Incident Library
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  • Root cause
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  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
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Cases10 cases

6 to 10 of 10

  1. Symptoms

    At 10:23 on 6 June 2023 a user of the Cloud Platform reported that all of their production pods had been deleted at the same moment. Several users received Pingdom alerts that their applications were down for a few minutes.

    Trigger

    The team changed the instance type of the cluster's worker nodes through Terraform.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Users reported that their production pods had been deleted at once and that Pingdom alerts showed their applications down; the incident was declared at 11:00.

    Action items
    • Ask AWS, through a support ticket, for the steps to change the node instance type without an outage
    • Plan how to make instance type changes through Terraform without downtime and add a runbook with the steps for changing the node instance type
  2. Symptoms

    At 09:33 UTC on 14 February 2023 end users told the platform team that Kubernetes logs were not arriving in CloudWatch as expected. The investigation went through fluentd and found that the nodes were running containerd as their container runtime instead of docker-shim. A scheduled node rollover the day before, at 07:30 UTC on 13 February, had set containerd as the default runtime by accident.

    Trigger

    A scheduled node rollover had accidentally made containerd the default container runtime, which stopped log shipping to CloudWatch; the unscheduled rollover to revert it timed out, and the pipeline run that followed reduced the Auto Scaling group from 30 to 15 instances.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    End users reported the missing CloudWatch logs that started the work. The postmortem lists 2 minutes as the time to detection of the node failure.

    Remediation
    • ran the node rollover script to add new nodes, which failed on a timeout from Docker Hub
    • ran the node rollover script a second time, which added new nodes that the load balancer marked healthy at 11:01 UTC
    Action items
    • Document the rollover process, especially what can be done when it goes wrong
    • Investigate options for improving the rollover process
    • Add fluentd log collection to the QA test suite so logs are covered end to end
    • Add alarms for fluentd when too little or no log data is sent
    • Implement a staging environment
    • Implement guards against selecting an invalid container runtime
    Lessons

    When a change goes wrong, rolling back to a known working configuration is safer than rushing a fix, which can make the damage worse. Launching new worker nodes depends on the cloud-init script not failing in any way. The QA configuration differed from production, there was no staging environment, the QA tests did not cover fluentd log collection, and the rollover process had no documentation for when it fails.

  3. Symptoms

    Right after a pull request to the infrastructure-as-code repository was merged, every API endpoint of one InfluxDB Cloud production cluster began returning 404 errors. Writes and reads failed alike: no one could collect data, scheduled tasks failed to run and external queries did not work.

    Trigger

    A merged pull request whose rendered YAML added a new Argo CD Application and AppProject that an automation error had named app01-cluster01, the name of the existing production Application, instead of app02-cluster01; reviewers did not notice the app01 and app02 difference.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Monitoring and alerting did not detect the issue right away, so the team's first response was to try to roll the change back rather than plan a recovery. The write-up does not say how the team found out.

    Remediation
    • stopped the revert of the merged pull request
    • restored the etcd metadata cluster
    • recreated the missing Kubernetes objects so the retained PersistentVolumes became available, then recreated the StatefulSets
    • restored the Zookeeper volumes from an hourly Velero backup
    • rebuilt the Kafka StatefulSet one pod at a time with health and readiness checks disabled
    • accepted writes into the Kafka write-ahead log and scaled up the write path with more replicas and higher memory requests and limits
    • recreated the storage pods, which downloaded data from object storage, reindexed it and replayed the write-ahead log
    • re-enabled Argo CD, queries, dashboards and scheduled tasks, restored replica counts and ran final QA checks
    Action items
    • Write runbooks for restoring state when Kubernetes objects such as PersistentVolumeClaims are deleted but the data on the underlying volumes is preserved
    • Set every volume in every environment to retain data when its PersistentVolumeClaim is deleted
    • Improve the process for handling public-facing incidents
    • Store generated YAML as one object per file, so an overwrite of an existing object shows up as such in review
    • Detect duplicate objects when generating YAML and warn before review, treating objects with the same group, namespace and name as the same even when the apiVersion string differs
    • Add the Argo CD Prune=false annotation to all stateful resources and to Namespace objects managed by Argo CD
    • Set FailOnSharedResource=true on Argo CD Applications so Argo CD fails before changing an object another Application manages or managed
    Lessons

    The biggest gap was that monitoring did not notice the deletion quickly, which pushed the team toward a reflex rollback; in a stateful system a revert can create a new, empty instance instead of bringing the old one back. Retained volumes and clients that retry writes are what kept data loss at zero. Rendering many objects into one file let an overwrite of an existing object look like an addition, so generated configuration needs one object per file and duplicate detection that compares objects the way Kubernetes does. Stateful resources need protection from pruning, and that protection must cover their Namespace too, or deleting the namespace removes everything inside it.

