Incident Library
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Cases19 cases

4 to 8 of 19

  1. Symptoms

    From 06:00 UTC on 10 June 2025, Heroku services degraded badly: customers reported intermittent logins, applications failed, and Heroku's monitoring detected widespread errors with dyno networking. Heroku's own tools and the Heroku Status Page were affected as well, which delayed communication with customers and left many of them without accurate status updates. Only at 13:58 UTC did the team find a workaround to post updates to the @herokustatus account on X.

    Trigger

    An automated operating system update ran on Heroku's production infrastructure when it should have been disabled, and it restarted the hosts' networking services.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Customers reported intermittent logins, and Heroku's monitoring detected widespread errors with dyno networking. Heroku's own tools and the Heroku Status Page were affected as well.

    Remediation
    • Restarted internal instances in rotation, which gave some relief
    • Had an upstream vendor invalidate the token used for the automated updates
    • Disabled the automated upgrade service
    • Recycled dynos across the whole fleet
    Action items
    • Put permanent controls in place so no system change happens outside the controlled deployment process
    • Audit all base images for similar risks
    • Make network routing survive graceful restarts of the networking service
    • Build fully independent backup communication channels
    • Overhaul incident response tooling, including tools that run queries across the whole fleet
    • Streamline break-glass procedures for rapid access to critical systems
    • Improve monitoring to detect complex issues earlier
    Lessons

    Heroku's post-mortem names three areas: production lacked immutability controls, so an automated process could change it; communication was too slow, made worse by a status page that went down with the platform; and gaps in tooling and process made recovery take longer than it should have.

  2. Symptoms

    At 20:45 UTC on 28 May 2025, most of Twingate's API traffic started going to a single backend service, which was overwhelmed and returned elevated error rates, so API calls failed widely across core services.

    Trigger

    A rollout that updated the routing rules of Twingate's global load balancer.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The incident was detected at 20:48 UTC, three minutes after API traffic was first misrouted, and triage began.

    Remediation
    • Started a rollback of the routing change at 20:52 UTC; the automated rollback stalled on infrastructure dependencies
    • Applied a manual fix with local tooling at 21:09 UTC, which restored service by 21:14 UTC
    Action items
    • Correct the routing rule
    • Add alerts that detect backend traffic anomalies in lower environments
    • Improve resource scaling thresholds
    • Decouple infrastructure tooling from service dependencies so recovery has faster options
    • Introduce backend sharding to isolate customer workloads and reduce the impact of incidents
  3. Symptoms

    On 2 August 2024, two minutes after Clever Cloud's data team started a minor rolling upgrade of its Apache Pulsar messaging cluster to release 3.3.1, monitoring showed connection problems with the messaging platform. Producing data into the event bus failed, the backlog grew while no new producers or consumers succeeded, and agents on hypervisors, log forwarders on load balancers and deployments were affected. At 10:20 CEST the Pulsar cluster was declared defective.

    Trigger

    At 10:06 CEST the data team began a minor rolling upgrade of Apache Pulsar to release 3.3.1 that also switched on a new balancer for bundle placement: the extensible load manager (loadManagerClassName=org.apache.pulsar.broker.loadbalance.extensions.ExtensibleLoadManagerImpl) with the TransferShedder load shedding strategy instead of the native OverloadShedder.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Monitoring showed connection issues to the messaging platform at 10:08 CEST, two minutes after the upgrade began, and engineers confirmed at 10:09 that producing data into the event bus failed. Monitoring did not catch the first broker's failure to create the system topic, because that broker stayed up.

