Cases3 cases

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1. IL-0267 Wikimedia's eqsin cache site went unreachable when both of its transport links to the core data centers were down

   Wikimedia Foundation2023

   Symptoms

   On 10 January 2023 at 16:37 UTC Icinga reported "BGP status on cr3-eqsin is CRITICAL: BGP CRITICAL - AS1299/IPv6: Active - Telia, AS1299/IPv4: Active - Telia", and from 16:45 the hosts in Wikimedia's eqsin site went DOWN with "PING CRITICAL - Packet loss = 100%". Users normally directed to eqsin, mostly in the APAC region, could only read Wikipedia pages already cached in eqsin.

   Network unreachable

   Trigger

   Planned maintenance by the transport provider took down eqsin's second transport link while the first was still down from a long fiber cut.

   Root cause

   Dependency failure

   Component

   Backbone network (WAN)BGP routingCDN and edge network

   Contributing factor

   Single point of failureIgnored early signal

   Detection

   Automated monitoring: Icinga BGP status alerts for cr3-eqsin at 16:37 and cr2-eqsin at 16:44, followed by a flood of host-down alerts and three pages at the same time.

   Remediation

   • Depooled eqsin from DNS
   • Repooled eqsin

   Action items

   • Create a backup GRE tunnel for eqsin (T327265)
   • Ensure the long-down transport link comes back up properly once it is fixed (T322529)
   • Automatically parse maintenance notifications and alert on conflicting maintenance (T230835)

   Lessons

   The site was depooled quickly, and "depool first, investigate later" was the right attitude. A flood of host-down alerts usually means a network problem. eqsin stayed too long on a single working transport link, SREs did not catch that the downtime of the two transport links overlapped, and the provider's planned maintenance was not recorded in a task or reminder.

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2. IL-0255 Basecamp's two redundant links between data centers dropped together and a Redis replica resync loop stalled chat

   37signals2020

   Symptoms

   At 11:59AM CDT on Friday 28 August 2020, Basecamp's Ops team received a flood of alerts from PagerDuty, Nagios and Prometheus. Monitoring showed that the newer of the two metro links between the data centers in Ashburn, VA and Chicago, IL had been lost for about 20-30 seconds, and BC3 kept responding slowly after the link came back.

   Link flappingHigh latencyReplication lag

   Trigger

   Both redundant metro links between Basecamp's Ashburn and Chicago data centers dropped for short periods; monitoring showed the newer link down for about 20-30 seconds.

   Root cause

   Dependency failure

   Component

   Backbone network (WAN)BGP routingIn-memory cacheDatabase replication

   Contributing factor

   Single point of failureRetry stormSignal buried in noise

   Detection

   A flood of alerts from PagerDuty, Nagios and Prometheus, with monitoring showing the lost metro link. A lingering alert for one Redis DB instance later pointed to the replication problem.

   Remediation

   • Turned chat off at the load balancer layer so the rest of BC3 could stabilise
   • Restarted Redis on the replica that was stuck in the resynchronization loop

   Action items

   • Make the documented Redis configuration changes for the known replication issue
   • Make concrete plans to remove the shared physical path under the two metro links
   • Prove the failover systems in production at peak load
   • Make explicit room for post-incident follow-up work and push other work out

   Lessons

   Planned redundancy and live testing had given Basecamp a false sense of security, especially at peak load: moving between redundant network links or shifting load across data centers should work without issue, and Basecamp would rather find out in a controlled test with the full team ready. The follow-up from an outage needs urgency and explicitly cleared time, not just a place on a list.

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3. IL-0358 Packet Public Cloud locations had high latency and unreachable paths from routing loops and blackholed traffic

   Packet2019

   Symptoms

   At about 08:49 UTC on 2 June 2019, Packet's internal network monitoring alerted on serious reachability and performance problems in several of Packet's global datacenter locations. The first investigation found routing loops and traffic being blackholed to specific internal and Internet destinations.

   Network unreachablePacket lossHigh latency

   Trigger

   A trans-continental US backbone link in the network of Packet's upstream provider Zayo had a hardware failure and blackholed IP traffic routed over it.

   Root cause

   Dependency failure

   Component

   Backbone network (WAN)BGP routingNetwork control plane (SDN)

   Contributing factor

   –

   Detection

   Packet's internal network monitoring alerted at 08:49 UTC on reachability issues in several global datacenter locations, and engineers confirmed them at 08:52.

   Remediation

   • Migrated traffic to an alternative network and removed Zayo from the provider mix
   • Applied route filters to return service to normal
   • Optimised specific routing policies to improve latency across the backbone with the new traffic mix

   Action items

   • Expand internal connectivity monitoring and alerting of on-call operations teams
   • Expand network automation and routing so traffic can be balanced across all available backbone paths and an operator can trigger automated re-routes across all Packet datacenters in a major provider incident
   • Make Packet's provisioning systems less dependent on third party network providers and inter-datacenter connectivity

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