   Link flappingHigh latencyReplication lag

   Trigger

   Both redundant metro links between Basecamp's Ashburn and Chicago data centers dropped for short periods; monitoring showed the newer link down for about 20-30 seconds.

   Root cause

   Dependency failure

   Component

   Backbone network (WAN)BGP routingIn-memory cacheDatabase replication

   Contributing factor

   Single point of failureRetry stormSignal buried in noise

   Detection

   A flood of alerts from PagerDuty, Nagios and Prometheus, with monitoring showing the lost metro link. A lingering alert for one Redis DB instance later pointed to the replication problem.

   Remediation

   • Turned chat off at the load balancer layer so the rest of BC3 could stabilise
   • Restarted Redis on the replica that was stuck in the resynchronization loop

   Action items

   • Make the documented Redis configuration changes for the known replication issue
   • Make concrete plans to remove the shared physical path under the two metro links
   • Prove the failover systems in production at peak load
   • Make explicit room for post-incident follow-up work and push other work out

   Lessons

   Planned redundancy and live testing had given Basecamp a false sense of security, especially at peak load: moving between redundant network links or shifting load across data centers should work without issue, and Basecamp would rather find out in a controlled test with the full team ready. The follow-up from an outage needs urgency and explicitly cleared time, not just a place on a list.

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