Incident Library
  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases16 cases

4 to 8 of 16

  1. Symptoms

    GitLab.com showed widespread, erratic behaviour and more 500 errors for about 30 minutes while its redis-sidekiq Redis was down. Alerts in the #production channel began with Redis client errors and spread to error SLO violations on several services, such as the Webservice and API load balancer and Puma.

    Trigger

    The VM of the primary node, redis-sidekiq-03-db-gprd, failed on a GCP host error and was reset and moved to another node.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Several alerts in the #production channel, first Redis client errors and then error SLO violations on several services, such as the Webservice and API load balancer and Puma.

    Remediation
    • Restarted the failed Redis node so Sentinel had enough nodes to elect a primary
    Action items
    • Alert when the Sentinel service is down
    • Make merge requests robust to Redis Sidekiq outages
    Lessons

    An alert on a down Sentinel node would have kept enough nodes up to form a quorum when failover was needed, and could have avoided the incident entirely. Removing a noisy alert earlier may have let the down node go unnoticed.

  2. Symptoms

    On March 16, 2022 at 14:09 UTC, write operations across GitHub stopped working, including git operations, webhooks, pull requests, API requests, issues, GitHub Packages, GitHub Codespaces, GitHub Actions and GitHub Pages. Under peak-hour load, the database proxy in front of the shared mysql1 MySQL database had reached its maximum number of connections.

    Trigger

    Increased load on mysql1 during peak hours, combined with poor query performance in specific circumstances, pushed the database proxy to its maximum number of connections.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • Failed over mysql1 to a healthy replica on March 16
    • Reset the application connections to the new primary on March 17
    • Added an index that fixed the main query performance problem
    • Performed a primary failover on March 22
    • Performed a primary failover on March 23
    • Throttled webhook traffic to reduce load
    Action items
    • Keep throttling webhook traffic at peak load times
    • Audit the load patterns of mysql1 during peak hours and make performance fixes based on the audits
    • Move traffic to other databases to reduce load and speed up failover
    • Review change management, particularly monitoring and changes during high load in production
    • Shard the databases and scale up hardware
  3. Symptoms

    On 10 July 2019 the Stripe API failed a substantial majority of requests twice, from 16:35 to 17:02 UTC and from 21:14 to 22:47 UTC. In the first period automated monitoring detected within a minute that a database cluster had failed to elect a new primary.

    Trigger

    The primary node of a database cluster failed at 16:35 UTC while one shard had several stalled nodes. The second period was set off by rolling the election protocol back to the previous minor version at 20:42 UTC.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Automated monitoring detected the failed election within a minute, and the team was alerted at 16:36 UTC. The second period was announced at 21:14 UTC by automated alerts that some shards in the cluster were unavailable.

    Remediation
    • Restarted all nodes of the database cluster, which forced a successful primary election
    • Updated the production configuration and restarted the database cluster's nodes
    • Ramped traffic back up, putting services for user-initiated API requests first
    Action items
    • Alert when nodes stop reporting their replication lag
    • Alert when a shard enters a state that could trigger the election fault
    • Work with the database maintainers on a fix for the underlying fault
    • Add circuit breaking on failed operations to particular database clusters
    • Use fault isolation to contain the impact of a single failed shard
    • Limit the resources used by clients that keep retrying failed requests
    • Add procedures and tooling that make rapid configuration changes during incident response safer
  4. Symptoms

    At 2:30 am CEST on 3 April 2019, the primary MongoDB server of updown.io started answering queries about 200 times slower than usual, and the website and the monitoring daemons went almost completely down.

    Trigger

    One of the three SSDs in the primary MongoDB server's RAID5 array began to fail, slowing the server's IO without taking the server down.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    –
    Detection

    The founder, who was asleep when the slowdown began, noticed the problem at 8:45 am CEST and found the IO performance issue by inspecting the primary server.

    Remediation
    • Forced the primary to step down after making sure the secondary was ready to take over
    • Took the failing SSD out of the RAID array, which restored the old primary's performance
    • Asked the hosting provider to replace the SSD
    • Replaced the less powerful secondary with a more powerful server
    Action items
    • Write a script that detects when MongoDB is up but not responsive and forces a step-down automatically
    • Shut down and delete the old secondary once nothing is left to investigate on it
    • Make sure the new secondary can run as primary for several days
    • Test the automatic step-down script once the primary server is healthy again
    • Provide a proper status page for updown.io
    • Replace the custom script with MongoDB's Storage Node Watchdog
  5. Symptoms

    At 22:54 UTC on 21 October 2018 GitHub's internal monitoring started alerting on many faults at once. By 23:02 UTC the first responders saw that the replication topologies of many MySQL clusters were in an unexpected state: the Orchestrator API showed topologies made only of servers in the US West Coast data center. When connectivity came back, the application tier had immediately started sending writes to the new West Coast primaries.