    Remediation
    • Rolled back the new unload strategy while keeping Pulsar 3.3.1
    • Shut down the client proxies to release the brokers
    • Switched deployment notification events to RabbitMQ as a workaround
    • Stopped all brokers and started only one, which loaded the conflicting system topic so it could be deleted, then started all brokers
    • Restarted the messaging proxies, after which messages flowed again
    • Stopped the watchdog so it would not reload every failed component, and started components one by one
    • Disabled Metrics API ingestion to protect its storage cluster
    • Stopped the long-term storage for observability metrics (the Warp10/FoundationDB cluster) to free resources
    • Put all monitoring instances in all regions into maintenance so they stopped sending events to the orchestrator
    • Killed the overloaded small VMs one by one
    • Flagged 12 hypervisors to drain workload and shut down some load balancers to free CPU and memory
    • Cleaned zombie VMs to speed up recovery
    • Cleared the monitoring alert queue so queued events would not flood the orchestrator
    • Added parked hypervisors to EU-FR-1 to relieve the overloaded ones
    • Removed an overloaded RabbitMQ node from the cluster used by the orchestrator
    • Rolling-restarted every regional L7 load balancer and every L4 load balancer
    • Restarted all HV agents and the add-on provider APIs
    • Destroyed all dangling VMs stuck in the stopping state
    • Re-enabled Metrics API ingestion with a ramp-up QoS policy
    Action items
    • Track KPIs for Pulsar broker and cluster health, hypervisor load, I/O and kernel panic reboots, zombie VMs, RabbitMQ broker and cluster health and deployment queue consumption, each by time of event, detection, decision and resolution
    • Deal with too many monitoring alerts
    • Look at a backup bastion, because a regional bastion is vulnerable
    • Rework the control plane recovery process
    • Rework the correlation between monitoring and orchestration
    • Revisit fault domain separation against multi-tenancy
    • Rethink runtime images and the role of the hypervisor
    • Isolate waved release upgrades of Pulsar
    • Redesign runtime images with better hypervisor integration
    • Regionalise observability for redundancy
    • Set Vector's buffer.max_events and buffer.max_size for small VMs
    • Switch Vector's buffer.type from memory, the default, to disk
    • Change Vector's buffer.when_full from block, the default, to drop_newest
    • Tune journald verbosity and SystemMaxUse on small VMs
    • Add cgroups restrictions for better process control
    • Add I/O restrictions for the VM manager
    • Detect zombie VMs better
    Lessons

    The simulation process that validates non-minor releases was not applied to minor upgrades or to small configuration changes, and this one went straight to production. Running Clever Cloud on Clever Cloud turned into a chicken-and-egg situation: recovery needed the scheduler to carry out large actions while the control plane was itself slowed and the infrastructure had no free resources. Measuring each key indicator by time of event, detection, decision and resolution showed where the team had lacked visibility or reaction and challenged established rules.

  4. Symptoms

    From 1:54 PM ET on 7 September 2023, Square products and services were unavailable, and at 2:02 PM ET engineers were notified of infrastructure issues and began investigating DNS. Square Online websites stayed up, but their customers could not make payments.

    Trigger

    At 11:04 AM ET a host-based firewall rule change was deployed to enable region communication, which increased the size of the firewall rules on nodes. Combined with a DNS service upgrade, it put unexpected load on the internal DNS servers. The timeline also lists a DNS zone change at 1:56 PM ET.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Engineers were notified of infrastructure issues at 2:02 PM ET, eight minutes after services became unavailable.

    Remediation
    • Shed network traffic to the DNS servers and started bringing up new DNS servers by hand
    • Deployed networking changes by hand to re-enable the authorization and access services
    • Deployed the networking changes by hand to all data centers
    • Rebuilt the DNS servers
    • Built a new configuration from the reverted firewall ruleset and pushed it to the DNS hosts
    Action items
    • Move the DNS infrastructure onto isolated infrastructure
    • Add monitoring and optimizations for critical networking infrastructure
    • Optimize dependencies between the deploy and platform infrastructure where feasible
    • Expand support for Offline Mode and improve communication about when it is available
  5. Symptoms

    From 7:30 AM PST on 7 December 2021, AWS services in us-east-1 that communicate between AWS's internal network and its main network saw rising latency and errors. The AWS operations teams lost real-time monitoring data at once, and the first thing found in the logs was elevated internal DNS errors.

