Cases13 cases

1 to 5 of 13

1. IL-0100 PostHog's feature flags pods were packed onto Kubernetes nodes that were too small for their CPU requests, and CPU saturation above 90% caused three outages in ten days through Redis overload, connection pool exhaustion and slow queries

   PostHog2025

   Symptoms

   On 21 October 2025 at 21:45 UTC a change to timeout handling was deployed to the feature flags service, and two minutes later automated monitoring reported higher error rates. The change was rolled back by 21:49, but error rates stayed high: about 38% of flag evaluation requests in the US datacenter returned errors. At 22:30 Redis metrics showed memory exhaustion on ElastiCache, at 22:35 Postgres connections spiked, and at 22:45 the team found a massive data transfer from Postgres into Redis. The main PostHog application was affected as well, because it shares the Redis instance with the flags service.

   Sustained high node CPUHigh error rateHigh latencyContainer crash loopDatabase overload

   Trigger

   On 21 October a deployment meant to reduce timeout errors (PR #39821); on 24 October the deployment of IP-based rate limiting (PR #40074) that saw all traffic as coming from the load balancer's IP; on 28 October an unrelated routine deployment that rolled the feature flag pods in the US region.

   Root cause

   Capacity exhaustion

   Component

   Node poolPod scheduling and placementIn-memory cacheApplication database

   Contributing factor

   No alert on limitRetry stormIneffective rollbackSingle point of failureNo staged rolloutUnrepresentative staging

   Detection

   On 21 October automated monitoring detected higher error rates two minutes after the deploy. On 24 October no alert existed for 429 errors, and the team learned of the incident from customer reports that began at 18:10 UTC, a 62-minute detection delay. On 28 October on-call received a high error count alert. On 29 October the incident was reported with higher error rates and latency. No alert existed for CPU pressure, so the CPU saturation behind all three incidents was not seen directly.

   Remediation

   • rolled back the timeout handling change within 2 minutes on 21 October, which did not stop the errors
   • throttled connections and Redis writes on 21 October
   • halted the rollout on 28 October, scaled the US flags pods to zero until Redis recovered, then scaled them back gradually
   • rolled back hardware changes on 30 October at 00:03 UTC, which removed most errors but not the latency
   • increased the pod resource requests and adjusted the Kubernetes fleet size so fewer pods ran on each node
   • added retry limits to Envoy between the load balancer and the service
   • moved database connection timeouts and other critical settings to runtime configuration and raised the timeout values
   • added per-node and per-pod CPU alerts at 80% sustained for 5 minutes that page on-call

   Action items

   • Form a strike team from the flags, ingestion and infrastructure teams to review the application and infrastructure for remaining bottlenecks
   • Investigate separating the flags Redis instance from the application Redis instance
   • Before re-enabling ArgoCD sync, align the flags service chart configuration with the values in ArgoCD and define the deployment and Redis strategy
   • Make the feature flags team hard code-owners for flags-related code
   • Build a dashboard of key flag metrics with runbook links and update the feature flag runbooks
   • Add missing alerts on existing service and infrastructure metrics
   • Make readiness checks validate dependencies that degrade under load, for example by pinging the database
   • Rate-limit cache population so it cannot overwhelm Redis
   • Monitor connection pools with automatic throttling near exhaustion and limit concurrent connections
   • Build a production-scale load testing framework
   • Build progressive rollout infrastructure to limit blast radius
   • Document Postgres-to-Redis data flows and write runbooks for data transfer storms

   Lessons

   Nodes that are small relative to pod requests let the scheduler pack many pods on each node, and the resulting CPU saturation showed up three different ways: excessive parallelism, connection pool exhaustion and slow queries. Treating each symptom separately let the problem return; right-sizing the pods and nodes fixed all three. CPU must be alerted on from the start. Unbounded Envoy retries and unbounded cache population amplified the overload, and a Redis instance shared with the main application spread a flags problem to the main application. A rollback did not end the incident, because the data transfer and resource exhaustion it had started kept running.

   View case
2. IL-0122 An invalid value in a configuration shared by several ChatGPT services put pods into crash loops and raised error rates

   OpenAI2025

   Symptoms

   From 7:43 PM to 8:38 PM PDT on July 15, 2025, a small percentage of ChatGPT users saw more errors in their conversations.

   Container crash loopHigh error rate

   Trigger

   An internal engineer applied a configuration change that contained an invalid value.

   Root cause

   Configuration change

   Component

   –

   Contributing factor

   Excessive blast radiusNo staged rollout

   Remediation

   • reverted the configuration to the correct value
   • started a rolling restart of the affected pods to force them to resynchronise

   Action items

   • Roll out future critical configuration changes for the service to a single cluster first, with automated health guards that stop the rollout if availability drops
   • Move to a service-specific configuration value instead of one shared between services
   • Improve deployment safeguards

   View case
3. IL-0120 A daily scheduled OS update restarted systemd-networkd on cloud-hosted GPU nodes, which conflicted with OpenAI's networking agent and removed all routes, cutting capacity for ChatGPT and the API

   OpenAI2025

   Symptoms

   At 11:36 PM PDT on 9 June, alerts fired across multiple OpenAI services as a large number of cloud-hosted GPU nodes lost network connectivity, and the engineering team was escalated to immediately. Losing those nodes cut the capacity available to serve ChatGPT and the API.

