Cases29 cases

2 to 6 of 29

1. IL-0102 CoreDNS pods on a production EKS cluster ran out of memory under a burst of new pods, endpoints and nodes, taking down the Buildkite web UI, APIs and job dispatch

   Buildkite2026

   Symptoms

   From 22:47 UTC on 25 August 2026 the Buildkite web interface, REST API, Agent API, job queue and notifications stopped working for every customer. No one could create a build from the UI or the REST API, job dispatch was delayed, and some builds that were already running when the outage began stayed stuck until the services recovered.

   Service outageDNS resolution failuresOOMKilledAutoscaler misbehaviour

   Trigger

   At 22:44 UTC an application deploy created a surge of new pods, which used up the free capacity on the existing nodes and made the EKS cluster scale out. Background worker pools with unusually high maximum replica counts were scaling out at the same time and kept asking for more pods while new nodes were still being provisioned. Together they produced an unusually high rate of change in applications, network endpoints and nodes, and with it a sudden rise in demand on CoreDNS.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   CoreDNSContainer memory limitHorizontal pod autoscalerNode pool

   Contributing factor

   No headroomAutomation amplificationRetry stormMonitoring blind spot

   Detection

   The first status post, at 22:55 UTC, eight minutes after the outage began, said something had gone wrong, and at 23:05 UTC the status page said a sitewide outage was being investigated. CoreDNS query duration had been rising as the cluster grew, but a defect in a key monitoring query and too little monitoring of query volume meant this went unnoticed before the outage.

   Remediation

   • paused further application deploys
   • scaled CoreDNS from three to twelve pods
   • raised each CoreDNS pod's memory limit from 512 MiB to 2 GiB
   • expanded the system node pool that runs CoreDNS

   Action items

   • Increase immediate CoreDNS headroom: twelve pods instead of three, a 2 GiB memory limit instead of 512 MiB, and a larger system node pool
   • Enable EKS-managed CoreDNS autoscaling with a tested minimum replica count and enough capacity to spread the replicas across nodes and availability zones
   • Add direct alerts on CoreDNS query duration, query volume, goroutine growth, memory pressure, OOM restarts and available replicas, and track longer-term trends in capacity planning
   • Find other cluster-critical services that lack tested capacity, direct alerting, spread across failure domains, and either safe autoscaling or documented static headroom, and fix them

   Lessons

   A CoreDNS deployment sized once and left at a fixed size can carry a growing cluster for months and then fail on the first burst of churn it cannot absorb. When query processing slows, pending queries take up memory, the pods hit their limits and restart, and client retries keep the service down after the restart. Server-side DNS query duration and volume need their own alerts: here client-side latency was masked by unrelated application speed-ups, and a broken monitoring query hid the server-side trend. Maximum replica counts raised as a temporary measure remove the cap that normally stops runaway scaling when new nodes are slow to arrive.

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2. IL-0124 Capacity changes queued while a circuit breaker was engaged ran all at once when it was released, taking multiple OpenAI inference engines out of service and raising API error rates

   OpenAI2026

   Symptoms

   Between about 4:26 PM and 4:56 PM PST on 4 March 2026, some OpenAI API requests to several models failed or took longer than usual, and some Codex traffic was affected too. The overall API success rate dropped temporarily.

   High error rateHigh latency

   Trigger

   A protective circuit breaker that had paused some scheduling operations was released, and the infrastructure actions queued during the pause were executed at the same time.

   Root cause

   Software defect

   Component

   Automated capacity manager

   Contributing factor

   Automation amplificationChange with a delayed effectNo safeguard on destructive changeMonitoring blind spot

   Remediation

   • manually reassigned infrastructure resources to the affected models
   • brought the removed inference engines back online and reassigned them until error rates returned to normal

   Action items

   • Improve safeguards in the automated capacity management systems so they detect and respond to state drift
   • Improve observability of circuit breakers and scheduling systems so their status and effects are easier to identify
   • Add safeguards so queued actions cannot run in large batches after long pauses
   • Improve monitoring and alerting around capacity reconciliation problems

   Lessons

   Pausing one automated system does not stop the systems that feed it. Changes queued during the pause reflect the state at the time they were queued, and releasing the queue all at once applies those stale decisions together. The fixes OpenAI names are detecting state drift, making circuit breaker status visible, and preventing large batches from executing after a long pause.

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3. IL-0150 A latent race condition in DynamoDB's DNS automation left an empty DNS record for dynamodb.us-east-1.amazonaws.com, and the DynamoDB and EC2 launch failures that followed caused EKS, ECS and Fargate container launch failures and cluster scaling delays in us-east-1

   Amazon Web Services2025

   Symptoms

   At 11:48 PM PDT on 19 October 2025, every system that reached DynamoDB in us-east-1 through the public regional endpoint started getting DNS failures and could not connect. This included customer traffic and internal AWS services that depend on DynamoDB. DynamoDB global table replicas in other regions still answered but fell behind in replication to and from us-east-1.