    Trigger

    At 7:30 AM PST an automated activity that scales the capacity of one AWS service hosted in the main AWS network triggered unexpected behaviour from a large number of clients inside the internal network.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    The congestion immediately cut off real-time monitoring data for the AWS operations teams, who turned to logs and first identified elevated internal DNS errors.

    Remediation
    • Moved internal DNS traffic away from the congested network paths
    • Isolated the top sources of traffic onto dedicated network devices
    • Disabled some heavy network traffic services, including EventBridge event delivery
    • Brought additional networking capacity online
    • Disabled the automated scaling activities that triggered the event
    Action items
    • Keep the triggering scaling activities off until all remediations are deployed
    • Fix the latent issue that kept networking clients from backing off
    • Deploy network configuration that protects the affected networking devices in a similar congestion event
    • Keep API Gateway servers healthy when the internal network is unavailable and speed up their recycling
    • Release a new Service Health Dashboard that makes service impact easier to understand
    • Run the support system actively across multiple AWS regions
Check your cluster for this

These 19 cases involve Database and Automated capacity manager. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause8

Capacity exhaustion5 cases

  1. IL-0497 Buttondown's database ran out of connections twice in one day and requests failed while health checks mostly passed
  2. IL-0384 Amazon Kinesis front-end servers in US-EAST-1 could not route requests, so Kinesis and services built on it failed
  3. IL-0492 Hosted Graphite's self-hosted load balancers hit their connection limit in an AWS outage, timing out its site and APIs
  4. IL-0333 A downsized RDS PostgreSQL database maxed out its CPU at US peak and failing ELB health checks took buildkite.com down
  5. IL-0282 DynamoDB in US-East reached about 55% request errors as storage servers overloaded its metadata service

Cloud provider outage3 cases

  1. IL-0559 PubNub services degraded in US-East during an AWS outage in the IAD region, and failover load then degraded US-West
    PubNub2025
  2. IL-0284 Workers KV failed 90.22% of requests in a third-party storage outage, breaking Access, WARP and many Cloudflare products
  3. IL-0220 An overloaded AWS Transit Gateway dropped packets on 4 January 2021, and Slack's web tier saturated and went down
    Slack2021

Breaking change in an upgrade1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0227 Most Heroku dynos in Private Spaces lost outbound connectivity after an automated OS update restarted host networking
    Heroku2025

Configuration change4 cases

  1. IL-0543 Twingate API traffic piled onto one backend behind the global load balancer, failing core services for 29 minutes
  2. IL-0285 Clever Cloud's Pulsar brokers stalled in a minor upgrade, then hypervisors overloaded and crashed with kernel panics
  3. IL-0254 Square's internal DNS servers failed and Square products, services and payments were unavailable for about 15 hours
    Square2023
  4. IL-0272 New Cassandra nodes served reads for data they did not hold, so Monzo records looked missing and payments failed
    Monzo2019

Software defect2 cases

  1. IL-0223 A connection surge congested the devices between AWS's internal and main networks in us-east-1, breaking EC2 APIs
  2. IL-0222 Google Cloud US regions had heavy packet loss and some went unreachable after the network control plane was descheduled

Operator error2 cases

  1. IL-0221 A backbone maintenance command disconnected all Facebook data centers, and its DNS servers withdrew their BGP routes
    Meta2021
  2. IL-0534 Amazon S3 in US-EAST-1 could not serve GET, LIST, PUT or DELETE requests for hours while its index subsystem restarted

Faulty deployment1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0229 bunny.net's DNS servers crashed in a loop on a corrupted routing database file and could not fetch a fix from its CDN

Dependency failure1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0273 A power disruption took GitHub's Redis clusters offline, the app could not boot, and GitHub served 503s for 2 hours
    GitHub2016