   High error rateGPU unavailable

   Trigger

   A routine daily scheduled update of the host operating system on the cloud-hosted GPU servers restarted systemd-networkd on the affected nodes.

   Root cause

   Breaking change in an upgrade

   Component

   systemd-networkdNode operating system image

   Contributing factor

   No staged rolloutLimited debug access

   Detection

   Alerts fired immediately across multiple services when the infrastructure began losing network connectivity at 11:36 PM PDT, and the engineering team was escalated to at once.

   Remediation

   • re-imaged the affected GPU virtual machines
   • deployed recovery automation to restart the remaining impacted nodes
   • halted the background update mechanisms on the GPU VMs

   Action items

   • Disable automatic daily updates on GPU VMs so updates run in a controlled, scheduled way
   • Update system configurations to prevent conflicts between systemd-networkd and the networking service
   • Audit VM configurations across the fleet to find and reduce similar risks
   • Improve recovery speed for critical infrastructure such as GPU VMs and clusters
   • Run regular disaster recovery drills

   Lessons

   An unattended operating system update that restarts systemd-networkd can wipe the routes another networking agent manages, and it hits every node that takes the update at about the same time. Without break-glass tooling to restore connectivity, nodes that lost their network had to be re-imaged, which stretched recovery over many hours.

   View case
4. IL-0079 A GKE node auto-upgrade to an ubuntu_containerd image with a kernel regression left kube-proxy unable to apply its ip6tables rules, so load balancer health checks failed and several clusters lost all ingress traffic

   Altinity2025

   Symptoms

   On a Saturday, an OpsGenie alert fired for a ClickHouse cluster in Altinity.Cloud that had gone silent: no queries, no metrics, and no logs from customers trying to connect. The pods were running and the nodes looked healthy, but no traffic reached the database. Other clusters soon showed the same thing, and external access was blocked across several GKE clusters.

   Service outage

   Trigger

   GKE automatically upgraded worker nodes to the ubuntu_containerd image 1.32.3-gke.1785003, which ships kernel 6.8.0-1022-gke.

   Root cause

   Breaking change in an upgrade

   Component

   kube-proxyNode operating system imageLinux kernelCloud load balancer

   Contributing factor

   Unpatched known bugNo staged rollout

   Detection

   An OpsGenie alert fired when one ClickHouse cluster stopped receiving queries, metrics and customer connection logs.

   Remediation

   • added maintenance exceptions to pause all upgrades on the GKE clusters that were not yet affected
   • changed the load balancer health check policy to ignore failed kube-proxy health checks, so traffic flowed to the nodes again
   • began migrating the affected clusters from the ubuntu_containerd to the cos_containerd node image by recreating nodes

   Action items

   • Expand image pre-testing pipelines to catch regressions earlier
   • Enable notifications for upcoming GKE auto-upgrades
   • Make GKE maintenance windows required across the fleet to control when upgrades roll out
   • Track Google's issue and wait for a patched Ubuntu image

   Lessons

   A managed node upgrade can break kube-proxy in a way that leaves pods and nodes looking healthy while the load balancer sends nothing, because the load balancer health check depends on kube-proxy. kube-proxy's own logs showed the cause. Altinity recommends that GKE users on ubuntu_containerd restore traffic by switching to externalTrafficPolicy: Cluster, which disables the kube-proxy health check in the load balancer, move production workloads to cos_containerd, and pause auto-upgrades where possible until a patched image has been confirmed and tested.

   View case
5. IL-0192 A Crossplane composition merge-policy change for a TLS policy update switched Kubernetes Services from LoadBalancer to ClusterIP and deleted the load balancers behind about 25% of Grafana Cloud services

   Grafana Labs2025

   Symptoms

   At 08:41 UTC on 18 February 2025, several Grafana Labs application teams noticed that some of their endpoints were no longer available. The investigation quickly found that the load balancers for those endpoints were gone.

   Service outageResources deleted

   Trigger

   A change to the merge policy of a Crossplane composition, made so that the default TLS policy of the load balancers could be overridden, was applied to development, staging and production at the same time.

   Root cause

   Configuration change

   Component

   Configuration templatingCloud load balancer

   Contributing factor

   Unverified assumptionNo staged rolloutExcessive blast radiusNo safeguard on destructive change

   Detection

   Application teams noticed at 08:41 UTC that some of their endpoints were no longer available.

   Remediation

   • rolled back the Crossplane composition change
   • recreated the affected Kubernetes Services so that Kubernetes recreated their load balancers

   Action items

   • Add a CI check that blocks a deployment to more than one wave, so any exception to the dev, staging, canary, production order is caught
   • Give higher priority to a more sophisticated wave design that was already under discussion
   • Enable deletion protection on the load balancers, one layer below Crossplane
   • Enable deletion protection on other critical cloud provider resources
   • Develop the Crossplane Managed Resources exporter for change validation and visibility, now in beta testing within Platform engineering; simulated against the change that caused this outage, it shows a clear diff
   • Complete and test support for reconfiguring the TLS policy so application teams can deploy it

   Lessons

   A change that looked small and low-risk had a side effect that only a full end-to-end test through Crossplane and the cloud provider's load balancer controller would have shown; seeing the intended override work was not that test. Staged rollout and blast-radius limits that exist only as process can be skipped, so Grafana Labs moved to enforce waves in CI and to add deletion protection on the load balancers themselves, beneath the Crossplane layer.

   View case

By root cause4