Incident Library
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  • Root cause
  • Component
  • Symptom
  • Contributing factor
  • Case

Cases12 cases

2 to 6 of 12

  1. Symptoms

    On 15 January 2026, network services for VMware-based Private Clouds in IONOS Cloud's Berlin location stopped working: customers lost management VPN access and traffic to and from their virtual machines. Inside IONOS, several management interfaces in the Berlin region could no longer be reached.

    Trigger

    During a planned maintenance window to add a new VLAN to the management devices, a human error in the command replaced the existing VLANs on the trunk between the core and management devices instead of adding to them, so only the new VLAN stayed active.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • Restarted the affected storage services in the final stage of recovery, which caused a brief second outage
    Action items
    • Audit the management device architecture to segment it better (target Q3 2026)
    • Evaluate and implement ways to prevent unintended VLAN changes, such as improved configuration safeguards or automation scripts (target Q1 2026)
  2. Symptoms

    On 18 October 2024, from 7:50 to 8:01 UTC, about 25% of the hypervisors in Scaleway's FR-PAR-1 availability zone lost VPC connectivity with the rest of the region, and products that use VPC failed with them. Public internet connectivity and Elastic Metal VPC connectivity were not affected.

    Trigger

    At 6:20 UTC a Top of Rack switch in FR-PAR-1 had a software crash. One of the two BGP route reflectors for VPC ran on a hypervisor in that rack and was left in an abnormal state.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Health-check monitoring on both route reflectors detected the anomaly, and the Scaleway Customer Excellence and SRE teams detected the customer impact and opened an incident.

    Remediation
    • Fixed both VPC route reflectors by manual action
    Action items
    • Fixed the autohealing mechanism that had failed to fix route reflectors stuck in a stale state; the fix is https://github.com/FRRouting/frr/pull/17163
    • Run different software versions on the route reflectors so a single bug cannot stop several instances
    • Investigate the software issue that left the route reflectors in a stale state
  3. Symptoms

    From 15:22 US/Pacific on 16 May 2024, new VMs and other new instances across Google Cloud came up without network programming, so the new instances could not open network connections, and VMs that were migrated or restarted lost connectivity. Changes to virtual network configuration, such as firewall rules and load balancers, were not applied. Internal monitoring alerted Google engineers at 15:41.

    Trigger

    Google's infrastructure team ran a routine maintenance action meant to shut down one unused VPC Controller in a single Google Cloud zone, and the automation shut down VPC controllers in all zones where the controllers were still in use.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Internal monitoring alerts reached Google engineers at 15:41 US/Pacific, and the investigation started immediately.

    Remediation
    • Paused maintenance operations to prevent the shutdown from repeating
    • Brought the affected VPC Controllers back into a serving state in every zone
    • Stopped the automation responsible for the shutdown until safeguards are in place
    • Recovered partial Apigee proxy deployments by hand
    • Cleaned up VMs left behind by failed Dataproc cluster deletions
    Action items
    • Add safety measures that check that maintenance operations carry correctly scoped zone information
    • Make the underlying tools reject maintenance operations that do not specify zones
    • Tighten on-demand access control so one maintenance invocation cannot work across multiple zones
    • Add safety checks, testing and validation for maintenance operations, including positive and negative test cases for the new safety measures
  4. Symptoms

    On 5 October 2023 in us-central1, newly created VMs waited a long time before their networking worked, and VMs that had been live migrated lost connectivity for a long time after the migration. Networking telemetry showed cross-region packet loss to and from us-central1 from 03:08 US/Pacific. Health check state of VMs reached load balancers late.

    Trigger

    A management plane behaviour change, meant to decouple the processing of API updates to Instance Groups and Network Endpoint Groups used as load balancer backends, was deployed in us-central1 after rolling out to several other regions without incident.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Detection

    Engineers were alerted to slowness in the virtual network control plane in us-central1 at 21:45 US/Pacific on 4 October, before the packet loss started, and to controller failures from memory exhaustion at 02:11 on 5 October. Networking telemetry showed cross-region packet loss from 03:08.

    Remediation
    • Increased the memory allocated to the virtual network router controllers
    • Rolled back the management plane change in us-central1
    • Restarted by hand the routers that were still not accepting updates
    Action items
    • Alert proactively on memory risks and unexpected memory increases
    • Refactor the deployment configuration so engineers can reallocate memory much faster
    • Re-evaluate existing practices and add safety mechanisms for API reconciliation
    • Make management plane changes more visible across teams so the changes can be correlated faster
    • Adjust the deployment footprint so a regional API change is less likely to exhaust memory across the region at once
    • Optimise memory use in the traffic routers and their controllers
  5. Symptoms

    From 09:55 UTC on 9 August 2023, DigitalOcean's AMS3, LON1 and SFO2 datacenters lost Internet access in waves of 10 to 15 minutes, about an hour apart. Users saw connectivity issues, latency and timeout errors on Droplets and on Droplet-based services such as Load Balancers, Kubernetes and Database clusters.

    Trigger

    The edge routers received an RPKI-related routing update, and the operating system software on them crashed its routing process on that update.

    Root cause
    Component
    Contributing factor
    Remediation
    • Rolled out a software update to the edge routers running the affected version, site by site
    • Rebalanced traffic on the congested routes between AMS3 and FRA1
    • Rolled out the fix to the redundant networking equipment so a failover would not hit the bug
    Action items
    • Upgrade all global edge routers to remove the bug
    • Bring the network upgrades already done in Asia to Europe and North America
Check your cluster for this

These 12 cases involve BGP routing and Network control plane (SDN). kubegap audits a Kubernetes cluster for gaps like these, read-only, from Claude Code or Codex; its checks cite public reports like the ones in this library.

By root cause5

Capacity exhaustion1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0350 Hosts in an IONOS TXL cluster lost connectivity when an InfiniBand fabric resweep failed on a full multicast table

Operator error2 cases

  1. IL-0349 IONOS Private Cloud in Berlin lost management access, storage and VM internet routing after a VLAN change
  2. IL-0337 EBS volumes in one US East Availability Zone got stuck after a network change cut EBS nodes off from their replicas

Software defect5 cases

  1. IL-0347 About 25% of Scaleway FR-PAR-1 hypervisors lost VPC connectivity when both VPC BGP route reflectors got stuck
  2. IL-0529 New Google Cloud VMs and other instances came up without network connectivity in all zones after VPC controllers stopped
  3. IL-0342 DigitalOcean's AMS3, LON1 and SFO2 data centers lost Internet connectivity in repeated waves as edge routers failed
  4. IL-0222 Google Cloud US regions had heavy packet loss and some went unreachable after the network control plane was descheduled
  5. IL-0396 New or live-migrated GCE instances, VPN tunnels and network load balancers were unreachable on public IPs for over 2h

Faulty deployment1 case

Organisation
  1. IL-0530 Virtual router controllers in us-central1 ran out of memory in a loop, cutting networking for new and migrated VMs

Configuration change3 cases

  1. IL-0225 An IGP purge command made every Microsoft WAN router recompute routes, causing global latency, timeouts and packet loss
  2. IL-0539 KT's internet service failed nationwide for about 89 minutes as wrong routes spread from one router in Busan
    KT2021
  3. IL-0228 IPv4 routing across OVHcloud's global network broke after a router change put the full internet routing table into OSPF