    Trigger

    At 22:52 UTC on 21 October, routine maintenance to replace failing 100G optical equipment cut connectivity between GitHub's US East Coast network hub and its primary US East Coast data center for 43 seconds.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    GitHub's internal monitoring raised alerts on numerous faults at 22:54 UTC, two minutes after the partition. By 23:02 UTC the first responders had found, by querying the Orchestrator API, that many database clusters had a topology with only US West Coast servers.

    Remediation
    • Locked the internal deployment tooling to stop further changes
    • Paused webhook delivery and GitHub Pages builds to stop jobs writing metadata
    • Restored the affected MySQL clusters from backups into the US East Coast data center and let them replicate from the West Coast
    • Found ways to restore directly from the West Coast to get around the throughput limits of downloading from off-site storage
    • Moved all database primaries back to the US East Coast data center
    • Spread read traffic over additional MySQL read replicas in the US East Coast public cloud so replication could catch up
    • Failed over to the original topology once the replicas were in sync
    • Processed the backlog of webhook events and Pages builds, pausing to raise an internal TTL after about 200,000 webhook payloads were dropped
    Action items
    • Reconcile the writes from the captured MySQL binary logs that were not replicated, automatically where possible and with user outreach otherwise
    • Make sure status updates can be published even when GitHub Pages builds are paused
    • Give more accurate public estimates of the time to repair
    • Configure Orchestrator so it cannot promote database primaries across regional boundaries
    • Move to a status reporting mechanism that shows the status of each component of the platform
    • Serve GitHub traffic from multiple data centers in an active/active/active design with N+1 redundancy at the facility level
    • Test assumptions about the system more proactively
    • Validate failure scenarios systematically, with investment in fault injection and chaos engineering tooling
    Lessons

    Orchestrator did what it was configured to do, but the application tier could not work with primaries on the other side of the country: leader election within one region is generally safe, while the sudden cross-country latency was a major contributing factor. The behaviour emerged from a partition larger than any GitHub had seen. Replication caught up along a power decay curve, not a straight line, so the linear estimates of recovery time were wrong. GitHub concluded that tighter operational controls and faster response are not enough on their own and that failure scenarios have to be validated before they happen.

Check your cluster for this

These 16 cases involve Database and Database failover manager. kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause9

Software defect4 cases

  1. IL-0310 An Aurora PostgreSQL failover to an upsized reader reversed twice and backend writes failed in read-only transactions
  2. IL-0241 A database shard could not elect a new primary, and the Stripe API failed most requests in two periods on one day
    Stripe2019
  3. IL-0388 A Google Cloud live migration took a Discord Redis primary offline, and the failover broke API instances and then guilds
  4. IL-0303 GitHub's MySQL master failed over to a node with a cold buffer pool during a schema migration and GitHub.com went down
    GitHub2012

Capacity exhaustion3 cases

  1. IL-0544 Wasabi's database cache stopped responding when its queueing service filled up, and S3 failed in all regions
    Wasabi2024
  2. IL-0302 Peak load on GitHub's mysql1 MySQL cluster maxed out its database proxy's connections and stopped writes in March 2022
    GitHub2022
  3. IL-0320 Postmark's primary MySQL disk filled but MySQL kept running, so MySQL-MMM never failed over and sending was delayed

Configuration change1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0367 Azure Storage in Central US rejected VM disk I/O, taking down VMs and the SQL Database and Cosmos DB services on them

Cloud provider outage2 cases

Organisation
  1. IL-0291 GitLab.com's redis-sidekiq Sentinel could not elect a primary after a GCP host error, so Sidekiq was down for 30 minutes
    GitLab2023
  2. IL-0588 AppOptics metrics APIs returned 5xx as Kafka partitions stayed leaderless after an AWS power event hit their ZooKeeper

Hardware failure2 cases

  1. IL-0289 A failing SSD made updown.io's primary MongoDB about 200 times slower, no failover happened and the site went down
  2. IL-0219 GoCardless's API and Dashboard failed every request for 1 hour 50 minutes when Pacemaker did not promote a replica

DNS or network fault1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0210 GitHub's MySQL clusters failed over to the US West Coast and the site served slow, stale, inconsistent data for 24 hours
    GitHub2018

unknown1 case

Component
Contributing factor
Organisation
  1. IL-0335 A bugcheck in the primary SQL Server put the Stack Exchange network into read-only mode and then offline for 12 minutes

Faulty deployment1 case

Contributing factor
Organisation
  1. IL-0278 A weekly update put a Redis Cloud management process into an infinite loop, and most nodes of a GCP cluster failed
    Redis2016

Operator error1 case

  1. IL-0337 EBS volumes in one US East Availability Zone got stuck after a network change cut EBS nodes off from their replicas