Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases3 cases

1 to 3 of 3

  1. Symptoms

    On 30 September 2026, between about 07:35 and 07:40 UTC, new connections to every domain hosted on Railway, both custom domains and *.up.railway.app domains, got HTTP 404 in all regions. Internal alerting paged the on-call team as soon as route lookups started to fail.

    Trigger

    At 07:29 UTC an engineer merged a change to the routing control plane that contained a database schema update and a new version of the routing service. At about 07:35 the deployment system rolled the new routing service out to every region before the schema update had been applied.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Internal alerting engaged the on-call response team as soon as route lookups began to fail at about 07:35 UTC.

    Remediation
    • Let the CI system finish the schema update, after which the routing service's retried lookups succeeded and routing recovered without a rollback
    Action items
    • Force the migration rollout to run in serial order and unify the deployment pipeline so deploy order and blast radius are checked before merge
    • Block the routing service's blue/green rollout until the database schema matching its version is in place
    • Add shard based rollouts per region to the distributed control plane to isolate impact
  2. Symptoms

    On 3 March 2026, during a scheduled maintenance to replace a faulty switch in a cluster in IONOS Cloud's TXL data center, monitoring alerts fired and the hosts in that cluster lost network connectivity. Customers saw intermittent network degradation or outages, and the Data Center Designer (DCD) web frontend and the AI Model Hub became unreachable.

    Trigger

    During a scheduled maintenance to replace a faulty switch, Topology 2 of 2 in the affected cluster was disabled as planned, and a link flap on a switch in Topology 1 then flooded the InfiniBand control plane with alerts and started a fabric resweep.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    IONOS began investigating monitoring alerts in TXL; the first status update was posted at 11:36 UTC.

    Remediation
    • Switched from the affected control plane to its standby
    • Rebooted the locked-up gateways
    • Recovered Topology 1 from the scheduled maintenance
    • Paused provisioning in the cluster that had a backlog of queued jobs
    • Re-enabled provisioning once network connectivity improved and watched job execution
    • Re-established connectivity for the systems that support the DCD
    Action items
    • Adjusted the control-plane configuration to use less aggressive failover timers and reduced heavy sweep activity, lowering the load on the forwarding table
    • Reduced the number of multicast group memberships to relieve the forwarding table
    • Set up continuous monitoring of forwarding table use and control-plane memory with alerts before capacity limits are reached
    • Move the control plane to dedicated high-performance servers, separate from data-plane traffic
    • Audit IPv6 configurations and IPoIB driver settings
    • Modernise the interconnect fabric, including switches, gateways and drivers
    • Hardened IAM maintenance protocols so that critical identity services keep working when the primary Cloud APIs are temporarily unavailable
    • Move IAM to a dedicated platform without a dependency on the standard managed Kubernetes clusters
    • Introduce a dedicated provisioning provider for DBaaS and Managed Kubernetes
    • Add automated circuit breakers to the provisioning engine against overload and queue buildup from self-healing services
    • Improve visibility and control over job execution and prioritisation in the provisioning queue
    • Change the provisioning queue architecture to decouple services and reduce spillover
    Lessons

    IONOS identified the linking of services through the shared provisioning queue as a key reason the degradation lasted as long as it did. Alongside making each service more robust, it is decoupling the provisioning queue and addressing dependencies between services to reduce the blast radius of future incidents.

  3. Symptoms

    At about 16:38 UTC on 17 March 2025, internal alerts fired across multiple Linode data centers because various servers had been unreachable for an extended period. At the same time customers began reporting problems with several products.

    Trigger

    A release of Akamai Compute's internal backend API component was rolling out, and during the rollout the API gave inconsistent responses to the route servers.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Internal alerts fired across multiple data centers showing servers unreachable for an extended period, and customers reported problems with multiple products at the same time.

    Remediation
    • Restarted the route servers in all data centers in phases, starting with the most affected regions
    Action items
    • Hold backend API releases until there is a better way to make sure route data for route servers is contiguous
Check your cluster for this

These 3 cases involve Network control plane (SDN) and BGP routing. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

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