   DNS resolution failuresHigh error rateScale-up failureIntermittent connection failuresHigh latency

   Trigger

   One DNS Enactor, slowed by unusually high retry delays, applied a much older DNS plan to the regional DynamoDB endpoint just as another Enactor that had applied the newest plan ran its clean-up, which deleted that older plan and with it every IP address of the endpoint.

   Root cause

   Software defect

   Component

   Authoritative DNS servers and recordsApplication databaseCloud load balancer

   Contributing factor

   Automation amplificationRetry stormNo runbook

   Detection

   DNS failures to DynamoDB began immediately at 11:48 PM PDT and the engineering teams of affected AWS services were engaged at once; by 12:38 AM they had identified DynamoDB's DNS state as the source. The later NLB health check problem was detected by monitoring at 6:52 AM.

   Remediation

   • applied temporary mitigations by 1:15 AM that let some internal services reach DynamoDB and repaired key internal tooling
   • restored all DynamoDB DNS information by 2:25 AM through manual operator intervention
   • throttled incoming work and selectively restarted DWFM hosts from 4:14 AM so droplet leases could be re-established
   • reduced the load on Network Manager to bring network configuration propagation times back to normal by 10:36 AM
   • disabled automatic health check failover for NLB at 9:36 AM, and re-enabled it at 2:09 PM after EC2 recovered
   • relaxed the EC2 request throttles from 11:23 AM until all EC2 APIs and launches were normal at 1:50 PM

   Action items

   • Disable the DynamoDB DNS Planner and DNS Enactor automation worldwide
   • Fix the race condition and add protections against applying incorrect DNS plans before re-enabling the DNS automation
   • Add a velocity control to NLB that limits how much capacity a single load balancer can remove when health check failures cause availability zone failover
   • Build an additional EC2 test suite that exercises the DWFM recovery workflow at scale
   • Improve throttling in EC2 data propagation systems so incoming work is rate limited by the size of the waiting queue

   Lessons

   A single DNS record that automation can empty is enough to take a widely used regional endpoint off the network, and every service built on it fails in turn. A check made once at the start of a long operation can be stale by the time the operation writes its result. Recovery of the dependency is not recovery of the dependents: systems that lost state during the outage, such as EC2's droplet leases and network propagation backlog, can collapse under their own catch-up work, and container services that rely on new instance launches keep failing to launch and scale until that work is done.

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4. IL-0187 A brief Spring Cloud Config Server downtime failed every client application's liveness probe, because the actuator health check included the config server, and Kubernetes restarted the pods in a kill loop

   Yonghyun Kim2025

   Symptoms

   While the Spring Cloud Config Server was briefly down for an upgrade, every client application began to answer its liveness probe with a failure saying it could not reach the config server.

   Probe failuresContainer crash loopService outage

   Trigger

   A downtime upgrade of the Spring Cloud Config Server made it stop responding for a short time.

   Root cause

   Dependency failure

   Component

   Liveness and readiness probes

   Contributing factor

   Unreviewed defaultsAutomation amplificationExcessive blast radius

   Lessons

   A liveness probe that includes an external dependency turns a short outage of that dependency into a restart loop of every client. Keep external dependencies out of liveness checks and handle temporary problems with readiness probes. Libraries can add health indicators to Spring Boot's actuator health endpoint automatically, so check what the probe path actually reports. The author ran another Kubernetes environment for two years without liveness probes, relying on strict readiness probes and on the application terminating itself on unrecoverable faults.

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5. IL-0171 Karpenter node auto-repair replaced EKS GPU nodes about 10 minutes after they became Ready, in a loop, because the Bottlerocket NVIDIA AMI lacked libdcgm.so and set AcceleratedHardwareReady to False

   Inflab2025

   Symptoms

   GPU nodes for an AI video upscaling job were created normally and reached Ready, and then about 10 to 11 minutes later Karpenter treated each one as unhealthy and replaced it. Every new node went the same way, so the GPU pods kept restarting and the upscaling work could not make progress.

   Node recreation loopGPU unavailable

   Trigger

   Enabling Karpenter's node auto-repair feature gate (nodeRepair: true) and then running GPU pods on nodes from the Bottlerocket NVIDIA AMI.

   Root cause

   Software defect

   Component

   KarpenterNode operating system imageGPU driver

   Contributing factor

   Automation amplificationUnverified assumption

   Detection

   The team noticed GPU nodes being replaced repeatedly after running GPU pods, then found the DCGMError message in the node events.

   Remediation

   • Disabled Karpenter node auto-repair by setting the nodeRepair feature gate to false

   Lessons

   Automatic node repair acts on every unhealthy node condition, including AcceleratedHardwareReady, so an image defect that only breaks GPU health monitoring is enough to have every GPU node terminated and recreated in a loop. Before turning on auto-repair, check which conditions it watches and whether the node image reports them correctly. Disabling auto-repair stops the loop at once but is only a temporary measure; installing the missing library or changing the AMI address the cause but cost more on an immutable OS such as Bottlerocket.

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