  4. Symptoms

    Between the team's 17 November 2021 update and 3 December 2021, the 175B-parameter OPT training run went down and had to be restarted more than 40 times, for hardware, infrastructure and training stability reasons. A hardware fault could stop the run for hours at any time of day, and several did over the Thanksgiving break.

    Trigger

    Nodes in the cloud training cluster failed with ECC errors, and each failure took the training run down.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    During these two weeks the team added monitoring of train.log, GPU burn-in testing to detect memory errors, and automated InfiniBand testing.

    Remediation
    • replaced failed nodes, and later did it through a script
    • added GPU burn-in testing to detect memory errors
    • automated InfiniBand testing
    • added monitoring of train.log
    • debugged the cloud provider's Python API until checkpoint downloads from the blob store worked well enough
    Action items
    • Run an on-call rotation for the training run, with runbooks and tooling for the most common issues, and invite more people to join it
    Lessons

    At this scale cloud hardware failures are certain, and the team concluded that automating the handling of hardware failures is necessary. Without spare nodes and burn-in tests, each failure costs hours and a replacement can bring the same fault back. The team also concluded that cloud infrastructure instability is something to always prepare for, because the customer has no control over the underlying hardware. A checkpoint large enough to need hundreds of multi-gigabyte downloads makes the storage path part of recovery time.

  5. Symptoms

    At 15:35 EST on 11 March 2021 the CircleCI web UI and runner.circleci.com became unavailable. The API, which uses a separate ingress point, stayed reachable, and builds kept running.

    Trigger

    An update deployed to a test Kubernetes cluster also removed Traefik and Calico resources from CircleCI's primary production cluster.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    CircleCI engineers were alerted and began investigating. The status page posted its first notice at 20:45 UTC.

    Remediation
    • restored Traefik in the production cluster
    • restored Calico in the production cluster, after which pods served customer requests again
    Action items
    • Improve network-level documentation and runbooks to cover every layer of the Kubernetes networks
    • Improve monitoring and alerting for the network infrastructure
    • Add guardrails that isolate the production and staging clusters so they cannot interfere with each other
    Lessons

    A deployment path that can reach both a test cluster and production can remove shared networking components from production. When the ingress controller and the CNI are both affected, restoring the ingress alone is not enough: engineers had to find the link between Calico and Traefik and restore Calico before pods served traffic again. Time went to DNS and AWS red herrings because nothing linked the outage to the test deployment; CircleCI's answer is better network runbooks, network alerting and guardrails between clusters.

Check your cluster for this

These 10 cases involve Persistent volumes and stateful sets and Terraform. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause6

Faulty deployment2 cases

  1. IL-0136 A deployment that cleared an internal service's caches at peak traffic sent 20 times the normal load to the Azure OpenAI metadata backend in Sweden Central, and health checks that depended on its database restarted instances in a loop for almost six hours
  2. IL-0086 A deployment meant for a CircleCI test Kubernetes cluster also removed Traefik and Calico resources from the production cluster, taking down the CircleCI UI and runner.circleci.com

Dependency failure2 cases

Organisation
  1. IL-0133 A storm shut down cooling at Nebius's us-central1 data center, and a disk hot-plug bug kept Managed Kubernetes control planes down for hours after power returned
    Nebius2026
  2. IL-0126 The OPT-175B training run restarted more than 40 times in two weeks as cloud GPU nodes failed with ECC errors, replacement nodes came back faulty, and checkpoint downloads hung

Software defect1 case

  1. IL-0150 A latent race condition in DynamoDB's DNS automation left an empty DNS record for dynamodb.us-east-1.amazonaws.com, and the DynamoDB and EC2 launch failures that followed caused EKS, ECS and Fargate container launch failures and cluster scaling delays in us-east-1

Operator error1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0095 An engineer deleted the prod namespace of the LEAP JupyterHub while believing the kubeconfig pointed at a new cluster, and the hub was down for about an hour
    2i2c2025

Capacity exhaustion1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0085 A control plane node of Magic Pages' Kubernetes cluster on Hetzner Cloud ran out of memory, the cluster's own calls then used up the Hetzner API rate limit, and all customer websites were down for about 7.5 hours

Configuration change3 cases

  1. IL-0091 Changing the worker node instance type through Terraform recycled all nodes at once and deleted users' production pods together
  2. IL-0109 A retried node rollover on a DFDS EKS cluster set the Auto Scaling group back to 15 instances, and the default termination policy removed every healthy worker node, leaving the cluster with no nodes
    DFDS2023
  3. IL-0009 A duplicated generated name made Argo CD replace the InfluxDB Cloud production Application and delete the whole production environment